The blockchain that provides the digital content namespace for the LBRY protocol
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Gregory Maxwell 19521acfa4 Do not consider inbound peers for outbound network group exclusion.
Bitcoin will not make an outbound connection to a network group
(/16 for IPv4) that it is already connected to. This means that
if an attacker wants good odds of capturing all a nodes outbound
connections he must have hosts on a a large number of distinct
groups.

Previously both inbound and outbound connections were used to
feed this exclusion. The use of inbound connections, which can be
controlled by the attacker, actually has the potential of making
sibyl attacks _easier_: An attacker can start up hosts in groups
which house many honest nodes and make outbound connections to
the victim to exclude big swaths of honest nodes. Because the
attacker chooses to make the outbound connection he can always
beat out honest nodes for the consumption of inbound slots.

At _best_ the old behavior increases attacker costs by a single
group (e.g. one distinct group to use to fill up all your inbound
slots), but at worst it allows the attacker to select whole
networks you won't connect to.

This commit makes the nodes use only outbound links to exclude
network groups for outbound connections. Fancier things could
be done, like weaker exclusion for inbound groups... but
simplicity is good and I don't believe more complexity is
currently needed.
2012-07-01 20:42:47 -04:00
contrib Update contrib/debian and remove system json_spirit patch. 2012-06-25 23:59:19 +02:00
doc Some documentation about tor 2012-06-23 01:11:38 +02:00
share Update bitcoinstrings from core and English source translation file 2012-06-13 18:19:16 +02:00
src Do not consider inbound peers for outbound network group exclusion. 2012-07-01 20:42:47 -04:00
.gitattributes Build identification strings 2012-04-10 18:16:53 +02:00
.gitignore .gitignore: add test_bitcoin 2012-05-23 21:45:26 -04:00
bitcoin-qt.pro Create new rpcnet module, and move 'getconnectioncount' RPC to it 2012-06-28 23:18:38 -04:00
COPYING Update all copyrights to 2012 2012-02-07 11:28:30 -05:00
INSTALL Update master 2012-06-21 09:36:20 +08:00
README directory re-organization (keeps the old build system) 2011-04-23 12:10:25 +02:00
README.md Updated readme file with timers. 2011-09-26 22:22:19 -04:00

Bitcoin integration/staging tree

Development process

Developers work in their own trees, then submit pull requests when they think their feature or bug fix is ready.

If it is a simple/trivial/non-controversial change, then one of the bitcoin development team members simply pulls it.

If it is a more complicated or potentially controversial change, then the patch submitter will be asked to start a discussion (if they haven't already) on the mailing list: http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/forum.php?forum_name=bitcoin-development

The patch will be accepted if there is broad consensus that it is a good thing. Developers should expect to rework and resubmit patches if they don't match the project's coding conventions (see coding.txt) or are controversial.

The master branch is regularly built and tested, but is not guaranteed to be completely stable. Tags are regularly created to indicate new official, stable release versions of Bitcoin. If you would like to help test the Bitcoin core, please contact QA@BitcoinTesting.org.

Feature branches are created when there are major new features being worked on by several people.

From time to time a pull request will become outdated. If this occurs, and the pull is no longer automatically mergeable; a comment on the pull will be used to issue a warning of closure. The pull will be closed 15 days after the warning if action is not taken by the author. Pull requests closed in this manner will have their corresponding issue labeled 'stagnant'.

Issues with no commits will be given a similar warning, and closed after 15 days from their last activity. Issues closed in this manner will be labeled 'stale'.

Requests to reopen closed pull requests and/or issues can be submitted to QA@BitcoinTesting.org.