package store

// TODO - DeviceId - What about clients that lie about deviceId? Maybe require a certain format to make sure it gives a real value? Something it wouldn't come up with by accident.

import (
	"database/sql"
	"errors"
	"fmt"
	"log"
	"time"

	"github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3"

	"lbryio/lbry-id/auth"
	"lbryio/lbry-id/wallet"
)

var (
	ErrDuplicateToken       = fmt.Errorf("Token already exists for this user and device")
	ErrNoTokenForUserDevice = fmt.Errorf("Token does not exist for this user and device")
	ErrNoTokenForUser       = fmt.Errorf("Token does not exist for this user")

	ErrDuplicateWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet already exists for this user")

	ErrNoWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet does not exist for this user")

	ErrUnexpectedWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet unexpectedly exist for this user")
	ErrWrongSequence    = fmt.Errorf("Wallet could not be updated to this sequence")

	ErrDuplicateEmail   = fmt.Errorf("Email already exists for this user")
	ErrDuplicateAccount = fmt.Errorf("User already has an account")

	ErrWrongCredentials = fmt.Errorf("No match for email and/or password")
	ErrNotVerified      = fmt.Errorf("User account is not verified")
)

const (
	AuthTokenLifespan   = time.Hour * 24 * 14
	VerifyTokenLifespan = time.Hour * 24 * 2
)

// For test stubs
type StoreInterface interface {
	SaveToken(*auth.AuthToken) error
	GetToken(auth.AuthTokenString) (*auth.AuthToken, error)
	SetWallet(auth.UserId, wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac) error
	GetWallet(auth.UserId) (wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac, error)
	GetUserId(auth.Email, auth.Password) (auth.UserId, error)
	CreateAccount(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed, auth.VerifyTokenString) error
	UpdateVerifyTokenString(auth.Email, auth.VerifyTokenString) error
	VerifyAccount(auth.VerifyTokenString) error
	ChangePasswordWithWallet(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed, wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac) error
	ChangePasswordNoWallet(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed) error
	GetClientSaltSeed(auth.Email) (auth.ClientSaltSeed, error)
}

type Store struct {
	db *sql.DB
}

func (s *Store) Init(fileName string) {
	db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+fileName+"?_foreign_keys=on")
	if err != nil {
		log.Fatal(err)
	}
	s.db = db
}

func (s *Store) Migrate() error {
	// We use the `sequence` field for transaction safety. For instance, let's
	// say two different clients are trying to update the sequence from 5 to 6.
	// The update command will specify "WHERE sequence=5". Only one of these
	// commands will succeed, and the other will get back an error.

	// We use AUTOINCREMENT against the protestations of people on the Internet
	// who claim that INTEGER PRIMARY KEY automatically has autoincrment, and
	// that using it when it's not "strictly needed" uses extra resources. But
	// without AUTOINCREMENT, it might reuse primary keys if a row is deleted and
	// re-added. Who wants that risk? Besides, we'll switch to Postgres when it's
	// time to scale anyway.

	// We use UNIQUE on auth_tokens.token so that we can retrieve it easily and
	// identify the user (and I suppose the uniqueness provides a little extra
	// security in case we screw up the random generator). However the primary
	// key should still be (user_id, device_id) so that a device's row can be
	// updated with a new token.
	query := `
		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_tokens(
			token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
			user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
			device_id TEXT NOT NULL,
			scope TEXT NOT NULL,
			expiration DATETIME NOT NULL,
			CHECK (
			  -- should eventually fail for foreign key constraint instead
			  device_id <> '' AND

			  token <> '' AND
			  scope <> '' AND

			  -- Don't know when it uses either format to denote UTC
			  expiration <> "0001-01-01 00:00:00+00:00" AND
			  expiration <> "0001-01-01 00:00:00Z"

			),
			PRIMARY KEY (user_id, device_id)
			FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES accounts(user_id)
		);
		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS wallets(
			user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
			encrypted_wallet TEXT NOT NULL,
			sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
			hmac TEXT NOT NULL,
			PRIMARY KEY (user_id)
			FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES accounts(user_id)
			CHECK (
			  encrypted_wallet <> '' AND
			  hmac <> '' AND
			  sequence <> 0
			)
		);
		CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS accounts(
			normalized_email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
			email TEXT NOT NULL,
			key TEXT NOT NULL,
			client_salt_seed TEXT NOT NULL,
			server_salt TEXT NOT NULL,
			verify_token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE, -- will query by token when verifying
			verify_expiration DATETIME,
			user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
			CHECK (
			  email <> '' AND
			  normalized_email <> '' AND
			  key <> '' AND
			  client_salt_seed <> '' AND
			  server_salt <> ''
			)
		);
	`

