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// Copyright (c) 2009-2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
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// Copyright (c) 2009-2018 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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# include <net_processing.h>
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# include <addrman.h>
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# include <banman.h>
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# include <arith_uint256.h>
# include <blockencodings.h>
# include <chainparams.h>
# include <consensus/validation.h>
# include <hash.h>
# include <validation.h>
# include <merkleblock.h>
# include <netmessagemaker.h>
# include <netbase.h>
# include <policy/fees.h>
# include <policy/policy.h>
# include <primitives/block.h>
# include <primitives/transaction.h>
# include <random.h>
# include <reverse_iterator.h>
# include <scheduler.h>
# include <tinyformat.h>
# include <txmempool.h>
# include <ui_interface.h>
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# include <util/system.h>
# include <util/moneystr.h>
# include <util/strencodings.h>
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# include <util/validation.h>
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# include <memory>
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# if defined(NDEBUG)
# error "Bitcoin cannot be compiled without assertions."
# endif
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/** Expiration time for orphan transactions in seconds */
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static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME = 20 * 60 ;
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/** Minimum time between orphan transactions expire time checks in seconds */
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static constexpr int64_t ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL = 5 * 60 ;
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/** Headers download timeout expressed in microseconds
* Timeout = base + per_header * ( expected number of headers ) */
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE = 15 * 60 * 1000000 ; // 15 minutes
static constexpr int64_t HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER = 1000 ; // 1ms/header
/** Protect at least this many outbound peers from disconnection due to slow/
* behind headers chain .
*/
static constexpr int32_t MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT = 4 ;
/** Timeout for (unprotected) outbound peers to sync to our chainwork, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT = 20 * 60 ; // 20 minutes
/** How frequently to check for stale tips, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL = 10 * 60 ; // 10 minutes
/** How frequently to check for extra outbound peers and disconnect, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL = 45 ;
/** Minimum time an outbound-peer-eviction candidate must be connected for, in order to evict, in seconds */
static constexpr int64_t MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME = 30 ;
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/** SHA256("main address relay")[0:8] */
static constexpr uint64_t RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY = 0x3cac0035b5866b90ULL ;
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/// Age after which a stale block will no longer be served if requested as
/// protection against fingerprinting. Set to one month, denominated in seconds.
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static constexpr int STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
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/// Age after which a block is considered historical for purposes of rate
/// limiting block relay. Set to one week, denominated in seconds.
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static constexpr int HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
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/** Maximum number of in-flight transactions from a peer */
static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT = 100 ;
/** Maximum number of announced transactions from a peer */
static constexpr int32_t MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS = 2 * MAX_INV_SZ ;
/** How many microseconds to delay requesting transactions from inbound peers */
static constexpr int64_t INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY = 2 * 1000000 ;
/** How long to wait (in microseconds) before downloading a transaction from an additional peer */
static constexpr int64_t GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL = 60 * 1000000 ;
/** Maximum delay (in microseconds) for transaction requests to avoid biasing some peers over others. */
static constexpr int64_t MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY = 2 * 1000000 ;
static_assert ( INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY > = MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY ,
" To preserve security, MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY should not exceed INBOUND_PEER_DELAY " ) ;
/** Limit to avoid sending big packets. Not used in processing incoming GETDATA for compatibility */
static const unsigned int MAX_GETDATA_SZ = 1000 ;
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struct COrphanTx {
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// When modifying, adapt the copy of this definition in tests/DoS_tests.
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CTransactionRef tx ;
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NodeId fromPeer ;
int64_t nTimeExpire ;
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size_t list_pos ;
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} ;
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CCriticalSection g_cs_orphans ;
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > mapOrphanTransactions GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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void EraseOrphansFor ( NodeId peer ) ;
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/** Increase a node's misbehavior score. */
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void Misbehaving ( NodeId nodeid , int howmuch , const std : : string & message = " " ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Average delay between local address broadcasts in seconds. */
static constexpr unsigned int AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 24 * 60 * 60 ;
/** Average delay between peer address broadcasts in seconds. */
static const unsigned int AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 30 ;
/** Average delay between trickled inventory transmissions in seconds.
* Blocks and whitelisted receivers bypass this , outbound peers get half this delay . */
static const unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 5 ;
/** Maximum number of inventory items to send per transmission.
* Limits the impact of low - fee transaction floods . */
static constexpr unsigned int INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX = 7 * INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ;
/** Average delay between feefilter broadcasts in seconds. */
static constexpr unsigned int AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL = 10 * 60 ;
/** Maximum feefilter broadcast delay after significant change. */
static constexpr unsigned int MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY = 5 * 60 ;
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// Internal stuff
namespace {
/** Number of nodes with fSyncStarted. */
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int nSyncStarted GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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/**
* Sources of received blocks , saved to be able to send them reject
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* messages or ban them when processing happens afterwards .
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* Set mapBlockSource [ hash ] . second to false if the node should not be
* punished if the block is invalid .
*/
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , bool > > mapBlockSource GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/**
* Filter for transactions that were recently rejected by
* AcceptToMemoryPool . These are not rerequested until the chain tip
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* changes , at which point the entire filter is reset .
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*
* Without this filter we ' d be re - requesting txs from each of our peers ,
* increasing bandwidth consumption considerably . For instance , with 100
* peers , half of which relay a tx we don ' t accept , that might be a 50 x
* bandwidth increase . A flooding attacker attempting to roll - over the
* filter using minimum - sized , 60 byte , transactions might manage to send
* 1000 / sec if we have fast peers , so we pick 120 , 000 to give our peers a
* two minute window to send invs to us .
*
* Decreasing the false positive rate is fairly cheap , so we pick one in a
* million to make it highly unlikely for users to have issues with this
* filter .
*
* Memory used : 1.3 MB
*/
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std : : unique_ptr < CRollingBloomFilter > recentRejects GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
uint256 hashRecentRejectsChainTip GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Blocks that are in flight, and that are in the queue to be downloaded. */
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struct QueuedBlock {
uint256 hash ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex ; //!< Optional.
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bool fValidatedHeaders ; //!< Whether this block has validated headers at the time of request.
std : : unique_ptr < PartiallyDownloadedBlock > partialBlock ; //!< Optional, used for CMPCTBLOCK downloads
} ;
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > mapBlocksInFlight GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Stack of nodes which we have set to announce using compact blocks */
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std : : list < NodeId > lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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/** Number of preferable block download peers. */
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int nPreferredDownload GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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/** Number of peers from which we're downloading blocks. */
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int nPeersWithValidatedDownloads GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
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Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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/** Number of outbound peers with m_chain_sync.m_protect. */
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int g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) = 0 ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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/** When our tip was last updated. */
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std : : atomic < int64_t > g_last_tip_update ( 0 ) ;
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/** Relay map */
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typedef std : : map < uint256 , CTransactionRef > MapRelay ;
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MapRelay mapRelay GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
/** Expiration-time ordered list of (expire time, relay map entry) pairs. */
std : : deque < std : : pair < int64_t , MapRelay : : iterator > > vRelayExpiration GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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struct IteratorComparator
{
template < typename I >
bool operator ( ) ( const I & a , const I & b ) const
{
return & ( * a ) < & ( * b ) ;
}
} ;
std : : map < COutPoint , std : : set < std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator , IteratorComparator > > mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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std : : vector < std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator > g_orphan_list GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ; //! For random eviction
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static size_t vExtraTxnForCompactIt GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) = 0 ;
static std : : vector < std : : pair < uint256 , CTransactionRef > > vExtraTxnForCompact GUARDED_BY ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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} // namespace
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namespace {
struct CBlockReject {
unsigned char chRejectCode ;
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std : : string strRejectReason ;
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uint256 hashBlock ;
} ;
/**
* Maintain validation - specific state about nodes , protected by cs_main , instead
* by CNode ' s own locks . This simplifies asynchronous operation , where
* processing of incoming data is done after the ProcessMessage call returns ,
* and we ' re no longer holding the node ' s locks .
*/
struct CNodeState {
//! The peer's address
const CService address ;
//! Whether we have a fully established connection.
bool fCurrentlyConnected ;
//! Accumulated misbehaviour score for this peer.
int nMisbehavior ;
//! Whether this peer should be disconnected and banned (unless whitelisted).
bool fShouldBan ;
//! String name of this peer (debugging/logging purposes).
const std : : string name ;
//! List of asynchronously-determined block rejections to notify this peer about.
std : : vector < CBlockReject > rejects ;
//! The best known block we know this peer has announced.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexBestKnownBlock ;
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//! The hash of the last unknown block this peer has announced.
uint256 hashLastUnknownBlock ;
//! The last full block we both have.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexLastCommonBlock ;
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//! The best header we have sent our peer.
