consensus: guard against openssl's new strict DER checks
New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. However, it'll happily decode them. Decode then re-encode before verification in order to ensure that it is properly consumed.
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1 changed files with 13 additions and 3 deletions
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@ -117,10 +117,20 @@ bool CECKey::SetPubKey(const unsigned char* pubkey, size_t size) {
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}
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bool CECKey::Verify(const uint256 &hash, const std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig) {
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// -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
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if (ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), &vchSig[0], vchSig.size(), pkey) != 1)
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// New versions of OpenSSL will reject non-canonical DER signatures. de/re-serialize first.
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unsigned char *norm_der = NULL;
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ECDSA_SIG *norm_sig = ECDSA_SIG_new();
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const unsigned char* sigptr = &vchSig[0];
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d2i_ECDSA_SIG(&norm_sig, &sigptr, vchSig.size());
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int derlen = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(norm_sig, &norm_der);
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ECDSA_SIG_free(norm_sig);
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if (derlen <= 0)
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return false;
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return true;
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// -1 = error, 0 = bad sig, 1 = good
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bool ret = ECDSA_verify(0, (unsigned char*)&hash, sizeof(hash), norm_der, derlen, pkey) == 1;
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OPENSSL_free(norm_der);
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return ret;
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}
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bool CECKey::Recover(const uint256 &hash, const unsigned char *p64, int rec)
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