Document RNG design in random.h

src/random.cpp

@@ -282,6 +282,14 @@ namespace {
 
 class RNGState {
     Mutex m_mutex;
+    /* The RNG state consists of 256 bits of entropy, taken from the output of
+     * one operation's SHA512 output, and fed as input to the next one.
+     * Carrying 256 bits of entropy should be sufficient to guarantee
+     * unpredictability as long as any entropy source was ever unpredictable
+     * to an attacker. To protect against situations where an attacker might
+     * observe the RNG's state, fresh entropy is always mixed when
+     * GetStrongRandBytes is called.
+     */
     unsigned char m_state[32] GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = {0};
     uint64_t m_counter GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = 0;
     bool m_strongly_seeded GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = false;

src/random.h

@@ -13,6 +13,49 @@
 #include <stdint.h>
 #include <limits>
 
+/**
+ * Overall design of the RNG and entropy sources.
+ *
+ * We maintain a single global 256-bit RNG state for all high-quality randomness.
+ * The following (classes of) functions interact with that state by mixing in new
+ * entropy, and optionally extracting random output from it:
+ *
+ * - The GetRand*() class of functions, as well as construction of FastRandomContext objects,
+ *   perform 'fast' seeding, consisting of mixing in:
+ *   - A stack pointer (indirectly committing to calling thread and call stack)
+ *   - A high-precision timestamp (rdtsc when available, c++ high_resolution_clock otherwise)
+ *   - Hardware RNG (rdrand) when available.
+ *   These entropy sources are very fast, and only designed to protect against situations
+ *   where a VM state restore/copy results in multiple systems with the same randomness.
+ *   FastRandomContext on the other hand does not protect against this once created, but
+ *   is even faster (and acceptable to use inside tight loops).
+ *
+ * - The GetStrongRand*() class of function perform 'slow' seeding, including everything
+ *   that fast seeding includes, but additionally:
+ *   - OS entropy (/dev/urandom, getrandom(), ...). The application will terminate if
+ *     this entropy source fails.
+ *   - Bytes from OpenSSL's RNG (which itself may be seeded from various sources)
+ *   - Another high-precision timestamp (indirectly committing to a benchmark of all the
+ *     previous sources).
+ *   These entropy sources are slower, but designed to make sure the RNG state contains
+ *   fresh data that is unpredictable to attackers.
+ *
+ * - RandAddSeedSleep() seeds everything that fast seeding includes, but additionally:
+ *   - A high-precision timestamp before and after sleeping 1ms.
+ *   - (On Windows) Once every 10 minutes, performance monitoring data from the OS.
+ *   These just exploit the fact the system is idle to improve the quality of the RNG
+ *   slightly.
+ *
+ * On first use of the RNG (regardless of what function is called first), all entropy
+ * sources used in the 'slow' seeder are included, but also:
+ * - (On Windows) Performance monitoring data from the OS.
+ * - (On Windows) Through OpenSSL, the screen contents.
+ *
+ * When mixing in new entropy, H = SHA512(entropy || old_rng_state) is computed, and
+ * (up to) the first 32 bytes of H are produced as output, while the last 32 bytes
+ * become the new RNG state.
+*/
+
 /**
  * Generate random data via the internal PRNG.
  *