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const CBlockIndex * pindexBestHeaderSent ;
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//! Length of current-streak of unconnecting headers announcements
int nUnconnectingHeaders ;
//! Whether we've started headers synchronization with this peer.
bool fSyncStarted ;
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//! When to potentially disconnect peer for stalling headers download
int64_t nHeadersSyncTimeout ;
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//! Since when we're stalling block download progress (in microseconds), or 0.
int64_t nStallingSince ;
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std : : list < QueuedBlock > vBlocksInFlight ;
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//! When the first entry in vBlocksInFlight started downloading. Don't care when vBlocksInFlight is empty.
int64_t nDownloadingSince ;
int nBlocksInFlight ;
int nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders ;
//! Whether we consider this a preferred download peer.
bool fPreferredDownload ;
//! Whether this peer wants invs or headers (when possible) for block announcements.
bool fPreferHeaders ;
//! Whether this peer wants invs or cmpctblocks (when possible) for block announcements.
bool fPreferHeaderAndIDs ;
/**
* Whether this peer will send us cmpctblocks if we request them .
* This is not used to gate request logic , as we really only care about fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ,
* but is used as a flag to " lock in " the version of compact blocks ( fWantsCmpctWitness ) we send .
*/
bool fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ;
//! Whether this peer can give us witnesses
bool fHaveWitness ;
//! Whether this peer wants witnesses in cmpctblocks/blocktxns
bool fWantsCmpctWitness ;
/**
* If we ' ve announced NODE_WITNESS to this peer : whether the peer sends witnesses in cmpctblocks / blocktxns ,
* otherwise : whether this peer sends non - witnesses in cmpctblocks / blocktxns .
*/
bool fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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/** State used to enforce CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT
* Only in effect for outbound , non - manual connections , with
* m_protect = = false
* Algorithm : if a peer ' s best known block has less work than our tip ,
* set a timeout CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT seconds in the future :
* - If at timeout their best known block now has more work than our tip
* when the timeout was set , then either reset the timeout or clear it
* ( after comparing against our current tip ' s work )
* - If at timeout their best known block still has less work than our
* tip did when the timeout was set , then send a getheaders message ,
* and set a shorter timeout , HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds in future .
* If their best known block is still behind when that new timeout is
* reached , disconnect .
*/
struct ChainSyncTimeoutState {
//! A timeout used for checking whether our peer has sufficiently synced
int64_t m_timeout ;
//! A header with the work we require on our peer's chain
const CBlockIndex * m_work_header ;
//! After timeout is reached, set to true after sending getheaders
bool m_sent_getheaders ;
//! Whether this peer is protected from disconnection due to a bad/slow chain
bool m_protect ;
} ;
ChainSyncTimeoutState m_chain_sync ;
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//! Time of last new block announcement
int64_t m_last_block_announcement ;
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/*
* State associated with transaction download .
*
* Tx download algorithm :
*
* When inv comes in , queue up ( process_time , txid ) inside the peer ' s
* CNodeState ( m_tx_process_time ) as long as m_tx_announced for the peer
* isn ' t too big ( MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS ) .
*
* The process_time for a transaction is set to nNow for outbound peers ,
* nNow + 2 seconds for inbound peers . This is the time at which we ' ll
* consider trying to request the transaction from the peer in
* SendMessages ( ) . The delay for inbound peers is to allow outbound peers
* a chance to announce before we request from inbound peers , to prevent
* an adversary from using inbound connections to blind us to a
* transaction ( InvBlock ) .
*
* When we call SendMessages ( ) for a given peer ,
* we will loop over the transactions in m_tx_process_time , looking
* at the transactions whose process_time < = nNow . We ' ll request each
* such transaction that we don ' t have already and that hasn ' t been
* requested from another peer recently , up until we hit the
* MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT limit for the peer . Then we ' ll update
* g_already_asked_for for each requested txid , storing the time of the
* GETDATA request . We use g_already_asked_for to coordinate transaction
* requests amongst our peers .
*
* For transactions that we still need but we have already recently
* requested from some other peer , we ' ll reinsert ( process_time , txid )
* back into the peer ' s m_tx_process_time at the point in the future at
* which the most recent GETDATA request would time out ( ie
* GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL + the request time stored in g_already_asked_for ) .
* We add an additional delay for inbound peers , again to prefer
* attempting download from outbound peers first .
* We also add an extra small random delay up to 2 seconds
* to avoid biasing some peers over others . ( e . g . , due to fixed ordering
* of peer processing in ThreadMessageHandler ) .
*
* When we receive a transaction from a peer , we remove the txid from the
* peer ' s m_tx_in_flight set and from their recently announced set
* ( m_tx_announced ) . We also clear g_already_asked_for for that entry , so
* that if somehow the transaction is not accepted but also not added to
* the reject filter , then we will eventually redownload from other
* peers .
*/
struct TxDownloadState {
/* Track when to attempt download of announced transactions (process
* time in micros - > txid )
*/
std : : multimap < int64_t , uint256 > m_tx_process_time ;
//! Store all the transactions a peer has recently announced
std : : set < uint256 > m_tx_announced ;
//! Store transactions which were requested by us
std : : set < uint256 > m_tx_in_flight ;
} ;
TxDownloadState m_tx_download ;
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//! Whether this peer is an inbound connection
bool m_is_inbound ;
//! Whether this peer is a manual connection
bool m_is_manual_connection ;
CNodeState ( CAddress addrIn , std : : string addrNameIn , bool is_inbound , bool is_manual ) :
address ( addrIn ) , name ( std : : move ( addrNameIn ) ) , m_is_inbound ( is_inbound ) ,
m_is_manual_connection ( is_manual )
{
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fCurrentlyConnected = false ;
nMisbehavior = 0 ;
fShouldBan = false ;
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pindexBestKnownBlock = nullptr ;
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hashLastUnknownBlock . SetNull ( ) ;
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pindexLastCommonBlock = nullptr ;
pindexBestHeaderSent = nullptr ;
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nUnconnectingHeaders = 0 ;
fSyncStarted = false ;
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nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0 ;
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nStallingSince = 0 ;
nDownloadingSince = 0 ;
nBlocksInFlight = 0 ;
nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = 0 ;
fPreferredDownload = false ;
fPreferHeaders = false ;
fPreferHeaderAndIDs = false ;
fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = false ;
fHaveWitness = false ;
fWantsCmpctWitness = false ;
fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = false ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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m_chain_sync = { 0 , nullptr , false , false } ;
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m_last_block_announcement = 0 ;
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}
} ;
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// Keeps track of the time (in microseconds) when transactions were requested last time
limitedmap < uint256 , int64_t > g_already_asked_for GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ( MAX_INV_SZ ) ;
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/** Map maintaining per-node state. */
static std : : map < NodeId , CNodeState > mapNodeState GUARDED_BY ( cs_main ) ;
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static CNodeState * State ( NodeId pnode ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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std : : map < NodeId , CNodeState > : : iterator it = mapNodeState . find ( pnode ) ;
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if ( it = = mapNodeState . end ( ) )
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return nullptr ;
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return & it - > second ;
}
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static void UpdatePreferredDownload ( CNode * node , CNodeState * state ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
nPreferredDownload - = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
// Whether this node should be marked as a preferred download node.
state - > fPreferredDownload = ( ! node - > fInbound | | node - > fWhitelisted ) & & ! node - > fOneShot & & ! node - > fClient ;
nPreferredDownload + = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
}
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static void PushNodeVersion ( CNode * pnode , CConnman * connman , int64_t nTime )
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{
ServiceFlags nLocalNodeServices = pnode - > GetLocalServices ( ) ;
uint64_t nonce = pnode - > GetLocalNonce ( ) ;
int nNodeStartingHeight = pnode - > GetMyStartingHeight ( ) ;
NodeId nodeid = pnode - > GetId ( ) ;
CAddress addr = pnode - > addr ;
CAddress addrYou = ( addr . IsRoutable ( ) & & ! IsProxy ( addr ) ? addr : CAddress ( CService ( ) , addr . nServices ) ) ;
CAddress addrMe = CAddress ( CService ( ) , nLocalNodeServices ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pnode , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : VERSION , PROTOCOL_VERSION , ( uint64_t ) nLocalNodeServices , nTime , addrYou , addrMe ,
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nonce , strSubVersion , nNodeStartingHeight , : : g_relay_txes ) ) ;
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if ( fLogIPs ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, them=%s, peer=%d \n " , PROTOCOL_VERSION , nNodeStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , addrYou . ToString ( ) , nodeid ) ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " send version message: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d \n " , PROTOCOL_VERSION , nNodeStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , nodeid ) ;
}
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}
// Returns a bool indicating whether we requested this block.
