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Clean up banning levels

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Compared with previous bans, the following changes are made:
 * Txn with empty vin/vout or null prevouts move from 10 DoS
   points to 100.
 * Loose transactions with a dependency loop now result in a ban
   instead of 10 DoS points.
 * Many pre-segwit soft-fork errors now result in a ban.
   Note: Transactions that violate soft-fork script flags since P2SH do not generally
   result in a ban. Also, banning behavior for invalid blocks is dependent on
   whether the node is validating with multiple script check threads, due to a long-
   standing bug. That inconsistency is still present after this commit.
 * Proof of work failure moves from 50 DoS points to a ban.
 * Blocks with timestamps under MTP now result in a ban, blocks
   too far in the future continue to *not* result in a ban.
 * Inclusion of non-final transactions in a block now results in a
   ban instead of 10 DoS points.

Co-authored-by: Anthony Towns <aj@erisian.com.au>
This commit is contained in:
Matt Corallo 2019-01-23 15:14:16 -05:00 committed by Suhas Daftuar
parent b8b4c80146
commit 7b999103e2
5 changed files with 17 additions and 17 deletions
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6
src/consensus/tx_check.cpp
View file

@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe
{
// Basic checks that don't depend on any context
if (tx.vin.empty())
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vin-empty");
if (tx.vout.empty())
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-vout-empty");
// Size limits (this doesn't take the witness into account, as that hasn't been checked for malleability)
if (::GetSerializeSize(tx, PROTOCOL_VERSION | SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS) * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR > MAX_BLOCK_WEIGHT)
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-oversize");
@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ bool CheckTransaction(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState &state, bool fChe
{
for (const auto& txin : tx.vin)
if (txin.prevout.IsNull())
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-prevout-null");
}
return true;

4
src/consensus/tx_verify.cpp
View file

@ -172,8 +172,8 @@ bool Consensus::CheckTxInputs(const CTransaction& tx, CValidationState& state, c
// If prev is coinbase, check that it's matured
if (coin.IsCoinBase() && nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight < COINBASE_MATURITY) {
return state.Invalid(false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase",
return state.DoS(0, false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-premature-spend-of-coinbase", false,
strprintf("tried to spend coinbase at depth %d", nSpendHeight - coin.nHeight));
}

10
src/validation.cpp
View file

@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static bool AcceptToMemoryPoolWorker(const CChainParams& chainparams, CTxMemPool
const uint256 &hashAncestor = ancestorIt->GetTx().GetHash();
if (setConflicts.count(hashAncestor))
{
return state.DoS(10, false,
return state.DoS(100, false,
REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-spends-conflicting-tx", false,
strprintf("%s spends conflicting transaction %s",
hash.ToString(),
@ -3047,7 +3047,7 @@ static bool CheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationState& state,
{
// Check proof of work matches claimed amount
if (fCheckPOW && !CheckProofOfWork(block.GetHash(), block.nBits, consensusParams))
return state.DoS(50, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "high-hash", false, "proof of work failed");
return true;
}
@ -3214,7 +3214,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
// Check timestamp against prev
if (block.GetBlockTime() <= pindexPrev->GetMedianTimePast())
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", "block's timestamp is too early");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "time-too-old", false, "block's timestamp is too early");
// Check timestamp
if (block.GetBlockTime() > nAdjustedTime + MAX_FUTURE_BLOCK_TIME)
@ -3225,7 +3225,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlockHeader(const CBlockHeader& block, CValidationSta
if((block.nVersion < 2 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP34Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 3 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP66Height) ||
(block.nVersion < 4 && nHeight >= consensusParams.BIP65Height))
return state.Invalid(false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion),
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_OBSOLETE, strprintf("bad-version(0x%08x)", block.nVersion), false,
strprintf("rejected nVersion=0x%08x block", block.nVersion));
return true;
@ -3255,7 +3255,7 @@ static bool ContextualCheckBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, c
// Check that all transactions are finalized
for (const auto& tx : block.vtx) {
if (!IsFinalTx(*tx, nHeight, nLockTimeCutoff)) {
return state.DoS(10, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
return state.DoS(100, false, REJECT_INVALID, "bad-txns-nonfinal", false, "non-final transaction");
}
}

4
test/functional/data/invalid_txs.py
View file

@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ class BadTxTemplate:
class OutputMissing(BadTxTemplate):
reject_reason = "bad-txns-vout-empty"
expect_disconnect = False
expect_disconnect = True
def get_tx(self):
tx = CTransaction()
@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ class OutputMissing(BadTxTemplate):
class InputMissing(BadTxTemplate):
reject_reason = "bad-txns-vin-empty"
expect_disconnect = False
expect_disconnect = True
def get_tx(self):
tx = CTransaction()

10
test/functional/feature_block.py
View file

@ -630,7 +630,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
while b47.sha256 < target:
b47.nNonce += 1
b47.rehash()
self.send_blocks([b47], False, force_send=True, reject_reason='high-hash')
self.send_blocks([b47], False, force_send=True, reject_reason='high-hash', reconnect=True)
self.log.info("Reject a block with a timestamp >2 hours in the future")
self.move_tip(44)
@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
b54 = self.next_block(54, spend=out[15])
b54.nTime = b35.nTime - 1
b54.solve()
self.send_blocks([b54], False, force_send=True, reject_reason='time-too-old')
self.send_blocks([b54], False, force_send=True, reject_reason='time-too-old', reconnect=True)
# valid timestamp
self.move_tip(53)
@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
assert tx.vin[0].nSequence < 0xffffffff
tx.calc_sha256()
b62 = self.update_block(62, [tx])
self.send_blocks([b62], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-nonfinal')
self.send_blocks([b62], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-nonfinal', reconnect=True)
# Test a non-final coinbase is also rejected
#
@ -841,7 +841,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
b63.vtx[0].vin[0].nSequence = 0xDEADBEEF
b63.vtx[0].rehash()
b63 = self.update_block(63, [])
self.send_blocks([b63], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-nonfinal')
self.send_blocks([b63], success=False, reject_reason='bad-txns-nonfinal', reconnect=True)
# This checks that a block with a bloated VARINT between the block_header and the array of tx such that
# the block is > MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE with the bloated varint, but <= MAX_BLOCK_BASE_SIZE without the bloated varint,
@ -1255,7 +1255,7 @@ class FullBlockTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
self.log.info("Reject a block with an invalid block header version")
b_v1 = self.next_block('b_v1', version=1)
self.send_blocks([b_v1], success=False, force_send=True, reject_reason='bad-version(0x00000001)')
self.send_blocks([b_v1], success=False, force_send=True, reject_reason='bad-version(0x00000001)', reconnect=True)
self.move_tip(chain1_tip + 2)
b_cb34 = self.next_block('b_cb34', version=4)