	_, err := s.db.Exec(query)
	return err
}

////////////////
// Auth Token //
////////////////

// TODO - Is it safe to assume that the owner of the token is legit, and is
// coming from the legit device id? No need to query by userId and deviceId
// (which I did previously)?
//
// TODO Put the timestamp in the token to avoid duplicates over time. And/or just use a library! Someone solved this already.
func (s *Store) GetToken(token auth.AuthTokenString) (authToken *auth.AuthToken, err error) {
	expirationCutoff := time.Now().UTC()

	authToken = &(auth.AuthToken{})

	err = s.db.QueryRow(
		"SELECT token, user_id, device_id, scope, expiration FROM auth_tokens WHERE token=? AND expiration>?", token, expirationCutoff,
	).Scan(
		&authToken.Token,
		&authToken.UserId,
		&authToken.DeviceId,
		&authToken.Scope,
		&authToken.Expiration,
	)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		err = ErrNoTokenForUserDevice
	}
	if err != nil {
		authToken = nil
	}
	return
}

func (s *Store) insertToken(authToken *auth.AuthToken, expiration time.Time) (err error) {
	_, err = s.db.Exec(
		"INSERT INTO auth_tokens (token, user_id, device_id, scope, expiration) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
		authToken.Token, authToken.UserId, authToken.DeviceId, authToken.Scope, expiration,
	)

	var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
	if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
		// I initially expected to need to check for ErrConstraintUnique.
		// Maybe for psql it will be?
		if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintPrimaryKey) {
			err = ErrDuplicateToken
		}
	}

	return
}

func (s *Store) updateToken(authToken *auth.AuthToken, experation time.Time) (err error) {
	res, err := s.db.Exec(
		"UPDATE auth_tokens SET token=?, expiration=?, scope=? WHERE user_id=? AND device_id=?",
		authToken.Token, experation, authToken.Scope, authToken.UserId, authToken.DeviceId,
	)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if numRows == 0 {
		err = ErrNoTokenForUserDevice
	}
	return
}

func (s *Store) SaveToken(token *auth.AuthToken) (err error) {
	// TODO: For psql, do upsert here instead of separate insertToken and updateToken functions
	//       Actually it may even be available for SQLite?
	//       But not for wallet, it probably makes sense to keep that separate because of the sequence variable

	// TODO - Should we auto-delete expired tokens?

	expiration := time.Now().UTC().Add(AuthTokenLifespan)

	// This is most likely not the first time calling this function for this
	// device, so there's probably already a token in there.
	err = s.updateToken(token, expiration)

	if err == ErrNoTokenForUserDevice {
		// If we don't have a token already saved, insert a new one:
		err = s.insertToken(token, expiration)

		if err == ErrDuplicateToken {
			// By unlikely coincidence, a token was created between trying `updateToken`
			// and trying `insertToken`. At this point we can safely `updateToken`.
			// TODO - reconsider this - if one client has two concurrent requests
			// that create this situation, maybe the second one should just fail?
			err = s.updateToken(token, expiration)
		}
	}
	if err == nil {
		token.Expiration = &expiration
	}
	return
}

////////////
// Wallet //
////////////

func (s *Store) GetWallet(userId auth.UserId) (encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet, sequence wallet.Sequence, hmac wallet.WalletHmac, err error) {
	err = s.db.QueryRow(
		"SELECT encrypted_wallet, sequence, hmac FROM wallets WHERE user_id=?",
		userId,
	).Scan(
		&encryptedWallet,
		&sequence,
		&hmac,
	)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		err = ErrNoWallet
	}
	return
}

func (s *Store) insertFirstWallet(
	userId auth.UserId,
	encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
	hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
) (err error) {
	// This will only be used to attempt to insert the first wallet (sequence=1).
	//   The database will enforce that this will not be set if this user already
	//   has a wallet.
	_, err = s.db.Exec(
		"INSERT INTO wallets (user_id, encrypted_wallet, sequence, hmac) VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
		userId, encryptedWallet, 1, hmac,
	)