// Also used if a block was /not/ received and timed out or started with another peer
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static bool MarkBlockAsReceived ( const uint256 & hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( itInFlight ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ) {
CNodeState * state = State ( itInFlight - > second . first ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders - = itInFlight - > second . second - > fValidatedHeaders ;
if ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = = 0 & & itInFlight - > second . second - > fValidatedHeaders ) {
// Last validated block on the queue was received.
nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - - ;
}
if ( state - > vBlocksInFlight . begin ( ) = = itInFlight - > second . second ) {
// First block on the queue was received, update the start download time for the next one
state - > nDownloadingSince = std : : max ( state - > nDownloadingSince , GetTimeMicros ( ) ) ;
}
state - > vBlocksInFlight . erase ( itInFlight - > second . second ) ;
state - > nBlocksInFlight - - ;
state - > nStallingSince = 0 ;
mapBlocksInFlight . erase ( itInFlight ) ;
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
// returns false, still setting pit, if the block was already in flight from the same peer
// pit will only be valid as long as the same cs_main lock is being held
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static bool MarkBlockAsInFlight ( NodeId nodeid , const uint256 & hash , const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator * * pit = nullptr ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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// Short-circuit most stuff in case it is from the same node
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( itInFlight ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) & & itInFlight - > second . first = = nodeid ) {
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if ( pit ) {
* pit = & itInFlight - > second . second ;
}
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return false ;
}
// Make sure it's not listed somewhere already.
MarkBlockAsReceived ( hash ) ;
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std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator it = state - > vBlocksInFlight . insert ( state - > vBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ,
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{ hash , pindex , pindex ! = nullptr , std : : unique_ptr < PartiallyDownloadedBlock > ( pit ? new PartiallyDownloadedBlock ( & mempool ) : nullptr ) } ) ;
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state - > nBlocksInFlight + + ;
state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders + = it - > fValidatedHeaders ;
if ( state - > nBlocksInFlight = = 1 ) {
// We're starting a block download (batch) from this peer.
state - > nDownloadingSince = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
}
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if ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders = = 1 & & pindex ! = nullptr ) {
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nPeersWithValidatedDownloads + + ;
}
itInFlight = mapBlocksInFlight . insert ( std : : make_pair ( hash , std : : make_pair ( nodeid , it ) ) ) . first ;
if ( pit )
* pit = & itInFlight - > second . second ;
return true ;
}
/** Check whether the last unknown block a peer advertised is not yet known. */
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static void ProcessBlockAvailability ( NodeId nodeid ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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if ( ! state - > hashLastUnknownBlock . IsNull ( ) ) {
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( state - > hashLastUnknownBlock ) ;
if ( pindex & & pindex - > nChainWork > 0 ) {
if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | pindex - > nChainWork > = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork ) {
state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex ;
}
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state - > hashLastUnknownBlock . SetNull ( ) ;
}
}
}
/** Update tracking information about which blocks a peer is assumed to have. */
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static void UpdateBlockAvailability ( NodeId nodeid , const uint256 & hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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ProcessBlockAvailability ( nodeid ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hash ) ;
if ( pindex & & pindex - > nChainWork > 0 ) {
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// An actually better block was announced.
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if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | pindex - > nChainWork > = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork ) {
state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = pindex ;
}
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} else {
// An unknown block was announced; just assume that the latest one is the best one.
state - > hashLastUnknownBlock = hash ;
}
}
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/**
* When a peer sends us a valid block , instruct it to announce blocks to us
* using CMPCTBLOCK if possible by adding its nodeid to the end of
* lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs , and keeping that list under a certain size by
* removing the first element if necessary .
*/
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static void MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs ( NodeId nodeid , CConnman * connman ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( nodeid ) ;
if ( ! nodestate | | ! nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
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// Never ask from peers who can't provide witnesses.
return ;
}
if ( nodestate - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ) {
for ( std : : list < NodeId > : : iterator it = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . begin ( ) ; it ! = lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . end ( ) ; it + + ) {
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if ( * it = = nodeid ) {
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . erase ( it ) ;
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . push_back ( nodeid ) ;
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return ;
}
}
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connman - > ForNode ( nodeid , [ connman ] ( CNode * pfrom ) {
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AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) ? 2 : 1 ;
if ( lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . size ( ) > = 3 ) {
// As per BIP152, we only get 3 of our peers to announce
// blocks using compact encodings.
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connman - > ForNode ( lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . front ( ) , [ connman , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ] ( CNode * pnodeStop ) {
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AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pnodeStop , CNetMsgMaker ( pnodeStop - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/ false , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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return true ;
} ) ;
lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . pop_front ( ) ;
}
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , /*fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK=*/ true , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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lNodesAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs . push_back ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
} ) ;
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}
}
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static bool TipMayBeStale ( const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
if ( g_last_tip_update = = 0 ) {
g_last_tip_update = GetTime ( ) ;
}
return g_last_tip_update < GetTime ( ) - consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * 3 & & mapBlocksInFlight . empty ( ) ;
}
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static bool CanDirectFetch ( const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
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return : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockTime ( ) > GetAdjustedTime ( ) - consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * 20 ;
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}
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static bool PeerHasHeader ( CNodeState * state , const CBlockIndex * pindex ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock & & pindex = = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetAncestor ( pindex - > nHeight ) )
return true ;
if ( state - > pindexBestHeaderSent & & pindex = = state - > pindexBestHeaderSent - > GetAncestor ( pindex - > nHeight ) )
return true ;
return false ;
}
/** Update pindexLastCommonBlock and add not-in-flight missing successors to vBlocks, until it has
* at most count entries . */
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static void FindNextBlocksToDownload ( NodeId nodeid , unsigned int count , std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > & vBlocks , NodeId & nodeStaller , const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
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if ( count = = 0 )
return ;
vBlocks . reserve ( vBlocks . size ( ) + count ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
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// Make sure pindexBestKnownBlock is up to date, we'll need it.
ProcessBlockAvailability ( nodeid ) ;
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if ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock = = nullptr | | state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork | | state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork ) {
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// This peer has nothing interesting.
return ;
}
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if ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = = nullptr ) {
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// Bootstrap quickly by guessing a parent of our best tip is the forking point.
// Guessing wrong in either direction is not a problem.
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state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = : : ChainActive ( ) [ std : : min ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight , : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) ) ] ;
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}
// If the peer reorganized, our previous pindexLastCommonBlock may not be an ancestor
// of its current tip anymore. Go back enough to fix that.
state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = LastCommonAncestor ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock , state - > pindexBestKnownBlock ) ;
if ( state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock )
return ;
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std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToFetch ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexWalk = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock ;
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// Never fetch further than the best block we know the peer has, or more than BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW + 1 beyond the last
// linked block we have in common with this peer. The +1 is so we can detect stalling, namely if we would be able to
// download that next block if the window were 1 larger.
int nWindowEnd = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock - > nHeight + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_WINDOW ;
int nMaxHeight = std : : min < int > ( state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight , nWindowEnd + 1 ) ;
NodeId waitingfor = - 1 ;
while ( pindexWalk - > nHeight < nMaxHeight ) {
// Read up to 128 (or more, if more blocks than that are needed) successors of pindexWalk (towards
// pindexBestKnownBlock) into vToFetch. We fetch 128, because CBlockIndex::GetAncestor may be as expensive
// as iterating over ~100 CBlockIndex* entries anyway.
int nToFetch = std : : min ( nMaxHeight - pindexWalk - > nHeight , std : : max < int > ( count - vBlocks . size ( ) , 128 ) ) ;
vToFetch . resize ( nToFetch ) ;
pindexWalk = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetAncestor ( pindexWalk - > nHeight + nToFetch ) ;
vToFetch [ nToFetch - 1 ] = pindexWalk ;
for ( unsigned int i = nToFetch - 1 ; i > 0 ; i - - ) {
vToFetch [ i - 1 ] = vToFetch [ i ] - > pprev ;
}
// Iterate over those blocks in vToFetch (in forward direction), adding the ones that
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// are not yet downloaded and not in flight to vBlocks. In the meantime, update
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// pindexLastCommonBlock as long as all ancestors are already downloaded, or if it's
// already part of our chain (and therefore don't need it even if pruned).
