Do not invoke anti-DoS system for invalid BIP16 transactions
Doing so would allow an attack on old nodes, which would relay a standard transaction spending a BIP16 output in an invalid way, until reaching a new node, which will disconnect their peer. Reported by makomk on IRC.
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@ -1138,8 +1138,15 @@ bool CTransaction::ConnectInputs(MapPrevTx inputs,
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{
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// Verify signature
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if (!VerifySignature(txPrev, *this, i, fStrictPayToScriptHash, 0))
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{
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// only during transition phase for P2SH: do not invoke anti-DoS code for
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// potentially old clients relaying bad P2SH transactions
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if (fStrictPayToScriptHash && VerifySignature(txPrev, *this, i, false, 0))
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return error("ConnectInputs() : %s P2SH VerifySignature failed", GetHash().ToString().substr(0,10).c_str());
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return DoS(100,error("ConnectInputs() : %s VerifySignature failed", GetHash().ToString().substr(0,10).c_str()));
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}
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}
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// Mark outpoints as spent
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txindex.vSpent[prevout.n] = posThisTx;
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