	var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
	if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
		// I initially expected to need to check for ErrConstraintUnique.
		// Maybe for psql it will be?
		if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintPrimaryKey) {
			// NOTE While ErrDuplicateWallet makes sense in the context of trying to insert,
			// SetWallet, which also handles update, translates this to ErrWrongSequence
			err = ErrDuplicateWallet
		}
	}

	return
}

func (s *Store) updateWalletToSequence(
	userId auth.UserId,
	encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
	sequence wallet.Sequence,
	hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
) (err error) {
	// This will be used for wallets with sequence > 1.
	// Use the database to enforce that we only update if we are incrementing the sequence.
	// This way, if two clients attempt to update at the same time, it will return
	// an error for the second one.
	res, err := s.db.Exec(
		"UPDATE wallets SET encrypted_wallet=?, sequence=?, hmac=? WHERE user_id=? AND sequence=?",
		encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac, userId, sequence-1,
	)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if numRows == 0 {
		// NOTE While ErrNoWallet makes sense in the context of trying to update,
		// SetWallet, which also handles insert, translates this to ErrWrongSequence
		err = ErrNoWallet
	}
	return
}

// Assumption: Sequence has been validated (>=1)
func (s *Store) SetWallet(userId auth.UserId, encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet, sequence wallet.Sequence, hmac wallet.WalletHmac) (err error) {
	if sequence == 1 {
		// If sequence == 1, the client assumed that this is our first
		// wallet. Try to insert. If we get a conflict, the client
		// assumed incorrectly and we proceed below to return the latest
		// wallet from the db.
		err = s.insertFirstWallet(userId, encryptedWallet, hmac)
		if err == ErrDuplicateWallet {
			// A wallet already exists. That means the input sequence should not be 1.
			// To the caller, this means the sequence was wrong.
			err = ErrWrongSequence
		}
	} else {
		// If sequence > 1, the client assumed that it is replacing wallet
		// with sequence - 1. Explicitly try to update the wallet with
		// sequence - 1. If we updated no rows, the client assumed incorrectly
		// and we proceed below to return the latest wallet from the db.
		err = s.updateWalletToSequence(userId, encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac)
		if err == ErrNoWallet {
			// No wallet found to replace at the `sequence - 1`. To the caller, this
			// means the sequence they put in was wrong.
			err = ErrWrongSequence
		}
	}
	return
}

func (s *Store) GetUserId(email auth.Email, password auth.Password) (userId auth.UserId, err error) {
	var key auth.KDFKey
	var salt auth.ServerSalt
	var verified bool

	err = s.db.QueryRow(
		`SELECT user_id, key, server_salt, verify_token="" from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
		email.Normalize(),
	).Scan(&userId, &key, &salt, &verified)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
	}
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	match, err := password.Check(key, salt)
	if err == nil && !match {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
		userId = auth.UserId(0)
	}
	if err == nil && !verified {
		err = ErrNotVerified
		userId = auth.UserId(0)
	}
	return
}

/////////////
// Account //
/////////////

func (s *Store) CreateAccount(email auth.Email, password auth.Password, seed auth.ClientSaltSeed, verifyToken auth.VerifyTokenString) (err error) {
	key, salt, err := password.Create()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	var verifyExpiration *time.Time
	if len(verifyToken) > 0 {
		verifyExpiration = new(time.Time)
		*verifyExpiration = time.Now().UTC().Add(VerifyTokenLifespan)
	}

	// userId auto-increments
	_, err = s.db.Exec(
		"INSERT INTO accounts (normalized_email, email, key, server_salt, client_salt_seed, verify_token, verify_expiration) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?,?,?)",
		email.Normalize(), email, key, salt, seed, verifyToken, verifyExpiration,
	)
	var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
	if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
		if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintUnique) {
			err = ErrDuplicateAccount
		}
	}

	return
}

func (s *Store) UpdateVerifyTokenString(email auth.Email, verifyTokenString auth.VerifyTokenString) (err error) {
	expiration := time.Now().UTC().Add(VerifyTokenLifespan)

	res, err := s.db.Exec(
		"UPDATE accounts SET verify_token=?, verify_expiration=? WHERE normalized_email=?",
		verifyTokenString, expiration, email.Normalize(),
	)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if numRows == 0 {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
	}
	return
}

func (s *Store) VerifyAccount(verifyTokenString auth.VerifyTokenString) (err error) {
	res, err := s.db.Exec(
		"UPDATE accounts SET verify_token=?, verify_expiration=? WHERE verify_token=?",
		"", nil, verifyTokenString,
	)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if numRows == 0 {
		err = ErrNoTokenForUser
	}
	return
}