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for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : vToFetch ) {
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if ( ! pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) ) {
// We consider the chain that this peer is on invalid.
return ;
}
if ( ! State ( nodeid ) - > fHaveWitness & & IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , consensusParams ) ) {
// We wouldn't download this block or its descendants from this peer.
return ;
}
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if ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA | | : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindex ) ) {
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if ( pindex - > HaveTxsDownloaded ( ) )
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state - > pindexLastCommonBlock = pindex ;
} else if ( mapBlocksInFlight . count ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) = = 0 ) {
// The block is not already downloaded, and not yet in flight.
if ( pindex - > nHeight > nWindowEnd ) {
// We reached the end of the window.
if ( vBlocks . size ( ) = = 0 & & waitingfor ! = nodeid ) {
// We aren't able to fetch anything, but we would be if the download window was one larger.
nodeStaller = waitingfor ;
}
return ;
}
vBlocks . push_back ( pindex ) ;
if ( vBlocks . size ( ) = = count ) {
return ;
}
} else if ( waitingfor = = - 1 ) {
// This is the first already-in-flight block.
waitingfor = mapBlocksInFlight [ pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ] . first ;
}
}
}
}
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void EraseTxRequest ( const uint256 & txid ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
g_already_asked_for . erase ( txid ) ;
}
int64_t GetTxRequestTime ( const uint256 & txid ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
auto it = g_already_asked_for . find ( txid ) ;
if ( it ! = g_already_asked_for . end ( ) ) {
return it - > second ;
}
return 0 ;
}
void UpdateTxRequestTime ( const uint256 & txid , int64_t request_time ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
auto it = g_already_asked_for . find ( txid ) ;
if ( it = = g_already_asked_for . end ( ) ) {
g_already_asked_for . insert ( std : : make_pair ( txid , request_time ) ) ;
} else {
g_already_asked_for . update ( it , request_time ) ;
}
}
void RequestTx ( CNodeState * state , const uint256 & txid , int64_t nNow ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
CNodeState : : TxDownloadState & peer_download_state = state - > m_tx_download ;
if ( peer_download_state . m_tx_announced . size ( ) > = MAX_PEER_TX_ANNOUNCEMENTS | | peer_download_state . m_tx_announced . count ( txid ) ) {
// Too many queued announcements from this peer, or we already have
// this announcement
return ;
}
peer_download_state . m_tx_announced . insert ( txid ) ;
int64_t process_time ;
int64_t last_request_time = GetTxRequestTime ( txid ) ;
// First time requesting this tx
if ( last_request_time = = 0 ) {
process_time = nNow ;
} else {
// Randomize the delay to avoid biasing some peers over others (such as due to
// fixed ordering of peer processing in ThreadMessageHandler)
process_time = last_request_time + GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL + GetRand ( MAX_GETDATA_RANDOM_DELAY ) ;
}
// We delay processing announcements from non-preferred (eg inbound) peers
if ( ! state - > fPreferredDownload ) process_time + = INBOUND_PEER_TX_DELAY ;
peer_download_state . m_tx_process_time . emplace ( process_time , txid ) ;
}
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} // namespace
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// This function is used for testing the stale tip eviction logic, see
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// denialofservice_tests.cpp
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void UpdateLastBlockAnnounceTime ( NodeId node , int64_t time_in_seconds )
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( node ) ;
if ( state ) state - > m_last_block_announcement = time_in_seconds ;
}
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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// Returns true for outbound peers, excluding manual connections, feelers, and
// one-shots
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static bool IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate ( const CNode * node )
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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{
return ! ( node - > fInbound | | node - > m_manual_connection | | node - > fFeeler | | node - > fOneShot ) ;
}
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void PeerLogicValidation : : InitializeNode ( CNode * pnode ) {
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CAddress addr = pnode - > addr ;
std : : string addrName = pnode - > GetAddrName ( ) ;
NodeId nodeid = pnode - > GetId ( ) ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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mapNodeState . emplace_hint ( mapNodeState . end ( ) , std : : piecewise_construct , std : : forward_as_tuple ( nodeid ) , std : : forward_as_tuple ( addr , std : : move ( addrName ) , pnode - > fInbound , pnode - > m_manual_connection ) ) ;
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}
if ( ! pnode - > fInbound )
PushNodeVersion ( pnode , connman , GetTime ( ) ) ;
}
void PeerLogicValidation : : FinalizeNode ( NodeId nodeid , bool & fUpdateConnectionTime ) {
fUpdateConnectionTime = false ;
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
assert ( state ! = nullptr ) ;
if ( state - > fSyncStarted )
nSyncStarted - - ;
if ( state - > nMisbehavior = = 0 & & state - > fCurrentlyConnected ) {
fUpdateConnectionTime = true ;
}
for ( const QueuedBlock & entry : state - > vBlocksInFlight ) {
mapBlocksInFlight . erase ( entry . hash ) ;
}
EraseOrphansFor ( nodeid ) ;
nPreferredDownload - = state - > fPreferredDownload ;
nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - = ( state - > nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders ! = 0 ) ;
assert ( nPeersWithValidatedDownloads > = 0 ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect - = state - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ;
assert ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect > = 0 ) ;
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mapNodeState . erase ( nodeid ) ;
if ( mapNodeState . empty ( ) ) {
// Do a consistency check after the last peer is removed.
assert ( mapBlocksInFlight . empty ( ) ) ;
assert ( nPreferredDownload = = 0 ) ;
assert ( nPeersWithValidatedDownloads = = 0 ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
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assert ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect = = 0 ) ;
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}
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Cleared nodestate for peer=%d \n " , nodeid ) ;
}
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bool GetNodeStateStats ( NodeId nodeid , CNodeStateStats & stats ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * state = State ( nodeid ) ;
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if ( state = = nullptr )
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return false ;
stats . nMisbehavior = state - > nMisbehavior ;
stats . nSyncHeight = state - > pindexBestKnownBlock ? state - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nHeight : - 1 ;
stats . nCommonHeight = state - > pindexLastCommonBlock ? state - > pindexLastCommonBlock - > nHeight : - 1 ;
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for ( const QueuedBlock & queue : state - > vBlocksInFlight ) {
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if ( queue . pindex )
stats . vHeightInFlight . push_back ( queue . pindex - > nHeight ) ;
}
return true ;
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// mapOrphanTransactions
//
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static void AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( const CTransactionRef & tx ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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size_t max_extra_txn = gArgs . GetArg ( " -blockreconstructionextratxn " , DEFAULT_BLOCK_RECONSTRUCTION_EXTRA_TXN ) ;
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if ( max_extra_txn < = 0 )
return ;
if ( ! vExtraTxnForCompact . size ( ) )
vExtraTxnForCompact . resize ( max_extra_txn ) ;
vExtraTxnForCompact [ vExtraTxnForCompactIt ] = std : : make_pair ( tx - > GetWitnessHash ( ) , tx ) ;
vExtraTxnForCompactIt = ( vExtraTxnForCompactIt + 1 ) % max_extra_txn ;
}
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bool AddOrphanTx ( const CTransactionRef & tx , NodeId peer ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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const uint256 & hash = tx - > GetHash ( ) ;
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if ( mapOrphanTransactions . count ( hash ) )
return false ;
// Ignore big transactions, to avoid a
// send-big-orphans memory exhaustion attack. If a peer has a legitimate
// large transaction with a missing parent then we assume
// it will rebroadcast it later, after the parent transaction(s)
// have been mined or received.
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// 100 orphans, each of which is at most 100,000 bytes big is
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// at most 10 megabytes of orphans and somewhat more byprev index (in the worst case):
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unsigned int sz = GetTransactionWeight ( * tx ) ;
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if ( sz > MAX_STANDARD_TX_WEIGHT )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " ignoring large orphan tx (size: %u, hash: %s) \n " , sz , hash . ToString ( ) ) ;
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return false ;
}
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auto ret = mapOrphanTransactions . emplace ( hash , COrphanTx { tx , peer , GetTime ( ) + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME , g_orphan_list . size ( ) } ) ;
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assert ( ret . second ) ;
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g_orphan_list . push_back ( ret . first ) ;
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for ( const CTxIn & txin : tx - > vin ) {
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mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev [ txin . prevout ] . insert ( ret . first ) ;
}
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AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( tx ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " stored orphan tx %s (mapsz %u outsz %u) \n " , hash . ToString ( ) ,
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mapOrphanTransactions . size ( ) , mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . size ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
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int static EraseOrphanTx ( uint256 hash ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( g_cs_orphans )
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{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator it = mapOrphanTransactions . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( it = = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
return 0 ;
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for ( const CTxIn & txin : it - > second . tx - > vin )
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{
auto itPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( txin . prevout ) ;
if ( itPrev = = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) )
continue ;
itPrev - > second . erase ( it ) ;
if ( itPrev - > second . empty ( ) )
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . erase ( itPrev ) ;
}
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size_t old_pos = it - > second . list_pos ;
assert ( g_orphan_list [ old_pos ] = = it ) ;
if ( old_pos + 1 ! = g_orphan_list . size ( ) ) {
// Unless we're deleting the last entry in g_orphan_list, move the last
// entry to the position we're deleting.
