Extremely large transactions with lots of inputs can cost the network
almost as much to process as they cost the sender in fees.
We would never create transactions larger than 100K big; this change
makes transactions larger than 100K non-standard, so they are not
relayed/mined by default. This is most important for miners that might
create blocks larger than 250K big, who could be vulnerable to a
make-your-blocks-so-expensive-to-verify-they-get-orphaned attack.
- this change allows us to keep the translation without the need to
re-translate any string, when we update the copyright year
- copyright symbol is changed to HTML to ensure we get no encoding
issues and it's removed from the translation string so translators don't
break it by mistake
Version numbers changed from 0.7.99 to 0.8.0
Set CLIENT_VERSION_IS_RELEASE to remove pre-release warning
Updated copyright in COPYING and doc/READMEs to 2013
Updated doc/release-notes.txt
At least one service that accepted zero-confirmation transactions
was vulnerable because an attacker could send a transaction
with a lock time far in the future, and then have plenty of time in
which to get a double-spend mined (perhaps from a miner who wasn't
on the network when the first transaction was broadcast).
That is a variation on the "Finney attack". We still don't
recommend anybody accept 0-confirmation transactions as final
payment for anything. This change keeps non-final transactions
from appearing in the wallet, and, assuming most of the network
accepts this change, will prevent them from being relayed until
they are final.
* Pass txid's to CCoinsView functions by reference instead of by value
* Add a method to swap CCoins, and use it in some places to avoid a
allocating copy + destruct.
* Optimize CCoinsViewCache::FetchCoins to do only a single search
through the backing map.
- don't show QR Code context menu, when USE_QRCODE=1 was not specified
when compiling the client
- re-work on_showQRCode_clicked() for better readability and remove an
unneeded duplicate check
- re-work on_signMessage_clicked() and on_verifyMessage_clicked() to match
foreach in on_showQRCode_clicked(), which seems more robust / cleaner
- re-order context menu stuff to match real context menu layout
- add comments for all private slots in the class
Several changes to make the native windows leveldb code compile
with mingw32 and run on 32-bit Windows:
* Remove -std=c++0x dependency (modified code to use NULL instead of
nullptr)
* Link with -lshlwapi
* Only #define snprintf/etc if compiling with Visual Studio
* Do not link against DbgHelp.lib (wrote a CreateDir instead of using
DbgHelp's MakeSureDirectoryPathExists
* Define WINVER=0x0500 so MinGW32 can use the 64-bit-filesystem Windows
api calls
* Define __USE_MINGW_ANSI_STDIO=1 to use MinGW's printf (which supports
%ll)
I also cleaned up makefile.mingw, assuming that dependencies would be in
the standard /usr/local/{include,lib} by default but allowing overriding
with make DEPSDIR=... etc
This actually simplifies some SPV code, as they can keep track of
a filtered block and its txn before accepting both in one step.
The previous argument was that SPV nodes should handle the txn the
same as any other free txn and then mark them as connected to a
block when they get the filtered block itself. However, it now
appears that SPV nodes will need to put in more effort to verify
loose txn than they would to verify txn in blocks, thus making it
more approriate to send the txn after the filtered block.
By specifying -txindex when initializing the database, a txid-to-diskpos
index is maintained in the blktree database. This database is used to
help answering getrawtransaction() RPC queries, when enabled.
Changing the -txindex value requires a -reindex; the client will abort
at startup if the database and the specified -txindex mismatch.
- this flag allows bitcoin-qt.exe / bitcoind.exe (32-bit application) to
handle addresses larger than 2GB (up to 3GB on x86 Windows and up to
4GB on x64 Windows)
Note that the default value for fRelayTxes is false, meaning we
now no longer relay tx inv messages before receiving the remote
peer's version message.
Fixes issue #2178 : attacker could penny-flood with invalid-signature
transactions to deduce which addresses belonged to your node.
I'm committing this early for code review; I still need to write up
a test plan.
Executive summary of fix: check all transactions received from the network
for penny-flood rate-limiting before adding to the memory pool. But do NOT
ratelimit transactions added to the memory pool:
- because of blockchain reorgs
- stored in the wallet and added at startup
- sent from the GUI or one of the send* RPC commands (CWallet::CommitTransaction)
The limit-free-transactions code really should be a method on CNode, with
counters per-peer. But that is a bigger change for another day.
