bbf49da Fix comment for blocksonly parameter interactions (Patick Strateman)
6a4982f Fix fRelayTxs comment (Patick Strateman)
59441a0 Display DEFAULT_WHITELISTALWAYSRELAY in help text (Patick Strateman)
71a2683 Use DEFAULT_BLOCKSONLY and DEFAULT_WHITELISTALWAYSRELAY constants (Patick Strateman)
762b13b Add help text for blocksonly and whitelistalwaysrelay (Patick Strateman)
3a96497 Add whitelistalwaysrelay option (Patick Strateman)
420fa81 Do not process tx inv's in blocksonly mode (Patick Strateman)
4044f07 Add blocksonly mode (Patick Strateman)
58ef0ff doc: update docs for Tor listening (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
68ccdc4 doc: Mention Tor listening in release notes (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
09c1ae1 torcontrol improvements and fixes (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
2f796e5 Better error message if Tor version too old (Peter Todd)
8f4e67f net: Automatically create hidden service, listen on Tor (Wladimir J. van der Laan)
69d373f Don't wipe the sigcache in TestBlockValidity (Pieter Wuille)
0b9e9dc Evict sigcache entries that are seen in a block (Pieter Wuille)
830e3f3 Make sigcache faster and more efficient (Pieter Wuille)
Starting with Tor version 0.2.7.1 it is possible, through Tor's control socket
API, to create and destroy 'ephemeral' hidden services programmatically.
https://stem.torproject.org/api/control.html#stem.control.Controller.create_ephemeral_hidden_service
This means that if Tor is running (and proper authorization is available),
bitcoin automatically creates a hidden service to listen on, without user
manual configuration. This will positively affect the number of available
.onion nodes.
- When the node is started, connect to Tor through control socket
- Send `ADD_ONION` command
- First time:
- Make it create a hidden service key
- Save the key in the data directory for later usage
- Make it redirect port 8333 to the local port 8333 (or whatever port we're listening on).
- Keep control socket connection open for as long node is running. The hidden service will
(by default) automatically go away when the connection is closed.
Process `getheaders` messages from whitelisted peers even if we are in
initial block download. Whitelisted peers can always use a node as a
block source.
Also log a debug message when the request is ignored, for
troubleshooting.
Fixes#6971.
d1c3762 Revert "Revert "Enable policy enforcing GetMedianTimePast as the end point of lock-time constraints"" (Gregory Maxwell)
e4e5334 Restore MedianTimePast for locktime. (Gregory Maxwell)
Previously, the undo weren't being flushed during a reindex because
fKnown was set to true in FindBlockPos. That is the correct behaviour
for block files as they aren't being touched, but undo files are
touched.
This changes the behaviour to always flush when switching to a new file
(even for block files, though that isn't really necessary).
Revert "Revert "Add rules--presently disabled--for using GetMedianTimePast as endpoint for lock-time calculations""
This reverts commit 40cd32e835.
After careful analysis it was determined that the change was, in fact, safe and several people were suffering
momentary confusion about locktime semantics.
This reverts commit 9d55050773.
As noted by Luke-Jr, under some conditions this will accept transactions which are invalid by the network
rules. This happens when the current block time is head of the median time past and a transaction's
locktime is in the middle.
This could be addressed by changing the rule to MAX(this_block_time, MTP+offset) but this solution and
the particular offset used deserve some consideration.
* -maxuploadtarget can be set in MiB
* if <limit> - ( time-left-in-24h-cycle / 600 * MAX_BLOCK_SIZE ) has reach, stop serve blocks older than one week and filtered blocks
* no action if limit has reached, no guarantee that the target will not be surpassed
* add outbound limit informations to rpc getnettotals
The lock-time code currently uses CBlock::nTime as the cutoff point for time based locked transactions. This has the unfortunate outcome of creating a perverse incentive for miners to lie about the time of a block in order to collect more fees by including transactions that by wall clock determination have not yet matured. By using CBlockIndex::GetMedianTimePast from the prior block instead, the self-interested miner no longer gains from generating blocks with fraudulent timestamps. Users can compensate for this change by simply adding an hour (3600 seconds) to their time-based lock times.
If enforced, this would be a soft-fork change. This commit only adds the functionality on an unexecuted code path, without changing the behaviour of Bitcoin Core.
Add a comment that explains why the initial "getheader" requests are
made starting from the block preceding the currently best one.
Thanks to sdaftuar for the explanation!
There is no exact science to setting this parameter, but 5000
(just over 1 US cent at the time of writing) is higher than the
cost to relay a transaction around the network (the new benchmark
due to mempool limiting).
After each transaction which is added to mempool, we first call
Expire() to remove old transactions, then throwing away the
lowest-feerate transactions.
After throwing away transactions by feerate, we set the minimum
relay fee to the maximum fee transaction-and-dependant-set we
removed, plus the default minimum relay fee.
After the next block is received, the minimum relay fee is allowed
to decrease exponentially. Its halflife defaults to 12 hours, but
is decreased to 6 hours if the mempool is smaller than half its
maximum size, and 3 hours if the mempool is smaller than a quarter
its maximum size.
The minimum -maxmempool size is 40*-limitdescendantsize, as it is
easy for an attacker to play games with the cheapest
-limitdescendantsize transactions. -maxmempool defaults to 300MB.
This disables high-priority transaction relay when the min relay
fee adjustment is >0 (ie when the mempool is full). When the relay
fee adjustment drops below the default minimum relay fee / 2 it is
set to 0 (re-enabling priority-based free relay).
To bridge the time until a dynamic method for determining this fee is
merged.
This is especially aimed at the stable releases (0.10, 0.11) because
full mempool limiting, as will be in 0.12, is too invasive and risky to
backport.
