Fix qt/paymentrequestplus.cpp for OpenSSL 1.1 API.

This avoids a compile failure on newly installed debian stretch systems.
This commit is contained in:
Gregory Maxwell 2016-12-12 18:45:56 +00:00
parent bae1eef752
commit b05b1af10b

View file

@ -159,14 +159,24 @@ bool PaymentRequestPlus::getMerchant(X509_STORE* certStore, QString& merchant) c
std::string data_to_verify; // Everything but the signature std::string data_to_verify; // Everything but the signature
rcopy.SerializeToString(&data_to_verify); rcopy.SerializeToString(&data_to_verify);
EVP_MD_CTX ctx; #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (!ctx) throw SSLVerifyError("Error allocating OpenSSL context.");
#else
EVP_MD_CTX _ctx;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
ctx = &_ctx;
#endif
EVP_PKEY *pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert); EVP_PKEY *pubkey = X509_get_pubkey(signing_cert);
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); EVP_MD_CTX_init(ctx);
if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(&ctx, digestAlgorithm, NULL) || if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, digestAlgorithm, NULL) ||
!EVP_VerifyUpdate(&ctx, data_to_verify.data(), data_to_verify.size()) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data_to_verify.data(), data_to_verify.size()) ||
!EVP_VerifyFinal(&ctx, (const unsigned char*)paymentRequest.signature().data(), (unsigned int)paymentRequest.signature().size(), pubkey)) { !EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, (const unsigned char*)paymentRequest.signature().data(), (unsigned int)paymentRequest.signature().size(), pubkey)) {
throw SSLVerifyError("Bad signature, invalid payment request."); throw SSLVerifyError("Bad signature, invalid payment request.");
} }
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
#endif
// OpenSSL API for getting human printable strings from certs is baroque. // OpenSSL API for getting human printable strings from certs is baroque.
int textlen = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName, NULL, 0); int textlen = X509_NAME_get_text_by_NID(certname, NID_commonName, NULL, 0);