auto it_last = g_orphan_list . back ( ) ;
g_orphan_list [ old_pos ] = it_last ;
it_last - > second . list_pos = old_pos ;
}
g_orphan_list . pop_back ( ) ;
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mapOrphanTransactions . erase ( it ) ;
return 1 ;
}
void EraseOrphansFor ( NodeId peer )
{
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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int nErased = 0 ;
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions . begin ( ) ;
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while ( iter ! = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator maybeErase = iter + + ; // increment to avoid iterator becoming invalid
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if ( maybeErase - > second . fromPeer = = peer )
{
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nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( maybeErase - > second . tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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}
}
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if ( nErased > 0 ) LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx from peer=%d \n " , nErased , peer ) ;
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}
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unsigned int LimitOrphanTxSize ( unsigned int nMaxOrphans )
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{
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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unsigned int nEvicted = 0 ;
static int64_t nNextSweep ;
int64_t nNow = GetTime ( ) ;
if ( nNextSweep < = nNow ) {
// Sweep out expired orphan pool entries:
int nErased = 0 ;
int64_t nMinExpTime = nNow + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_TIME - ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL ;
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator iter = mapOrphanTransactions . begin ( ) ;
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while ( iter ! = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) )
{
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std : : map < uint256 , COrphanTx > : : iterator maybeErase = iter + + ;
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if ( maybeErase - > second . nTimeExpire < = nNow ) {
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nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( maybeErase - > second . tx - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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} else {
nMinExpTime = std : : min ( maybeErase - > second . nTimeExpire , nMinExpTime ) ;
}
}
// Sweep again 5 minutes after the next entry that expires in order to batch the linear scan.
nNextSweep = nMinExpTime + ORPHAN_TX_EXPIRE_INTERVAL ;
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if ( nErased > 0 ) LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx due to expiration \n " , nErased ) ;
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}
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FastRandomContext rng ;
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while ( mapOrphanTransactions . size ( ) > nMaxOrphans )
{
// Evict a random orphan:
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size_t randompos = rng . randrange ( g_orphan_list . size ( ) ) ;
EraseOrphanTx ( g_orphan_list [ randompos ] - > first ) ;
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+ + nEvicted ;
}
return nEvicted ;
}
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/**
* Mark a misbehaving peer to be banned depending upon the value of ` - banscore ` .
*/
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void Misbehaving ( NodeId pnode , int howmuch , const std : : string & message ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
if ( howmuch = = 0 )
return ;
CNodeState * state = State ( pnode ) ;
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if ( state = = nullptr )
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return ;
state - > nMisbehavior + = howmuch ;
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int banscore = gArgs . GetArg ( " -banscore " , DEFAULT_BANSCORE_THRESHOLD ) ;
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std : : string message_prefixed = message . empty ( ) ? " " : ( " : " + message ) ;
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if ( state - > nMisbehavior > = banscore & & state - > nMisbehavior - howmuch < banscore )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d) BAN THRESHOLD EXCEEDED%s \n " , __func__ , state - > name , pnode , state - > nMisbehavior - howmuch , state - > nMisbehavior , message_prefixed ) ;
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state - > fShouldBan = true ;
} else
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: %s peer=%d (%d -> %d)%s \n " , __func__ , state - > name , pnode , state - > nMisbehavior - howmuch , state - > nMisbehavior , message_prefixed ) ;
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}
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/**
* Returns true if the given validation state result may result in a peer
* banning / disconnecting us . We use this to determine which unaccepted
* transactions from a whitelisted peer that we can safely relay .
*/
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static bool TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect ( const CValidationState & state )
{
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assert ( IsTransactionReason ( state . GetReason ( ) ) ) ;
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return state . GetReason ( ) = = ValidationInvalidReason : : CONSENSUS ;
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}
/**
* Potentially ban a node based on the contents of a CValidationState object
*
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* @ param [ in ] via_compact_block : this bool is passed in because net_processing should
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* punish peers differently depending on whether the data was provided in a compact
* block message or not . If the compact block had a valid header , but contained invalid
* txs , the peer should not be punished . See BIP 152.
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*
* @ return Returns true if the peer was punished ( probably disconnected )
*
* Changes here may need to be reflected in TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect ( ) .
2018-04-16 18:52:03 +02:00
*/
static bool MaybePunishNode ( NodeId nodeid , const CValidationState & state , bool via_compact_block , const std : : string & message = " " ) {
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switch ( state . GetReason ( ) ) {
case ValidationInvalidReason : : NONE :
break ;
// The node is providing invalid data:
case ValidationInvalidReason : : CONSENSUS :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_MUTATED :
if ( ! via_compact_block ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
return true ;
}
break ;
case ValidationInvalidReason : : CACHED_INVALID :
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * node_state = State ( nodeid ) ;
if ( node_state = = nullptr ) {
break ;
}
// Ban outbound (but not inbound) peers if on an invalid chain.
// Exempt HB compact block peers and manual connections.
if ( ! via_compact_block & & ! node_state - > m_is_inbound & & ! node_state - > m_is_manual_connection ) {
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
return true ;
}
break ;
}
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case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_CHECKPOINT :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_INVALID_PREV :
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 100 , message ) ;
}
return true ;
// Conflicting (but not necessarily invalid) data or different policy:
case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_MISSING_PREV :
{
// TODO: Handle this much more gracefully (10 DoS points is super arbitrary)
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( nodeid , 10 , message ) ;
}
return true ;
case ValidationInvalidReason : : RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_NOT_STANDARD :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_MISSING_INPUTS :
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case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_PREMATURE_SPEND :
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case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_WITNESS_MUTATED :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_CONFLICT :
case ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_MEMPOOL_POLICY :
break ;
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}
if ( message ! = " " ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d: %s \n " , nodeid , message ) ;
}
return false ;
}
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//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// blockchain -> download logic notification
//
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// To prevent fingerprinting attacks, only send blocks/headers outside of the
// active chain if they are no more than a month older (both in time, and in
2017-10-30 15:41:05 +01:00
// best equivalent proof of work) than the best header chain we know about and
// we fully-validated them at some point.
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static bool BlockRequestAllowed ( const CBlockIndex * pindex , const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
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{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindex ) ) return true ;
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return pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS ) & & ( pindexBestHeader ! = nullptr ) & &
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( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) - pindex - > GetBlockTime ( ) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT ) & &
( GetBlockProofEquivalentTime ( * pindexBestHeader , * pindex , * pindexBestHeader , consensusParams ) < STALE_RELAY_AGE_LIMIT ) ;
}
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PeerLogicValidation : : PeerLogicValidation ( CConnman * connmanIn , BanMan * banman , CScheduler & scheduler , bool enable_bip61 )
: connman ( connmanIn ) , m_banman ( banman ) , m_stale_tip_check_time ( 0 ) , m_enable_bip61 ( enable_bip61 ) {
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// Initialize global variables that cannot be constructed at startup.
recentRejects . reset ( new CRollingBloomFilter ( 120000 , 0.000001 ) ) ;
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const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams = Params ( ) . GetConsensus ( ) ;
// Stale tip checking and peer eviction are on two different timers, but we
// don't want them to get out of sync due to drift in the scheduler, so we
// combine them in one function and schedule at the quicker (peer-eviction)
// timer.
static_assert ( EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL < STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL , " peer eviction timer should be less than stale tip check timer " ) ;
scheduler . scheduleEvery ( std : : bind ( & PeerLogicValidation : : CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers , this , consensusParams ) , EXTRA_PEER_CHECK_INTERVAL * 1000 ) ;
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}
2018-03-05 20:31:13 +01:00
/**
* Evict orphan txn pool entries ( EraseOrphanTx ) based on a newly connected
* block . Also save the time of the last tip update .
*/
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void PeerLogicValidation : : BlockConnected ( const std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > & pblock , const CBlockIndex * pindex , const std : : vector < CTransactionRef > & vtxConflicted ) {
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LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
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std : : vector < uint256 > vOrphanErase ;
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for ( const CTransactionRef & ptx : pblock - > vtx ) {
const CTransaction & tx = * ptx ;
// Which orphan pool entries must we evict?
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for ( const auto & txin : tx . vin ) {
auto itByPrev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( txin . prevout ) ;
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if ( itByPrev = = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) continue ;
for ( auto mi = itByPrev - > second . begin ( ) ; mi ! = itByPrev - > second . end ( ) ; + + mi ) {
const CTransaction & orphanTx = * ( * mi ) - > second . tx ;
const uint256 & orphanHash = orphanTx . GetHash ( ) ;
vOrphanErase . push_back ( orphanHash ) ;
}
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}
}
2018-03-05 20:31:13 +01:00
// Erase orphan transactions included or precluded by this block
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if ( vOrphanErase . size ( ) ) {
int nErased = 0 ;
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for ( const uint256 & orphanHash : vOrphanErase ) {
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nErased + = EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
}
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " Erased %d orphan tx included or conflicted by block \n " , nErased ) ;
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}
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g_last_tip_update = GetTime ( ) ;
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}
2017-02-07 17:49:07 +01:00
// All of the following cache a recent block, and are protected by cs_most_recent_block
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static CCriticalSection cs_most_recent_block ;
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static std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > most_recent_block GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > most_recent_compact_block GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static uint256 most_recent_block_hash GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
static bool fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock GUARDED_BY ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
2016-12-15 01:28:22 +01:00
2018-03-05 20:31:13 +01:00
/**
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* Maintain state about the best - seen block and fast - announce a compact block
2018-03-05 20:31:13 +01:00
* to compatible peers .
