45c00f8416
47776a958bAdd linter: Make sure all shell scripts opt out of locale dependence using "export LC_ALL=C" (practicalswift)3352da8da1Add "export LC_ALL=C" to all shell scripts (practicalswift) Pull request description: ~~Make sure `LC_ALL=C` is set when using `grep` range expressions.~~ Make sure `LC_ALL=C` is set in all shell scripts. From the `grep(1)` documentation: > Within a bracket expression, a range expression consists of two characters separated by a hyphen. It matches any single character that sorts between the two characters, inclusive, using the locale's collating sequence and character set. For example, in the default C locale, `[a-d]` is equivalent to `[abcd]`. Many locales sort characters in dictionary order, and in these locales `[a-d]` is typically not equivalent to `[abcd]`; it might be equivalent to `[aBbCcDd]`, for example. To obtain the traditional interpretation of bracket expressions, you can use the C locale by setting the `LC_ALL` environment variable to the value C. Context: [Locale issue found when reviewing #13450](https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/13450/files#r194877736) Tree-SHA512: fd74d2612998f9b49ef9be24410e505d8c842716f84d085157fc7f9799d40e8a7b4969de783afcf99b7fae4f91bbb4559651f7dd6578a6a081a50bdea29f0909
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Bash
Executable file
65 lines
2.4 KiB
Bash
Executable file
#!/bin/sh
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# Copyright (c) 2014-2016 The Bitcoin Core developers
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# Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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# file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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export LC_ALL=C
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INPUT=$(cat /dev/stdin)
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VALID=false
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REVSIG=false
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IFS='
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'
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if [ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_SHA1" = 1 ]; then
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GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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else
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# Note how we've disabled SHA1 with the --weak-digest option, disabling
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# signatures - including selfsigs - that use SHA1. While you might think that
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# collision attacks shouldn't be an issue as they'd be an attack on yourself,
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# in fact because what's being signed is a commit object that's
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# semi-deterministically generated by untrusted input (the pull-req) in theory
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# an attacker could construct a pull-req that results in a commit object that
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# they've created a collision for. Not the most likely attack, but preventing
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# it is pretty easy so we do so as a "belt-and-suspenders" measure.
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GPG_RES=""
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for LINE in "$(gpg --version)"; do
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case "$LINE" in
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"gpg (GnuPG) 1.4.1"*|"gpg (GnuPG) 2.0."*)
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echo "Please upgrade to at least gpg 2.1.10 to check for weak signatures" > /dev/stderr
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GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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;;
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# We assume if you're running 2.1+, you're probably running 2.1.10+
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# gpg will fail otherwise
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# We assume if you're running 1.X, it is either 1.4.1X or 1.4.20+
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# gpg will fail otherwise
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esac
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done
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[ "$GPG_RES" = "" ] && GPG_RES="$(printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always --weak-digest sha1 "$@" 2>/dev/null)"
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fi
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for LINE in $(echo "$GPG_RES"); do
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case "$LINE" in
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"[GNUPG:] VALIDSIG "*)
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while read KEY; do
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[ "${LINE#?GNUPG:? VALIDSIG * * * * * * * * * }" = "$KEY" ] && VALID=true
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done < ./contrib/verify-commits/trusted-keys
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;;
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"[GNUPG:] REVKEYSIG "*)
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[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
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REVSIG=true
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GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
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;;
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"[GNUPG:] EXPKEYSIG "*)
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[ "$BITCOIN_VERIFY_COMMITS_ALLOW_REVSIG" != 1 ] && exit 1
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REVSIG=true
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GOODREVSIG="[GNUPG:] GOODSIG ${LINE#* * *}"
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;;
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esac
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done
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if ! $VALID; then
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exit 1
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fi
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if $VALID && $REVSIG; then
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printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null | grep "^\[GNUPG:\] \(NEWSIG\|SIG_ID\|VALIDSIG\)"
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echo "$GOODREVSIG"
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else
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printf '%s\n' "$INPUT" | gpg --trust-model always "$@" 2>/dev/null
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fi
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