Merge #16421: Conservatively accept RBF bumps bumping one tx at the package limits
5ce822efbe
Conservatively accept RBF bumps bumping one tx at the package limits (Matt Corallo) Pull request description: Based on #15681, this adds support for some simple cases of RBF inside of large packages. Issue pointed out by sdaftuar in #15681, and this fix (or a broader one) is required ot make #15681 fully useful. Accept RBF bumps of single transactions (ie which evict exactly one transaction) even when that transaction is a member of a package which is currently at the package limit iff the new transaction does not add any additional mempool dependencies from the original. This could be made a bit looser in the future and still be safe, but for now this fixes the case that a transaction which was accepted by the carve-out rule will not be directly RBF'able ACKs for top commit: instagibbs: re-ACK5ce822efbe
ajtowns: ACK5ce822efbe
; GetSizeWithDescendants is only change and makes sense sipa: Code review ACK5ce822efbe
. I haven't thought hard about the effect on potential DoS issues this policy change may have. Tree-SHA512: 1cee3bc57393940a30206679eb60c3ec8cb4f4825d27d40d1f062c86bd22542dd5944fa5567601c74c8d9fd425333ed3e686195170925cfc68777e861844bd55
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0d20c42a01
2 changed files with 51 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -615,17 +615,55 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
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REJECT_HIGHFEE, "absurdly-high-fee",
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strprintf("%d > %d", nFees, nAbsurdFee));
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const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
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// Calculate in-mempool ancestors, up to a limit.
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CTxMemPool::setEntries setAncestors;
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size_t nLimitAncestors = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorcount", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_LIMIT);
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size_t nLimitAncestorSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitancestorsize", DEFAULT_ANCESTOR_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
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size_t nLimitDescendants = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantcount", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_LIMIT);
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size_t nLimitDescendantSize = gArgs.GetArg("-limitdescendantsize", DEFAULT_DESCENDANT_SIZE_LIMIT)*1000;
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if (setConflicts.size() == 1) {
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// In general, when we receive an RBF transaction with mempool conflicts, we want to know whether we
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// would meet the chain limits after the conflicts have been removed. However, there isn't a practical
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// way to do this short of calculating the ancestor and descendant sets with an overlay cache of
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// changed mempool entries. Due to both implementation and runtime complexity concerns, this isn't
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// very realistic, thus we only ensure a limited set of transactions are RBF'able despite mempool
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// conflicts here. Importantly, we need to ensure that some transactions which were accepted using
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// the below carve-out are able to be RBF'ed, without impacting the security the carve-out provides
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// for off-chain contract systems (see link in the comment below).
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//
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// Specifically, the subset of RBF transactions which we allow despite chain limits are those which
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// conflict directly with exactly one other transaction (but may evict children of said transaction),
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// and which are not adding any new mempool dependencies. Note that the "no new mempool dependencies"
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// check is accomplished later, so we don't bother doing anything about it here, but if BIP 125 is
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// amended, we may need to move that check to here instead of removing it wholesale.
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//
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// Such transactions are clearly not merging any existing packages, so we are only concerned with
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// ensuring that (a) no package is growing past the package size (not count) limits and (b) we are
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// not allowing something to effectively use the (below) carve-out spot when it shouldn't be allowed
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// to.
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//
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// To check these we first check if we meet the RBF criteria, above, and increment the descendant
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// limits by the direct conflict and its descendants (as these are recalculated in
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// CalculateMempoolAncestors by assuming the new transaction being added is a new descendant, with no
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// removals, of each parent's existing dependant set). The ancestor count limits are unmodified (as
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// the ancestor limits should be the same for both our new transaction and any conflicts).
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// We don't bother incrementing nLimitDescendants by the full removal count as that limit never comes
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// into force here (as we're only adding a single transaction).
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assert(setIterConflicting.size() == 1);
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CTxMemPool::txiter conflict = *setIterConflicting.begin();
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nLimitDescendants += 1;
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nLimitDescendantSize += conflict->GetSizeWithDescendants();
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}
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std::string errString;
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if (!pool.CalculateMemPoolAncestors(entry, setAncestors, nLimitAncestors, nLimitAncestorSize, nLimitDescendants, nLimitDescendantSize, errString)) {
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setAncestors.clear();
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// If CalculateMemPoolAncestors fails second time, we want the original error string.
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std::string dummy_err_string;
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// Contracting/payment channels CPFP carve-out:
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// If the new transaction is relatively small (up to 40k weight)
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// and has at most one ancestor (ie ancestor limit of 2, including
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// the new transaction), allow it if its parent has exactly the
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@ -674,7 +712,6 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
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CFeeRate newFeeRate(nModifiedFees, nSize);
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std::set<uint256> setConflictsParents;
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const int maxDescendantsToVisit = 100;
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const CTxMemPool::setEntries setIterConflicting = pool.GetIterSet(setConflicts);
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for (const auto& mi : setIterConflicting) {
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// Don't allow the replacement to reduce the feerate of the
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// mempool.
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@ -734,6 +771,11 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
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// feerate junk to be mined first. Ideally we'd keep track of
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// the ancestor feerates and make the decision based on that,
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// but for now requiring all new inputs to be confirmed works.
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//
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// Note that if you relax this to make RBF a little more useful,
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// this may break the CalculateMempoolAncestors RBF relaxation,
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// above. See the comment above the first CalculateMempoolAncestors
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// call for more info.
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if (!setConflictsParents.count(tx.vin[j].prevout.hash))
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{
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// Rather than check the UTXO set - potentially expensive -
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@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ class MempoolPackagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
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outputs = {}
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for i in range(num_outputs):
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outputs[node.getnewaddress()] = send_value
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rawtx = node.createrawtransaction(inputs, outputs)
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rawtx = node.createrawtransaction(inputs, outputs, 0, True)
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signedtx = node.signrawtransactionwithwallet(rawtx)
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txid = node.sendrawtransaction(signedtx['hex'])
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fulltx = node.getrawtransaction(txid, 1)
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@ -75,10 +75,16 @@ class MempoolPackagesTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
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# ...especially if its > 40k weight
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assert_raises_rpc_error(-26, "too-long-mempool-chain, too many descendants", self.chain_transaction, self.nodes[0], [chain[0][0]], [1], chain[0][1], fee, 350)
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# But not if it chains directly off the first transaction
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self.chain_transaction(self.nodes[0], [chain[0][0]], [1], chain[0][1], fee, 1)
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(replacable_txid, replacable_orig_value) = self.chain_transaction(self.nodes[0], [chain[0][0]], [1], chain[0][1], fee, 1)
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# and the second chain should work just fine
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self.chain_transaction(self.nodes[0], [second_chain], [0], second_chain_value, fee, 1)
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# Make sure we can RBF the chain which used our carve-out rule
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second_tx_outputs = {self.nodes[0].getrawtransaction(replacable_txid, True)["vout"][0]['scriptPubKey']['addresses'][0]: replacable_orig_value - (Decimal(1) / Decimal(100))}
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second_tx = self.nodes[0].createrawtransaction([{'txid': chain[0][0], 'vout': 1}], second_tx_outputs)
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signed_second_tx = self.nodes[0].signrawtransactionwithwallet(second_tx)
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self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(signed_second_tx['hex'])
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# Finally, check that we added two transactions
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assert_equal(len(self.nodes[0].getrawmempool(True)), MAX_ANCESTORS + 3)
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