aefda1245b
Prevents duplicate accounts. Also allows case insensitive search (user id, salt seed, etc) while still having an index. This is done by storing normalized as a separate field from originally formated (which we'll use for sending emails, etc).
556 lines
16 KiB
Go
556 lines
16 KiB
Go
package store
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// TODO - DeviceId - What about clients that lie about deviceId? Maybe require a certain format to make sure it gives a real value? Something it wouldn't come up with by accident.
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import (
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"database/sql"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"log"
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"time"
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"github.com/mattn/go-sqlite3"
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"lbryio/lbry-id/auth"
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"lbryio/lbry-id/wallet"
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)
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var (
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ErrDuplicateToken = fmt.Errorf("Token already exists for this user and device")
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ErrNoToken = fmt.Errorf("Token does not exist for this user and device")
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ErrDuplicateWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet already exists for this user")
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ErrNoWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet does not exist for this user")
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ErrUnexpectedWallet = fmt.Errorf("Wallet unexpectedly exist for this user")
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ErrWrongSequence = fmt.Errorf("Wallet could not be updated to this sequence")
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ErrDuplicateEmail = fmt.Errorf("Email already exists for this user")
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ErrDuplicateAccount = fmt.Errorf("User already has an account")
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ErrWrongCredentials = fmt.Errorf("No match for email and password")
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)
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// For test stubs
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type StoreInterface interface {
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SaveToken(*auth.AuthToken) error
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GetToken(auth.TokenString) (*auth.AuthToken, error)
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SetWallet(auth.UserId, wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac) error
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GetWallet(auth.UserId) (wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac, error)
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GetUserId(auth.Email, auth.Password) (auth.UserId, error)
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CreateAccount(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed) error
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ChangePasswordWithWallet(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed, wallet.EncryptedWallet, wallet.Sequence, wallet.WalletHmac) error
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ChangePasswordNoWallet(auth.Email, auth.Password, auth.Password, auth.ClientSaltSeed) error
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GetClientSaltSeed(auth.Email) (auth.ClientSaltSeed, error)
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}
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type Store struct {
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db *sql.DB
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}
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func (s *Store) Init(fileName string) {
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db, err := sql.Open("sqlite3", "file:"+fileName+"?_foreign_keys=on")
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if err != nil {
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log.Fatal(err)
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}
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s.db = db
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}
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func (s *Store) Migrate() error {
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// We use the `sequence` field for transaction safety. For instance, let's
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// say two different clients are trying to update the sequence from 5 to 6.
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// The update command will specify "WHERE sequence=5". Only one of these
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// commands will succeed, and the other will get back an error.
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// We use AUTOINCREMENT against the protestations of people on the Internet
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// who claim that INTEGER PRIMARY KEY automatically has autoincrment, and
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// that using it when it's not "strictly needed" uses extra resources. But
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// without AUTOINCREMENT, it might reuse primary keys if a row is deleted and
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// re-added. Who wants that risk? Besides, we'll switch to Postgres when it's
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// time to scale anyway.
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// We use UNIQUE on auth_tokens.token so that we can retrieve it easily and
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// identify the user (and I suppose the uniqueness provides a little extra
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// security in case we screw up the random generator). However the primary
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// key should still be (user_id, device_id) so that a device's row can be
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// updated with a new token.
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query := `
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auth_tokens(
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token TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
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device_id TEXT NOT NULL,
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scope TEXT NOT NULL,
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expiration DATETIME NOT NULL,
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CHECK (
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-- should eventually fail for foreign key constraint instead
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device_id <> '' AND
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token <> '' AND
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scope <> '' AND
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-- Don't know when it uses either format to denote UTC
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expiration <> "0001-01-01 00:00:00+00:00" AND
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expiration <> "0001-01-01 00:00:00Z"
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),
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PRIMARY KEY (user_id, device_id)
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FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES accounts(user_id)
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS wallets(
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user_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
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encrypted_wallet TEXT NOT NULL,
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sequence INTEGER NOT NULL,
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hmac TEXT NOT NULL,
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PRIMARY KEY (user_id)
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FOREIGN KEY (user_id) REFERENCES accounts(user_id)
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CHECK (
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encrypted_wallet <> '' AND
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hmac <> '' AND
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sequence <> 0
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)
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);
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CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS accounts(
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normalized_email TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE,
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email TEXT NOT NULL,
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key TEXT NOT NULL,
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client_salt_seed TEXT NOT NULL,
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server_salt TEXT NOT NULL,
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user_id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT,
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CHECK (
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email <> '' AND
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normalized_email <> '' AND
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key <> '' AND
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client_salt_seed <> '' AND
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server_salt <> ''
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)
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);
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`
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_, err := s.db.Exec(query)
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return err
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}
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////////////////
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// Auth Token //
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////////////////
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// TODO - Is it safe to assume that the owner of the token is legit, and is
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// coming from the legit device id? No need to query by userId and deviceId
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// (which I did previously)?
