Merge #11380: Remove outdated share/certs/ directory
6951a1c
Remove extremely outdated share/certs dir (MeshCollider)
Pull request description:
The directory hasn't been touched for 5 years (other than a couple of typo fixes/renaming). The certificates are expired, the build process notes are out of date, especially with the gitian building and everything, Gavin no longer has anything to do with it, etc.
The signing process is all documented (and scripted) elsewhere (e.g. doc/release-process.md and gitian-building.md, contrib/macdeploy and windeploy), this can just be removed
@theuni can confirm if this is okay, we discussed it on IRC for a bit :)
Tree-SHA512: e229785f7514a0f9988105f2ce68531a0a876032983ee5c77f41f1a976b9e732eb63cf2eb1f82841df8f7194940635c5ea5d4f8b30f95e69c763f74d4a3a28b1
This commit is contained in:
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3 changed files with 0 additions and 120 deletions
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Bag Attributes
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friendlyName: Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE
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localKeyID: 6B 9C 6C A8 A5 73 70 70 E2 57 A3 49 D8 62 FB 97 C7 A5 5D 5E
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subject=/UID=PBV4GLS9J4/CN=Developer ID Application: BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/OU=PBV4GLS9J4/O=BITCOIN FOUNDATION, INC., THE/C=US
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issuer=/CN=Developer ID Certification Authority/OU=Apple Certification Authority/O=Apple Inc./C=US
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIFhzCCBG+gAwIBAgIIJ0r1rumyfZAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAweTEtMCsGA1UE
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AwwkRGV2ZWxvcGVyIElEIENlcnRpZmljYXRpb24gQXV0aG9yaXR5MSYwJAYDVQQL
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VElPTiwgSU5DLiwgVEhFMQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzCCASIwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQAD
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c3AtZGV2aWQwMTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUa5xsqKVzcHDiV6NJ2GL7l8elXV4wDAYDVR0T
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AQH/BAIwADAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRXF+2iz9x8mKEQ4Py+hy0s8uMXVDCCAQ4GA1Ud
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YXRpb24gcHJhY3RpY2Ugc3RhdGVtZW50cy4wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBYGA1Ud
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JQEB/wQMMAoGCCsGAQUFBwMDMBMGCiqGSIb3Y2QGAQ0BAf8EAgUAMA0GCSqGSIb3
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DQEBCwUAA4IBAQAfJ0BjID/1dS2aEeVyhAzPzCBjG8vm0gDf+/qfwRn3+yWeL9vS
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nMdbilwM48IyQWTagjGGcojbsAd/vE4N7NhQyHInoCllNoeor1I5xx+blTaGRBK+
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dDhJbbdlGCjsLnH/BczGZi5fyEJds9lUIrp1hJidRcUKO76qb/9gc6qNZpl1vH5k
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lDUuJYt7YhAs+L6rTXDyqcK9maeQr0gaOPsRRAQLLwiQCorPeMTUNsbVMdMwZYJs
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R+PxiAnk+nyi7rfiFvPoASAYUuI6OzYL/Fa6QU4/gYyPgic944QYVkaQBnc0vEP1
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nXq6LGKwgVGcqJnkr/E2kui5gJoV5C3qll3e
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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Bag Attributes
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friendlyName: The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.'s COMODO CA Limited ID
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localKeyID: 8C 94 64 E3 B5 B0 41 89 5B 89 B0 57 CC 74 B9 44 E5 B2 92 66
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subject=/C=US/postalCode=98104-1444/ST=WA/L=Seattle/street=Suite 300/street=71 Columbia St/O=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc./CN=The Bitcoin Foundation, Inc.
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issuer=/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO Code Signing CA 2
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-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
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MIIFeDCCBGCgAwIBAgIRAJVYMd+waOER7lUqtiz3M2IwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEFBQAw
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A1UEBxMHU2FsZm9yZDEaMBgGA1UEChMRQ09NT0RPIENBIExpbWl0ZWQxITAfBgNV
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BAMTGENPTU9ETyBDb2RlIFNpZ25pbmcgQ0EgMjAeFw0xMzAxMTYwMDAwMDBaFw0x
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NDAxMTYyMzU5NTlaMIG8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJVUzETMBEGA1UEEQwKOTgxMDQtMTQ0
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NDELMAkGA1UECAwCV0ExEDAOBgNVBAcMB1NlYXR0bGUxEjAQBgNVBAkMCVN1aXRl
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IDMwMDEXMBUGA1UECQwONzEgQ29sdW1iaWEgU3QxJTAjBgNVBAoMHFRoZSBCaXRj
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qgr6PEp9tIYC+MbM
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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
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Code-signing private key notes
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==
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The private keys for these certificates were generated on Gavin's main work machine,
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following the certificate authority's recommendations for generating certificate
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signing requests.
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For OSX, the private key was generated by Keychain.app on Gavin's main work machine.
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The key and certificate is in a separate, passphrase-protected keychain file that is
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unlocked to sign the Bitcoin-Qt.app bundle.
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For Windows, the private key was generated by Firefox running on Gavin's main work machine.
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The key and certificate were exported into a separate, passphrase-protected PKCS#12 file, and
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then deleted from Firefox's keystore. The exported file is used to sign the Windows setup.exe.
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Threat analysis
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--
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Gavin is a single point of failure. He could be coerced to divulge the secret signing keys,
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allowing somebody to distribute a Bitcoin-Qt.app or bitcoin-qt-setup.exe with a valid
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signature but containing a malicious binary.
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Or the machine Gavin uses to sign the binaries could be compromised, either remotely or
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by breaking in to his office, allowing the attacker to get the private key files and then
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install a keylogger to get the passphrase that protects them.
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Threat Mitigation
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--
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"Air gapping" the machine used to do the signing will not work, because the signing
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process needs to access a timestamp server over the network. And it would not
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prevent the "rubber hose cryptography" threat (coercing Gavin to sign a bad binary
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or divulge the private keys).
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Windows binaries are reproducibly 'gitian-built', and the setup.exe file created
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by the NSIS installer system is a 7zip archive, so you could check to make sure
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that the bitcoin-qt.exe file inside the installer had not been tampered with.
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However, an attacker could modify the installer's code, so when the setup.exe
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was run it compromised users' systems. A volunteer to write an auditing tool
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that checks the setup.exe for tampering, and checks the files in it against
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the list of gitian signatures, is needed.
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The long-term solution is something like the 'gitian downloader' system, which
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uses signatures from multiple developers to determine whether or not a binary
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should be trusted. However, that just pushes the problem to "how will
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non-technical users securely get the gitian downloader code to start?"
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