Non-grammatical language improvements
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11 changed files with 33 additions and 30 deletions
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@ -393,4 +393,4 @@ Uploading signatures
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After building and signing you can push your signatures (both the `.assert` and `.assert.sig` files) to the
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[bitcoin/gitian.sigs](https://github.com/bitcoin/gitian.sigs/) repository, or if that's not possible create a pull
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request. You can also mail the files to me (laanwj@gmail.com) and I'll commit them.
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request. You can also mail the files to Wladimir (laanwj@gmail.com) and he will commit them.
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@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ public:
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/** Stochastic address manager
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*
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* Design goals:
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* * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire to able in peers.dat.
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* * Keep the address tables in-memory, and asynchronously dump the entire table to peers.dat.
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* * Make sure no (localized) attacker can fill the entire table with his nodes/addresses.
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*
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* To that end:
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@ -6,10 +6,10 @@
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/**
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* Why base-58 instead of standard base-64 encoding?
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* - Don't want 0OIl characters that look the same in some fonts and
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* could be used to create visually identical looking account numbers.
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* - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as an account number.
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* could be used to create visually identical looking data.
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* - A string with non-alphanumeric characters is not as easily accepted as input.
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* - E-mail usually won't line-break if there's no punctuation to break at.
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* - Double-clicking selects the whole number as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
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* - Double-clicking selects the whole string as one word if it's all alphanumeric.
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*/
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#ifndef BITCOIN_BASE58_H
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#define BITCOIN_BASE58_H
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@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ enum BlockStatus {
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*/
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BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS = 3,
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//! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
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//! Outputs do not overspend inputs, no double spends, coinbase output ok, no immature coinbase spends, BIP30.
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//! Implies all parents are also at least CHAIN.
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BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN = 4,
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@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ public:
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/**
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* The message start string is designed to be unlikely to occur in normal data.
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* The characters are rarely used upper ASCII, not valid as UTF-8, and produce
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* a large 4-byte int at any alignment.
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* a large 32-bit integer with any alignment.
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*/
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pchMessageStart[0] = 0xf9;
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pchMessageStart[1] = 0xbe;
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@ -124,8 +124,9 @@ public:
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nPruneAfterHeight = 100000;
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/**
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* Build the genesis block. Note that the output of the genesis coinbase cannot
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* be spent as it did not originally exist in the database.
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* Build the genesis block. Note that the output of its generation
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* transaction cannot be spent since it did not originally exist in the
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* database.
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*
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* CBlock(hash=000000000019d6, ver=1, hashPrevBlock=00000000000000, hashMerkleRoot=4a5e1e, nTime=1231006505, nBits=1d00ffff, nNonce=2083236893, vtx=1)
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* CTransaction(hash=4a5e1e, ver=1, vin.size=1, vout.size=1, nLockTime=0)
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@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ public:
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bool MiningRequiresPeers() const { return fMiningRequiresPeers; }
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/** Default value for -checkmempool and -checkblockindex argument */
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bool DefaultConsistencyChecks() const { return fDefaultConsistencyChecks; }
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/** Make standard checks */
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/** Policy: Filter transactions that do not match well-defined patterns */
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bool RequireStandard() const { return fRequireStandard; }
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int64_t PruneAfterHeight() const { return nPruneAfterHeight; }
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/** Make miner stop after a block is found. In RPC, don't return until nGenProcLimit blocks are generated */
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@ -15,9 +15,10 @@
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namespace Checkpoints {
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/**
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* How many times we expect transactions after the last checkpoint to
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* be slower. This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate for
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* every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
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* How many times slower we expect checking transactions after the last
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* checkpoint to be (from checking signatures, which is skipped up to the
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* last checkpoint). This number is a compromise, as it can't be accurate
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* for every system. When reindexing from a fast disk with a slow CPU, it
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* can be up to 20, while when downloading from a slow network with a
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* fast multicore CPU, it won't be much higher than 1.
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*/
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23
src/main.cpp
23
src/main.cpp
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@ -142,8 +142,9 @@ namespace {
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uint32_t nBlockSequenceId = 1;
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/**
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* Sources of received blocks, to be able to send them reject messages or ban
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* them, if processing happens afterwards. Protected by cs_main.