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//
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// TODO Put the timestamp in the token to avoid duplicates over time. And/or just use a library! Someone solved this already.
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func (s *Store) GetToken(token auth.TokenString) (authToken *auth.AuthToken, err error) {
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expirationCutoff := time.Now().UTC()
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authToken = &(auth.AuthToken{})
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err = s.db.QueryRow(
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"SELECT token, user_id, device_id, scope, expiration FROM auth_tokens WHERE token=? AND expiration>?", token, expirationCutoff,
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).Scan(
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&authToken.Token,
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&authToken.UserId,
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&authToken.DeviceId,
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&authToken.Scope,
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&authToken.Expiration,
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)
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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err = ErrNoToken
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}
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if err != nil {
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authToken = nil
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) insertToken(authToken *auth.AuthToken, expiration time.Time) (err error) {
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_, err = s.db.Exec(
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"INSERT INTO auth_tokens (token, user_id, device_id, scope, expiration) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
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authToken.Token, authToken.UserId, authToken.DeviceId, authToken.Scope, expiration,
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)
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var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
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if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
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// I initially expected to need to check for ErrConstraintUnique.
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// Maybe for psql it will be?
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if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintPrimaryKey) {
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err = ErrDuplicateToken
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}
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) updateToken(authToken *auth.AuthToken, experation time.Time) (err error) {
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res, err := s.db.Exec(
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"UPDATE auth_tokens SET token=?, expiration=?, scope=? WHERE user_id=? AND device_id=?",
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authToken.Token, experation, authToken.Scope, authToken.UserId, authToken.DeviceId,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if numRows == 0 {
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err = ErrNoToken
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) SaveToken(token *auth.AuthToken) (err error) {
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// TODO: For psql, do upsert here instead of separate insertToken and updateToken functions
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// Actually it may even be available for SQLite?
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// TODO - Should we auto-delete expired tokens?
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expiration := time.Now().UTC().Add(time.Hour * 24 * 14)
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// This is most likely not the first time calling this function for this
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// device, so there's probably already a token in there.
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err = s.updateToken(token, expiration)
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if err == ErrNoToken {
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// If we don't have a token already saved, insert a new one:
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err = s.insertToken(token, expiration)
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if err == ErrDuplicateToken {
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// By unlikely coincidence, a token was created between trying `updateToken`
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// and trying `insertToken`. At this point we can safely `updateToken`.
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// TODO - reconsider this - if one client has two concurrent requests
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// that create this situation, maybe the second one should just fail?
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err = s.updateToken(token, expiration)
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}
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}
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if err == nil {
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token.Expiration = &expiration
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}
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return
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}
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////////////
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// Wallet //
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////////////
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func (s *Store) GetWallet(userId auth.UserId) (encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet, sequence wallet.Sequence, hmac wallet.WalletHmac, err error) {
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err = s.db.QueryRow(
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"SELECT encrypted_wallet, sequence, hmac FROM wallets WHERE user_id=?",
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userId,
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).Scan(
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&encryptedWallet,
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&sequence,
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&hmac,
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)
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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err = ErrNoWallet
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) insertFirstWallet(
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userId auth.UserId,
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encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
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hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
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) (err error) {
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// This will only be used to attempt to insert the first wallet (sequence=1).
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// The database will enforce that this will not be set if this user already
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// has a wallet.