*/
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void PeerLogicValidation : : NewPoWValidBlock ( const CBlockIndex * pindex , const std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > & pblock ) {
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std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > pcmpctblock = std : : make_shared < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > ( * pblock , true ) ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
static int nHighestFastAnnounce = 0 ;
if ( pindex - > nHeight < = nHighestFastAnnounce )
return ;
nHighestFastAnnounce = pindex - > nHeight ;
bool fWitnessEnabled = IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , Params ( ) . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
uint256 hashBlock ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
most_recent_block_hash = hashBlock ;
most_recent_block = pblock ;
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most_recent_compact_block = pcmpctblock ;
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fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock = fWitnessEnabled ;
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}
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connman - > ForEachNode ( [ this , & pcmpctblock , pindex , & msgMaker , fWitnessEnabled , & hashBlock ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
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AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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// TODO: Avoid the repeated-serialization here
if ( pnode - > nVersion < INVALID_CB_NO_BAN_VERSION | | pnode - > fDisconnect )
return ;
ProcessBlockAvailability ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
CNodeState & state = * State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// If the peer has, or we announced to them the previous block already,
// but we don't think they have this one, go ahead and announce it
if ( state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs & & ( ! fWitnessEnabled | | state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) & &
! PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) & & PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex - > pprev ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d \n " , " PeerLogicValidation::NewPoWValidBlock " ,
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hashBlock . ToString ( ) , pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pnode , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * pcmpctblock ) ) ;
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ;
}
} ) ;
}
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/**
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* Update our best height and announce any block hashes which weren ' t previously
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* in : : ChainActive ( ) to our peers .
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*/
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void PeerLogicValidation : : UpdatedBlockTip ( const CBlockIndex * pindexNew , const CBlockIndex * pindexFork , bool fInitialDownload ) {
const int nNewHeight = pindexNew - > nHeight ;
connman - > SetBestHeight ( nNewHeight ) ;
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SetServiceFlagsIBDCache ( ! fInitialDownload ) ;
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if ( ! fInitialDownload ) {
// Find the hashes of all blocks that weren't previously in the best chain.
std : : vector < uint256 > vHashes ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexToAnnounce = pindexNew ;
while ( pindexToAnnounce ! = pindexFork ) {
vHashes . push_back ( pindexToAnnounce - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
pindexToAnnounce = pindexToAnnounce - > pprev ;
if ( vHashes . size ( ) = = MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) {
// Limit announcements in case of a huge reorganization.
// Rely on the peer's synchronization mechanism in that case.
break ;
}
}
// Relay inventory, but don't relay old inventory during initial block download.
connman - > ForEachNode ( [ nNewHeight , & vHashes ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
if ( nNewHeight > ( pnode - > nStartingHeight ! = - 1 ? pnode - > nStartingHeight - 2000 : 0 ) ) {
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for ( const uint256 & hash : reverse_iterate ( vHashes ) ) {
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pnode - > PushBlockHash ( hash ) ;
}
}
} ) ;
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connman - > WakeMessageHandler ( ) ;
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}
}
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/**
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* Handle invalid block rejection and consequent peer banning , maintain which
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* peers announce compact blocks .
*/
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void PeerLogicValidation : : BlockChecked ( const CBlock & block , const CValidationState & state ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
const uint256 hash ( block . GetHash ( ) ) ;
std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , bool > > : : iterator it = mapBlockSource . find ( hash ) ;
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if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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// Don't send reject message with code 0 or an internal reject code.
if ( it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) & & State ( it - > second . first ) & & state . GetRejectCode ( ) > 0 & & state . GetRejectCode ( ) < REJECT_INTERNAL ) {
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CBlockReject reject = { ( unsigned char ) state . GetRejectCode ( ) , state . GetRejectReason ( ) . substr ( 0 , MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) , hash } ;
State ( it - > second . first ) - > rejects . push_back ( reject ) ;
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MaybePunishNode ( /*nodeid=*/ it - > second . first , state , /*via_compact_block=*/ ! it - > second . second ) ;
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}
}
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// Check that:
// 1. The block is valid
// 2. We're not in initial block download
// 3. This is currently the best block we're aware of. We haven't updated
// the tip yet so we have no way to check this directly here. Instead we
// just check that there are currently no other blocks in flight.
else if ( state . IsValid ( ) & &
! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & &
mapBlocksInFlight . count ( hash ) = = mapBlocksInFlight . size ( ) ) {
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if ( it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) ) {
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MaybeSetPeerAsAnnouncingHeaderAndIDs ( it - > second . first , connman ) ;
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}
}
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if ( it ! = mapBlockSource . end ( ) )
mapBlockSource . erase ( it ) ;
}
//////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
//
// Messages
//
bool static AlreadyHave ( const CInv & inv ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
{
switch ( inv . type )
{
case MSG_TX :
case MSG_WITNESS_TX :
{
assert ( recentRejects ) ;
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ! = hashRecentRejectsChainTip )
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{
// If the chain tip has changed previously rejected transactions
// might be now valid, e.g. due to a nLockTime'd tx becoming valid,
// or a double-spend. Reset the rejects filter and give those
// txs a second chance.
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hashRecentRejectsChainTip = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
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recentRejects - > reset ( ) ;
}
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{
LOCK ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
if ( mapOrphanTransactions . count ( inv . hash ) ) return true ;
}
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return recentRejects - > contains ( inv . hash ) | |
mempool . exists ( inv . hash ) | |
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pcoinsTip - > HaveCoinInCache ( COutPoint ( inv . hash , 0 ) ) | | // Best effort: only try output 0 and 1
pcoinsTip - > HaveCoinInCache ( COutPoint ( inv . hash , 1 ) ) ;
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}
case MSG_BLOCK :
case MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK :
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return LookupBlockIndex ( inv . hash ) ! = nullptr ;
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}
// Don't know what it is, just say we already got one
return true ;
}
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static void RelayTransaction ( const CTransaction & tx , CConnman * connman )
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{
CInv inv ( MSG_TX , tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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connman - > ForEachNode ( [ & inv ] ( CNode * pnode )
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{
pnode - > PushInventory ( inv ) ;
} ) ;
}
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static void RelayAddress ( const CAddress & addr , bool fReachable , CConnman * connman )
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{
unsigned int nRelayNodes = fReachable ? 2 : 1 ; // limited relaying of addresses outside our network(s)
// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
// Use deterministic randomness to send to the same nodes for 24 hours
// at a time so the addrKnowns of the chosen nodes prevent repeats
uint64_t hashAddr = addr . GetHash ( ) ;
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const CSipHasher hasher = connman - > GetDeterministicRandomizer ( RANDOMIZER_ID_ADDRESS_RELAY ) . Write ( hashAddr < < 32 ) . Write ( ( GetTime ( ) + hashAddr ) / ( 24 * 60 * 60 ) ) ;
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FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
std : : array < std : : pair < uint64_t , CNode * > , 2 > best { { { 0 , nullptr } , { 0 , nullptr } } } ;
assert ( nRelayNodes < = best . size ( ) ) ;
auto sortfunc = [ & best , & hasher , nRelayNodes ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
if ( pnode - > nVersion > = CADDR_TIME_VERSION ) {
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uint64_t hashKey = CSipHasher ( hasher ) . Write ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) . Finalize ( ) ;
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for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < nRelayNodes ; i + + ) {
if ( hashKey > best [ i ] . first ) {
std : : copy ( best . begin ( ) + i , best . begin ( ) + nRelayNodes - 1 , best . begin ( ) + i + 1 ) ;
best [ i ] = std : : make_pair ( hashKey , pnode ) ;
break ;
}
}
}
} ;
auto pushfunc = [ & addr , & best , nRelayNodes , & insecure_rand ] {
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < nRelayNodes & & best [ i ] . first ! = 0 ; i + + ) {
best [ i ] . second - > PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
}
} ;
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connman - > ForEachNodeThen ( std : : move ( sortfunc ) , std : : move ( pushfunc ) ) ;
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}
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void static ProcessGetBlockData ( CNode * pfrom , const CChainParams & chainparams , const CInv & inv , CConnman * connman )
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{
bool send = false ;
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > a_recent_block ;
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs > a_recent_compact_block ;
bool fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock ;
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const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams = chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
a_recent_block = most_recent_block ;
a_recent_compact_block = most_recent_compact_block ;
fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock = fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock ;
}
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bool need_activate_chain = false ;
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{
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( inv . hash ) ;
if ( pindex ) {
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if ( pindex - > HaveTxsDownloaded ( ) & & ! pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_SCRIPTS ) & &
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pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) ) {
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// If we have the block and all of its parents, but have not yet validated it,
// we might be in the middle of connecting it (ie in the unlock of cs_main
// before ActivateBestChain but after AcceptBlock).
