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Add comment re: why SHA1 is disabled

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Peter Todd 2017-03-01 10:58:14 -05:00 committed by Matt Corallo
parent d9c450ffb2
commit eddc77a1b1
1 changed files with 9 additions and 0 deletions
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9
contrib/verify-commits/gpg.sh
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@ -11,6 +11,15 @@ IFS='
if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then
GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)" GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
else else
# Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling
# signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that
# collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself,
# in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's
# semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory
# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)" GPG_RES="$(echo "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
fi fi
for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do