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_, err = s.db.Exec(
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"INSERT INTO wallets (user_id, encrypted_wallet, sequence, hmac) VALUES(?,?,?,?)",
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userId, encryptedWallet, 1, hmac,
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)
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var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
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if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
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// I initially expected to need to check for ErrConstraintUnique.
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// Maybe for psql it will be?
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if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintPrimaryKey) {
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// NOTE While ErrDuplicateWallet makes sense in the context of trying to insert,
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// SetWallet, which also handles update, translates this to ErrWrongSequence
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err = ErrDuplicateWallet
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}
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) updateWalletToSequence(
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userId auth.UserId,
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encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
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sequence wallet.Sequence,
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hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
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) (err error) {
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// This will be used for wallets with sequence > 1.
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// Use the database to enforce that we only update if we are incrementing the sequence.
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// This way, if two clients attempt to update at the same time, it will return
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// an error for the second one.
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res, err := s.db.Exec(
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"UPDATE wallets SET encrypted_wallet=?, sequence=?, hmac=? WHERE user_id=? AND sequence=?",
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encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac, userId, sequence-1,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if numRows == 0 {
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// NOTE While ErrNoWallet makes sense in the context of trying to update,
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// SetWallet, which also handles insert, translates this to ErrWrongSequence
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err = ErrNoWallet
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}
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return
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}
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// Assumption: Sequence has been validated (>=1)
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func (s *Store) SetWallet(userId auth.UserId, encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet, sequence wallet.Sequence, hmac wallet.WalletHmac) (err error) {
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if sequence == 1 {
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// If sequence == 1, the client assumed that this is our first
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// wallet. Try to insert. If we get a conflict, the client
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// assumed incorrectly and we proceed below to return the latest
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// wallet from the db.
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err = s.insertFirstWallet(userId, encryptedWallet, hmac)
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if err == ErrDuplicateWallet {
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// A wallet already exists. That means the input sequence should not be 1.
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// To the caller, this means the sequence was wrong.
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err = ErrWrongSequence
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}
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} else {
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// If sequence > 1, the client assumed that it is replacing wallet
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// with sequence - 1. Explicitly try to update the wallet with
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// sequence - 1. If we updated no rows, the client assumed incorrectly
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// and we proceed below to return the latest wallet from the db.
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err = s.updateWalletToSequence(userId, encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac)
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if err == ErrNoWallet {
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// No wallet found to replace at the `sequence - 1`. To the caller, this
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// means the sequence they put in was wrong.
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err = ErrWrongSequence
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}
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}
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return
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}
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func (s *Store) GetUserId(email auth.Email, password auth.Password) (userId auth.UserId, err error) {
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var key auth.KDFKey
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var salt auth.ServerSalt
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err = s.db.QueryRow(
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`SELECT user_id, key, server_salt from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
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email.Normalize(),
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).Scan(&userId, &key, &salt)
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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err = ErrWrongCredentials
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}
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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match, err := password.Check(key, salt)
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if err == nil && !match {
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err = ErrWrongCredentials
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userId = auth.UserId(0)
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}
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return
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}
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/////////////
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// Account //
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/////////////
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func (s *Store) CreateAccount(email auth.Email, password auth.Password, seed auth.ClientSaltSeed) (err error) {
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key, salt, err := password.Create()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// userId auto-increments
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_, err = s.db.Exec(
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"INSERT INTO accounts (normalized_email, email, key, server_salt, client_salt_seed) VALUES(?,?,?,?,?)",
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email.Normalize(), email, key, salt, seed,
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)
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var sqliteErr sqlite3.Error
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if errors.As(err, &sqliteErr) {
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if errors.Is(sqliteErr.ExtendedCode, sqlite3.ErrConstraintUnique) {
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err = ErrDuplicateAccount
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}
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}
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return
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}
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// Change password. For the user, this requires changing their root password,
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// which changes the encryption key for the wallet as well. Thus, we should
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// update the wallet at the same time to avoid ever having a situation where
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// these two don't match.
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//
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// Also delete all auth tokens to force clients to update their root password
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// to get a new token. This prevents other clients from posting a wallet
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// encrypted with the old key.