// In this case, we need to run ActivateBestChain prior to checking the relay
// conditions below.
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need_activate_chain = true ;
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}
}
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} // release cs_main before calling ActivateBestChain
if ( need_activate_chain ) {
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CValidationState state ;
if ( ! ActivateBestChain ( state , Params ( ) , a_recent_block ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " failed to activate chain (%s) \n " , FormatStateMessage ( state ) ) ;
}
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}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( inv . hash ) ;
if ( pindex ) {
send = BlockRequestAllowed ( pindex , consensusParams ) ;
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if ( ! send ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block that isn't in the main chain \n " , __func__ , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
}
}
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
// disconnect node in case we have reached the outbound limit for serving historical blocks
// never disconnect whitelisted nodes
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if ( send & & connman - > OutboundTargetReached ( true ) & & ( ( ( pindexBestHeader ! = nullptr ) & & ( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) - pindex - > GetBlockTime ( ) > HISTORICAL_BLOCK_AGE ) ) | | inv . type = = MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK ) & & ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted )
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{
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " historical block serving limit reached, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
//disconnect node
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
send = false ;
}
// Avoid leaking prune-height by never sending blocks below the NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold
if ( send & & ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted & & (
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( ( ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) = = NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) & & ( ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_NETWORK ) ! = NODE_NETWORK ) & & ( : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nHeight - pindex - > nHeight > ( int ) NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED_MIN_BLOCKS + 2 /* add two blocks buffer extension for possible races */ ) )
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) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignore block request below NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED threshold from peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
//disconnect node and prevent it from stalling (would otherwise wait for the missing block)
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
send = false ;
}
// Pruned nodes may have deleted the block, so check whether
// it's available before trying to send.
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if ( send & & ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) )
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{
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > pblock ;
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if ( a_recent_block & & a_recent_block - > GetHash ( ) = = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
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pblock = a_recent_block ;
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} else if ( inv . type = = MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK ) {
// Fast-path: in this case it is possible to serve the block directly from disk,
// as the network format matches the format on disk
std : : vector < uint8_t > block_data ;
if ( ! ReadRawBlockFromDisk ( block_data , pindex , chainparams . MessageStart ( ) ) ) {
assert ( ! " cannot load block from disk " ) ;
}
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : BLOCK , MakeSpan ( block_data ) ) ) ;
// Don't set pblock as we've sent the block
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} else {
// Send block from disk
std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblockRead = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
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if ( ! ReadBlockFromDisk ( * pblockRead , pindex , consensusParams ) )
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assert ( ! " cannot load block from disk " ) ;
pblock = pblockRead ;
}
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if ( pblock ) {
if ( inv . type = = MSG_BLOCK )
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS , NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
else if ( inv . type = = MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK )
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
else if ( inv . type = = MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK )
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{
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bool sendMerkleBlock = false ;
CMerkleBlock merkleBlock ;
{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pfrom - > pfilter ) {
sendMerkleBlock = true ;
merkleBlock = CMerkleBlock ( * pblock , * pfrom - > pfilter ) ;
}
}
if ( sendMerkleBlock ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : MERKLEBLOCK , merkleBlock ) ) ;
// CMerkleBlock just contains hashes, so also push any transactions in the block the client did not see
// This avoids hurting performance by pointlessly requiring a round-trip
// Note that there is currently no way for a node to request any single transactions we didn't send here -
// they must either disconnect and retry or request the full block.
// Thus, the protocol spec specified allows for us to provide duplicate txn here,
// however we MUST always provide at least what the remote peer needs
typedef std : : pair < unsigned int , uint256 > PairType ;
for ( PairType & pair : merkleBlock . vMatchedTxn )
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS , NetMsgType : : TX , * pblock - > vtx [ pair . first ] ) ) ;
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}
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// else
// no response
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}
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else if ( inv . type = = MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK )
{
// If a peer is asking for old blocks, we're almost guaranteed
// they won't have a useful mempool to match against a compact block,
// and we don't feel like constructing the object for them, so
// instead we respond with the full, non-compact block.
bool fPeerWantsWitness = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ;
int nSendFlags = fPeerWantsWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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if ( CanDirectFetch ( consensusParams ) & & pindex - > nHeight > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) - MAX_CMPCTBLOCK_DEPTH ) {
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if ( ( fPeerWantsWitness | | ! fWitnessesPresentInARecentCompactBlock ) & & a_recent_compact_block & & a_recent_compact_block - > header . GetHash ( ) = = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * a_recent_compact_block ) ) ;
} else {
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( * pblock , fPeerWantsWitness ) ;
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
}
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} else {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : BLOCK , * pblock ) ) ;
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}
}
}
// Trigger the peer node to send a getblocks request for the next batch of inventory
if ( inv . hash = = pfrom - > hashContinue )
{
// Bypass PushInventory, this must send even if redundant,
// and we want it right after the last block so they don't
// wait for other stuff first.
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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vInv . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
pfrom - > hashContinue . SetNull ( ) ;
}
}
}
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void static ProcessGetData ( CNode * pfrom , const CChainParams & chainparams , CConnman * connman , const std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc ) LOCKS_EXCLUDED ( cs_main )
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{
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AssertLockNotHeld ( cs_main ) ;
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std : : deque < CInv > : : iterator it = pfrom - > vRecvGetData . begin ( ) ;
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std : : vector < CInv > vNotFound ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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while ( it ! = pfrom - > vRecvGetData . end ( ) & & ( it - > type = = MSG_TX | | it - > type = = MSG_WITNESS_TX ) ) {
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if ( interruptMsgProc )
return ;
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// Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway
if ( pfrom - > fPauseSend )
break ;
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const CInv & inv = * it ;
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it + + ;
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// Send stream from relay memory
bool push = false ;
auto mi = mapRelay . find ( inv . hash ) ;
int nSendFlags = ( inv . type = = MSG_TX ? SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS : 0 ) ;
if ( mi ! = mapRelay . end ( ) ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : TX , * mi - > second ) ) ;
push = true ;
} else if ( pfrom - > timeLastMempoolReq ) {
auto txinfo = mempool . info ( inv . hash ) ;
// To protect privacy, do not answer getdata using the mempool when
// that TX couldn't have been INVed in reply to a MEMPOOL request.
if ( txinfo . tx & & txinfo . nTime < = pfrom - > timeLastMempoolReq ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : TX , * txinfo . tx ) ) ;
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push = true ;
}
}
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if ( ! push ) {
vNotFound . push_back ( inv ) ;
}
}
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} // release cs_main
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2018-02-09 00:00:06 +01:00
if ( it ! = pfrom - > vRecvGetData . end ( ) & & ! pfrom - > fPauseSend ) {
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const CInv & inv = * it ;
if ( inv . type = = MSG_BLOCK | | inv . type = = MSG_FILTERED_BLOCK | | inv . type = = MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK | | inv . type = = MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK ) {
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it + + ;
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ProcessGetBlockData ( pfrom , chainparams , inv , connman ) ;
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}
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}
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pfrom - > vRecvGetData . erase ( pfrom - > vRecvGetData . begin ( ) , it ) ;
if ( ! vNotFound . empty ( ) ) {
// Let the peer know that we didn't find what it asked for, so it doesn't
// have to wait around forever. Currently only SPV clients actually care
// about this message: it's needed when they are recursively walking the
// dependencies of relevant unconfirmed transactions. SPV clients want to
// do that because they want to know about (and store and rebroadcast and
// risk analyze) the dependencies of transactions relevant to them, without
// having to download the entire memory pool.
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : NOTFOUND , vNotFound ) ) ;
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}
}
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static uint32_t GetFetchFlags ( CNode * pfrom ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main ) {
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = 0 ;
if ( ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) & & State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness ) {
nFetchFlags | = MSG_WITNESS_FLAG ;
}
return nFetchFlags ;
}
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inline void static SendBlockTransactions ( const CBlock & block , const BlockTransactionsRequest & req , CNode * pfrom , CConnman * connman ) {
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BlockTransactions resp ( req ) ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < req . indexes . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
if ( req . indexes [ i ] > = block . vtx . size ( ) ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 , strprintf ( " Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn with out-of-bounds tx indices " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ) ;
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return ;
}
resp . txn [ i ] = block . vtx [ req . indexes [ i ] ] ;
}
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
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int nSendFlags = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN , resp ) ) ;
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}
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bool static ProcessHeadersMessage ( CNode * pfrom , CConnman * connman , const std : : vector < CBlockHeader > & headers , const CChainParams & chainparams , bool via_compact_block )
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{
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
size_t nCount = headers . size ( ) ;
if ( nCount = = 0 ) {
// Nothing interesting. Stop asking this peers for more headers.
return true ;
}
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bool received_new_header = false ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindexLast = nullptr ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// If this looks like it could be a block announcement (nCount <
// MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE), use special logic for handling headers that
// don't connect:
// - Send a getheaders message in response to try to connect the chain.
