Use a probabilistic bloom filter to keep track of which addresses
we think we have given our peers, instead of a list.
This uses much less memory, at the cost of sometimes failing to
relay an address to a peer-- worst case if the bloom filter happens
to be as full as it gets, 1-in-1,000.
Measured memory usage of a full mruset setAddrKnown: 650Kbytes
Constant memory usage of CRollingBloomFilter addrKnown: 37Kbytes.
This will also help heap fragmentation, because the 37K of storage
is allocated when a CNode is created (when a connection to a peer
is established) and then there is no per-item-remembered memory
allocation.
I plan on testing by restarting a full node with an empty peers.dat,
running a while with -debug=addrman and -debug=net, and making sure
that the 'addr' message traffic out is reasonable.
(suggestions for better tests welcome)
1d21ba2 Scale up addrman (Pieter Wuille)
c6a63ce Always use a 50% chance to choose between tried and new entries (Pieter Wuille)
f68ba3f Do not bias outgoing connections towards fresh addresses (Pieter Wuille)
a8ff7c6 Simplify hashing code (Pieter Wuille)
e6b343d Make addrman's bucket placement deterministic. (Pieter Wuille)
b23add5 Switch addrman key from vector to uint256 (Pieter Wuille)
This change was suggested as Countermeasure 2 in
Eclipse Attacks on Bitcoin’s Peer-to-Peer Network, Ethan Heilman,
Alison Kendler, Aviv Zohar, Sharon Goldberg. ePrint Archive Report
2015/263. March 2015.
Normally bitcoin core does not display any network originated strings without
sanitizing or hex encoding. This wasn't done for strcommand in many places.
This could be used to play havoc with a terminal displaying the logs,
especially with printtoconsole in use.
Thanks to Evil-Knievel for reporting this issue.
856e862 namespace: drop most boost namespaces and a few header cleanups (Cory Fields)
9b1ab86 namespace: drop boost::assign altogether here (Cory Fields)
a324199 namespace: remove boost namespace pollution (Cory Fields)
This avoids connecting to them again too soon in ThreadOpenConnections.
Make an exception for connection failures to the proxy as these
shouldn't affect the status of specific nodes.
This is a simplified re-do of closed pull #3088.
This patch eliminates the privacy and reliability problematic use
of centralized web services for discovering the node's addresses
for advertisement.
The Bitcoin protocol already allows your peers to tell you what
IP they think you have, but this data isn't trustworthy since
they could lie. So the challenge is using it without creating a
DOS vector.
To accomplish this we adopt an approach similar to the one used
by P2Pool: If we're announcing and don't have a better address
discovered (e.g. via UPNP) or configured we just announce to
each peer the address that peer told us. Since peers could
already replace, forge, or drop our address messages this cannot
create a new vulnerability... but if even one of our peers is
giving us a good address we'll eventually make a useful
advertisement.
We also may randomly use the peer-provided address for the
daily rebroadcast even if we otherwise have a seemingly routable
address, just in case we've been misconfigured (e.g. by UPNP).
To avoid privacy problems, we only do these things if discovery
is enabled.
Many changes:
* Do not use 'getblocks', but 'getheaders', and use it to build a headers tree.
* Blocks are fetched in parallel from all available outbound peers, using a
limited moving window. When one peer stalls the movement of the window, it is
disconnected.
* No more orphan blocks. At all. We only ever request a block for which we have
verified the headers, and store it to disk immediately. This means that a
disk-fill attack would require PoW.
* Require protocol version 31800 for every peer (released in december 2010).
* No more syncnode (we sync from everyone we can, though limited to 1 during
initial *headers* sync).
* Introduce some extra named constants, comments and asserts.
Avoids that SOCKS5 negotiation will hold up the shutdown process.
- Sockets can stay in non-blocking mode, no need to switch it on/off
anymore
- Adds a timeout (20 seconds) on SOCK5 negotiation. This should be
enough for even Tor to get a connection to a hidden service, and
avoids blocking the opencon thread indefinitely on a hanging proxy.
Fixes#2954.