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* Sources of received blocks, saved to be able to send them reject
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* messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards. Protected by
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* cs_main.
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*/
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map<uint256, NodeId> mapBlockSource;
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@ -389,7 +390,7 @@ void FindNextBlocksToDownload(NodeId nodeid, unsigned int count, std::vector<CBl
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}
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// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
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// of their current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
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// of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
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state->pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor(state->pindexLastCommonBlock, state->pindexBestKnownBlock);
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if (state->pindexLastCommonBlock == state->pindexBestKnownBlock)
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return;
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@ -1721,7 +1722,7 @@ bool ConnectBlock(const CBlock& block, CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex* pin
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// already refuses previously-known transaction ids entirely.
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// This rule was originally applied to all blocks with a timestamp after March 15, 2012, 0:00 UTC.
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// Now that the whole chain is irreversibly beyond that time it is applied to all blocks except the
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// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes in their
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// two in the chain that violate it. This prevents exploiting the issue against nodes during their
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// initial block download.
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bool fEnforceBIP30 = (!pindex->phashBlock) || // Enforce on CreateNewBlock invocations which don't have a hash.
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!((pindex->nHeight==91842 && pindex->GetBlockHash() == uint256S("0x00000000000a4d0a398161ffc163c503763b1f4360639393e0e4c8e300e0caec")) ||
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@ -2315,7 +2316,7 @@ bool InvalidateBlock(CValidationState& state, CBlockIndex *pindex) {
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}
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// The resulting new best tip may not be in setBlockIndexCandidates anymore, so
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// add them again.
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// add it again.
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BlockMap::iterator it = mapBlockIndex.begin();
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while (it != mapBlockIndex.end()) {
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if (it->second->IsValid(BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS) && it->second->nChainTx && !setBlockIndexCandidates.value_comp()(it->second, chainActive.Tip())) {
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@ -3745,7 +3746,7 @@ void static ProcessGetData(CNode* pfrom)
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// no response
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}
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// Trigger them to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
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// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
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if (inv.hash == pfrom->hashContinue)
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{
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// Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
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@ -4141,8 +4142,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
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pfrom->PushInventory(CInv(MSG_BLOCK, pindex->GetBlockHash()));
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if (--nLimit <= 0)
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{
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// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll make them
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// getblocks the next batch of inventory.
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// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
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// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
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LogPrint("net", " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s\n", pindex->nHeight, pindex->GetBlockHash().ToString());
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pfrom->hashContinue = pindex->GetBlockHash();
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break;
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@ -4380,8 +4381,8 @@ bool static ProcessMessage(CNode* pfrom, string strCommand, CDataStream& vRecv,
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// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
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// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
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// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
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// Making users (which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections) ignore
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// getaddr message mitigates the attack.
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// Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
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// the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
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else if ((strCommand == "getaddr") && (pfrom->fInbound))
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{
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pfrom->vAddrToSend.clear();
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@ -4734,7 +4735,7 @@ bool SendMessages(CNode* pto, bool fSendTrickle)
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{
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const Consensus::Params& consensusParams = Params().GetConsensus();
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{
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// Don't send anything until we get their version message
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// Don't send anything until we get its version message
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if (pto->nVersion == 0)
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return true;
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@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ void SendCoinsDialog::processSendCoinsReturn(const WalletModel::SendCoinsReturn
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msgParams.first = tr("The total exceeds your balance when the %1 transaction fee is included.").arg(msgArg);
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break;
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case WalletModel::DuplicateAddress:
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msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: can only send to each address once per send operation.");
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msgParams.first = tr("Duplicate address found: addresses should only be used once each.");
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break;
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case WalletModel::TransactionCreationFailed:
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msgParams.first = tr("Transaction creation failed!");
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@ -912,8 +912,8 @@ static bool HTTPReq_JSONRPC(AcceptedConnection *conn,
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{
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LogPrintf("ThreadRPCServer incorrect password attempt from %s\n", conn->peer_address_to_string());
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/* Deter brute-forcing
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If this results in a DoS the user really
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shouldn't have their RPC port exposed. */
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We don't support exposing the RPC port, so this shouldn't result
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in a DoS. */
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MilliSleep(250);
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conn->stream() << HTTPError(HTTP_UNAUTHORIZED, false) << std::flush;
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