// Change password. For the user, this requires changing their root password,
// which changes the encryption key for the wallet as well. Thus, we should
// update the wallet at the same time to avoid ever having a situation where
// these two don't match.
//
// Also delete all auth tokens to force clients to update their root password
// to get a new token. This prevents other clients from posting a wallet
// encrypted with the old key.
func (s *Store) ChangePasswordWithWallet(
	email auth.Email,
	oldPassword auth.Password,
	newPassword auth.Password,
	clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
	encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
	sequence wallet.Sequence,
	hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
) (err error) {
	return s.changePassword(
		email,
		oldPassword,
		newPassword,
		clientSaltSeed,
		encryptedWallet,
		sequence,
		hmac,
	)
}

// Change password, but with no wallet currently saved. Since there's no
// wallet saved, there's no wallet to update. The encryption key is moot.
//
// Also delete all auth tokens to force clients to update their root password
// to get a new token. This prevents other clients from posting a wallet
// encrypted with the old key.
func (s *Store) ChangePasswordNoWallet(
	email auth.Email,
	oldPassword auth.Password,
	newPassword auth.Password,
	clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
) (err error) {
	return s.changePassword(
		email,
		oldPassword,
		newPassword,
		clientSaltSeed,
		wallet.EncryptedWallet(""),
		wallet.Sequence(0),
		wallet.WalletHmac(""),
	)
}

// Common code for for WithWallet and WithNoWallet password change functions
func (s *Store) changePassword(
	email auth.Email,
	oldPassword auth.Password,
	newPassword auth.Password,
	clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
	encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
	sequence wallet.Sequence,
	hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
) (err error) {
	var userId auth.UserId

	tx, err := s.db.Begin()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	// Lots of error conditions. Just defer this. However, we need to make sure to
	// make sure the variable `err` is set to the error before we return, instead
	// of doing `return <error>`.
	endTxn := func() {
		if err != nil {
			tx.Rollback()
		} else {
			tx.Commit()
		}
	}
	defer endTxn()

	var oldKey auth.KDFKey
	var oldSalt auth.ServerSalt
	var verified bool

	err = tx.QueryRow(
		`SELECT user_id, key, server_salt, verify_token="" from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
		email.Normalize(),
	).Scan(&userId, &oldKey, &oldSalt, &verified)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
	}
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	match, err := oldPassword.Check(oldKey, oldSalt)
	if err == nil && !match {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
	}
	if err == nil && !verified {
		err = ErrNotVerified
	}
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	newKey, newSalt, err := newPassword.Create()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}

	res, err := tx.Exec(
		"UPDATE accounts SET key=?, server_salt=?, client_salt_seed=? WHERE user_id=?",
		newKey, newSalt, clientSaltSeed, userId,
	)
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
	if err != nil {
		return
	}
	if numRows == 0 {
		// Very unexpected error!
		err = fmt.Errorf("Password failed to update")
		return
	}

	if encryptedWallet != "" {
		// With a wallet expected: update it.

		res, err = tx.Exec(
			`UPDATE wallets SET encrypted_wallet=?, sequence=?, hmac=?
			 WHERE user_id=? AND sequence=?`,
			encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac, userId, sequence-1,
		)
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		numRows, err = res.RowsAffected()
		if err != nil {
			return
		}
		if numRows == 0 {
			err = ErrWrongSequence
			return
		}
	} else {
		// With no wallet expected: assert we have no wallet.

		var dummy string
		err = tx.QueryRow("SELECT 1 FROM wallets WHERE user_id=?", userId).Scan(&dummy)
		if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
			if err == nil {
				// We expected no rows
				err = ErrUnexpectedWallet
				return
			}
			// Some other error
			return
		}
	}

	// Don't care how many I delete here. Might even be zero. No login token while
	// changing password seems plausible.
	_, err = tx.Exec("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE user_id=?", userId)
	return
}

func (s *Store) GetClientSaltSeed(email auth.Email) (seed auth.ClientSaltSeed, err error) {
	err = s.db.QueryRow(
		`SELECT client_salt_seed from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
		email.Normalize(),
	).Scan(&seed)
	if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
		err = ErrWrongCredentials
	}
	return
}