Now that the off-by-one error w/nLockTime txs issue has been fixed by
87550eef (75a4d512 in the 0.11 branch) we can make the anti-fee-sniping
protection create transactions with nLockTime set such that they're only
valid in the next block, rather than an earlier block.
There was also a concern about poor propagation, however testing with
transactions with nLockTime = GetAdjustedTime()+1 as a proxy for
nLockTime propagation, as well as a few transactions sent the moment
blocks were received, has turned up no detectable issues with
propagation. If you have a block at a given height you certainly have at
least one peer with that block who will accept the transaction. That
peer will certainly have other peers who will accept it, and soon
essentially the whole network has the transaction. In particular, if a
node recives a transaction that it rejects due to the tx being
non-final, it will be accepted again later as it winds its way around
the network.
Previously due to an off-by-one error the wallet ignored
nLockTime-by-height transactions that would be valid in the next block
even though they are accepted into the mempool. The transactions
wouldn't show up until confirmed, nor would they be included in the
unconfirmed balance. Similar to the mempool behavior fix in 665bdd3b,
the wallet code was calling IsFinalTx() directly without taking into
account the fact that doing so tells you if the transaction could have
been mined in the *current* block, rather than the next block.
To fix this we strip IsFinalTx() of non-consensus-critical
functionality, removing the default arguments, and add CheckFinalTx() to
check if a transaction will be final in the next block.
a8cdaf5 checkpoints: move the checkpoints enable boolean into main (Cory Fields)
11982d3 checkpoints: Decouple checkpoints from Params (Cory Fields)
6996823 checkpoints: make checkpoints a member of CChainParams (Cory Fields)
9f13a10 checkpoints: store mapCheckpoints in CCheckpointData rather than a pointer (Cory Fields)
Compute the change directly as difference between the "requested" and
the actual value returned by SelectCoins. This removes a duplication of
the fee logic code.
It's reasonable that automatic coin selection will not pick a zero
value txout, but they're actually spendable; and you should know
if you have them. Listing also makes them available to tools like
dust-b-gone.
Define CTransaction::IsEquivalentTo(const CTransaction& tx)
True if only scriptSigs are different. In other words, true if
the two transactions are malleability clones. In other words,
true if the two transactions have the same effect on the
outside universe.
In the wallet, only SyncMetaData for equivalent transactions.
This is an advanced feature which will disable any kind of automatic
transaction broadcasting in the wallet. This gives the user full control
of how the transaction is sent.
For example they can broadcast new transactions through some other
mechanism themselves, after getting the transaction hex through `gettransaction`.
This just adds the option `-walletbroadcast=<0,1>`. Right now these
transactions will get the status
Status: conflicted, has not been successfully broadcast yet
They shouldn't be shown as conflicted at all (`walletconflicts` is empty). This status
will go away when the transaction is received through the network.
Adds a regression test for the wallet's ResendWalletTransactions function, which uses a new, hidden RPC command "resendwallettransactions."
I refactored main's Broadcast signal so it is passed the best-block time, which let me remove a global variable shared between main.cpp and the wallet (nTimeBestReceived).
I also manually tested the "rebroadcast unconfirmed every half hour or so" functionality by:
1. Running bitcoind -connect=0.0.0.0:8333
2. Creating a couple of send-to-self transactions
3. Connect to a peer using -addnode
4. Waited a while, monitoring debug.log, until I see:
```2015-03-23 18:48:10 ResendWalletTransactions: rebroadcast 2 unconfirmed transactions```
One last change: don't bother putting ResendWalletTransactions messages in debug.log unless unconfirmed transactions were actually rebroadcast.
During startup, when adding pending wallet transactions, which spend outputs of
other pending wallet transactions, back to the memory pool, and when they are
added out of order, it appears as if they are orphans with missing inputs.
Those transactions are then rejected and flagged as "conflicting" (= not in the
memory pool, not in the block chain).
To prevent this, transactions are explicitly sorted.