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func (s *Store) ChangePasswordWithWallet(
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email auth.Email,
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oldPassword auth.Password,
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newPassword auth.Password,
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clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
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encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
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sequence wallet.Sequence,
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hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
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) (err error) {
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return s.changePassword(
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email,
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oldPassword,
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newPassword,
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clientSaltSeed,
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encryptedWallet,
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sequence,
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hmac,
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)
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}
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// Change password, but with no wallet currently saved. Since there's no
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// wallet saved, there's no wallet to update. The encryption key is moot.
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//
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// Also delete all auth tokens to force clients to update their root password
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// to get a new token. This prevents other clients from posting a wallet
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// encrypted with the old key.
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func (s *Store) ChangePasswordNoWallet(
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email auth.Email,
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oldPassword auth.Password,
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newPassword auth.Password,
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clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
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) (err error) {
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return s.changePassword(
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email,
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oldPassword,
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newPassword,
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clientSaltSeed,
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wallet.EncryptedWallet(""),
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wallet.Sequence(0),
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wallet.WalletHmac(""),
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)
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}
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// Common code for for WithWallet and WithNoWallet password change functions
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func (s *Store) changePassword(
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email auth.Email,
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oldPassword auth.Password,
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newPassword auth.Password,
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clientSaltSeed auth.ClientSaltSeed,
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encryptedWallet wallet.EncryptedWallet,
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sequence wallet.Sequence,
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hmac wallet.WalletHmac,
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) (err error) {
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var userId auth.UserId
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tx, err := s.db.Begin()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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// Lots of error conditions. Just defer this. However, we need to make sure to
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// make sure the variable `err` is set to the error before we return, instead
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// of doing `return <error>`.
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endTxn := func() {
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if err != nil {
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tx.Rollback()
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} else {
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tx.Commit()
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}
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}
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defer endTxn()
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var oldKey auth.KDFKey
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var oldSalt auth.ServerSalt
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err = tx.QueryRow(
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`SELECT user_id, key, server_salt from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
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email.Normalize(),
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).Scan(&userId, &oldKey, &oldSalt)
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if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
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err = ErrWrongCredentials
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}
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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match, err := oldPassword.Check(oldKey, oldSalt)
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if err == nil && !match {
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err = ErrWrongCredentials
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}
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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newKey, newSalt, err := newPassword.Create()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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res, err := tx.Exec(
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"UPDATE accounts SET key=?, server_salt=?, client_salt_seed=? WHERE user_id=?",
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newKey, newSalt, clientSaltSeed, userId,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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numRows, err := res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if numRows == 0 {
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// Very unexpected error!
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err = fmt.Errorf("Password failed to update")
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return
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}
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if encryptedWallet != "" {
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// With a wallet expected: update it.
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res, err = tx.Exec(
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`UPDATE wallets SET encrypted_wallet=?, sequence=?, hmac=?
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WHERE user_id=? AND sequence=?`,
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encryptedWallet, sequence, hmac, userId, sequence-1,
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)
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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numRows, err = res.RowsAffected()
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if err != nil {
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return
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}
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if numRows == 0 {
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err = ErrWrongSequence
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return
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}
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|
} else {
|
|
// With no wallet expected: assert we have no wallet.
|
|
|
|
var dummy string
|
|
err = tx.QueryRow("SELECT 1 FROM wallets WHERE user_id=?", userId).Scan(&dummy)
|
|
if err != sql.ErrNoRows {
|
|
if err == nil {
|
|
// We expected no rows
|
|
err = ErrUnexpectedWallet
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
// Some other error
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't care how many I delete here. Might even be zero. No login token while
|
|
// changing password seems plausible.
|
|
_, err = tx.Exec("DELETE FROM auth_tokens WHERE user_id=?", userId)
|
|
return
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (s *Store) GetClientSaltSeed(email auth.Email) (seed auth.ClientSaltSeed, err error) {
|
|
err = s.db.QueryRow(
|
|
`SELECT client_salt_seed from accounts WHERE normalized_email=?`,
|
|
email.Normalize(),
|
|
).Scan(&seed)
|
|
if err == sql.ErrNoRows {
|
|
err = ErrWrongCredentials
|
|
}
|
|
return
|
|
}
|