// - The peer can send up to MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS in a row that
// don't connect before giving DoS points
// - Once a headers message is received that is valid and does connect,
// nUnconnectingHeaders gets reset back to 0.
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if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( headers [ 0 ] . hashPrevBlock ) & & nCount < MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) {
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nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders + + ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received header %s: missing prev block %s, sending getheaders (%d) to end (peer=%d, nUnconnectingHeaders=%d) \n " ,
headers [ 0 ] . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
headers [ 0 ] . hashPrevBlock . ToString ( ) ,
pindexBestHeader - > nHeight ,
pfrom - > GetId ( ) , nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders ) ;
// Set hashLastUnknownBlock for this peer, so that if we
// eventually get the headers - even from a different peer -
// we can use this peer to download.
UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , headers . back ( ) . GetHash ( ) ) ;
if ( nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders % MAX_UNCONNECTING_HEADERS = = 0 ) {
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 ) ;
}
return true ;
}
uint256 hashLastBlock ;
for ( const CBlockHeader & header : headers ) {
if ( ! hashLastBlock . IsNull ( ) & & header . hashPrevBlock ! = hashLastBlock ) {
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Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 , " non-continuous headers sequence " ) ;
return false ;
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}
hashLastBlock = header . GetHash ( ) ;
}
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// If we don't have the last header, then they'll have given us
// something new (if these headers are valid).
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if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( hashLastBlock ) ) {
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received_new_header = true ;
}
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}
CValidationState state ;
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CBlockHeader first_invalid_header ;
if ( ! ProcessNewBlockHeaders ( headers , state , chainparams , & pindexLast , & first_invalid_header ) ) {
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if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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MaybePunishNode ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , state , via_compact_block , " invalid header received " ) ;
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return false ;
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}
}
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders > 0 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d: resetting nUnconnectingHeaders (%d -> 0) \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders ) ;
}
nodestate - > nUnconnectingHeaders = 0 ;
assert ( pindexLast ) ;
UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
// From here, pindexBestKnownBlock should be guaranteed to be non-null,
// because it is set in UpdateBlockAvailability. Some nullptr checks
// are still present, however, as belt-and-suspenders.
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if ( received_new_header & & pindexLast - > nChainWork > : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
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nodestate - > m_last_block_announcement = GetTime ( ) ;
}
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if ( nCount = = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
// Headers message had its maximum size; the peer may have more headers.
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// TODO: optimize: if pindexLast is an ancestor of ::ChainActive().Tip or pindexBestHeader, continue
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// from there instead.
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " more getheaders (%d) to end to peer=%d (startheight:%d) \n " , pindexLast - > nHeight , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , pfrom - > nStartingHeight ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexLast ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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}
bool fCanDirectFetch = CanDirectFetch ( chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
// If this set of headers is valid and ends in a block with at least as
// much work as our tip, download as much as possible.
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if ( fCanDirectFetch & & pindexLast - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TREE ) & & : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork < = pindexLast - > nChainWork ) {
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std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToFetch ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexWalk = pindexLast ;
// Calculate all the blocks we'd need to switch to pindexLast, up to a limit.
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while ( pindexWalk & & ! : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindexWalk ) & & vToFetch . size ( ) < = MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
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if ( ! ( pindexWalk - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) & &
! mapBlocksInFlight . count ( pindexWalk - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) & &
( ! IsWitnessEnabled ( pindexWalk - > pprev , chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) | | State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness ) ) {
// We don't have this block, and it's not yet in flight.
vToFetch . push_back ( pindexWalk ) ;
}
pindexWalk = pindexWalk - > pprev ;
}
// If pindexWalk still isn't on our main chain, we're looking at a
// very large reorg at a time we think we're close to caught up to
// the main chain -- this shouldn't really happen. Bail out on the
// direct fetch and rely on parallel download instead.
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if ( ! : : ChainActive ( ) . Contains ( pindexWalk ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Large reorg, won't direct fetch to %s (%d) \n " ,
pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
pindexLast - > nHeight ) ;
} else {
std : : vector < CInv > vGetData ;
// Download as much as possible, from earliest to latest.
for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : reverse_iterate ( vToFetch ) ) {
if ( nodestate - > nBlocksInFlight > = MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
// Can't download any more from this peer
break ;
}
uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) ;
vGetData . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
MarkBlockAsInFlight ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex ) ;
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting block %s from peer=%d \n " ,
pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
}
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > 1 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Downloading blocks toward %s (%d) via headers direct fetch \n " ,
pindexLast - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pindexLast - > nHeight ) ;
}
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > 0 ) {
if ( nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion & & vGetData . size ( ) = = 1 & & mapBlocksInFlight . size ( ) = = 1 & & pindexLast - > pprev - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_CHAIN ) ) {
// In any case, we want to download using a compact block, not a regular one
vGetData [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_CMPCT_BLOCK , vGetData [ 0 ] . hash ) ;
}
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
}
}
}
// If we're in IBD, we want outbound peers that will serve us a useful
// chain. Disconnect peers that are on chains with insufficient work.
if ( IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & nCount ! = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
// When nCount < MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS, we know we have no more
// headers to fetch from this peer.
if ( nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork < nMinimumChainWork ) {
// This peer has too little work on their headers chain to help
// us sync -- disconnect if using an outbound slot (unless
// whitelisted or addnode).
// Note: We compare their tip to nMinimumChainWork (rather than
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// ::ChainActive().Tip()) because we won't start block download
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// until we have a headers chain that has at least
// nMinimumChainWork, even if a peer has a chain past our tip,
// as an anti-DoS measure.
if ( IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate ( pfrom ) ) {
LogPrintf ( " Disconnecting outbound peer %d -- headers chain has insufficient work \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
}
}
if ( ! pfrom - > fDisconnect & & IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate ( pfrom ) & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ) {
// If this is an outbound peer, check to see if we should protect
// it from the bad/lagging chain logic.
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if ( g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect < MAX_OUTBOUND_PEERS_TO_PROTECT_FROM_DISCONNECT & & nodestate - > pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork & & ! nodestate - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Protecting outbound peer=%d from eviction \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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nodestate - > m_chain_sync . m_protect = true ;
+ + g_outbound_peers_with_protect_from_disconnect ;
}
}
}
return true ;
}
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void static ProcessOrphanTx ( CConnman * connman , std : : set < uint256 > & orphan_work_set , std : : list < CTransactionRef > & removed_txn ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans )
{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
AssertLockHeld ( g_cs_orphans ) ;
std : : set < NodeId > setMisbehaving ;
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bool done = false ;
while ( ! done & & ! orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) {
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const uint256 orphanHash = * orphan_work_set . begin ( ) ;
orphan_work_set . erase ( orphan_work_set . begin ( ) ) ;
auto orphan_it = mapOrphanTransactions . find ( orphanHash ) ;
if ( orphan_it = = mapOrphanTransactions . end ( ) ) continue ;
const CTransactionRef porphanTx = orphan_it - > second . tx ;
const CTransaction & orphanTx = * porphanTx ;
NodeId fromPeer = orphan_it - > second . fromPeer ;
bool fMissingInputs2 = false ;
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// Use a new CValidationState because orphans come from different peers (and we call
// MaybePunishNode based on the source peer from the orphan map, not based on the peer
// that relayed the previous transaction).
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CValidationState orphan_state ;
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if ( setMisbehaving . count ( fromPeer ) ) continue ;
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if ( AcceptToMemoryPool ( mempool , orphan_state , porphanTx , & fMissingInputs2 , & removed_txn , false /* bypass_limits */ , 0 /* nAbsurdFee */ ) ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " accepted orphan tx %s \n " , orphanHash . ToString ( ) ) ;
RelayTransaction ( orphanTx , connman ) ;
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < orphanTx . vout . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( COutPoint ( orphanHash , i ) ) ;
if ( it_by_prev ! = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) {
for ( const auto & elem : it_by_prev - > second ) {
orphan_work_set . insert ( elem - > first ) ;
}
}
}
EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
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done = true ;
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} else if ( ! fMissingInputs2 ) {
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if ( orphan_state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
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// Punish peer that gave us an invalid orphan tx
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if ( MaybePunishNode ( fromPeer , orphan_state , /*via_compact_block*/ false ) ) {
setMisbehaving . insert ( fromPeer ) ;
}
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " invalid orphan tx %s \n " , orphanHash . ToString ( ) ) ;
}
// Has inputs but not accepted to mempool
// Probably non-standard or insufficient fee
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " removed orphan tx %s \n " , orphanHash . ToString ( ) ) ;
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assert ( IsTransactionReason ( orphan_state . GetReason ( ) ) ) ;
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if ( ! orphanTx . HasWitness ( ) & & orphan_state . GetReason ( ) ! = ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_WITNESS_MUTATED ) {
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// Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
// witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
// See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
assert ( recentRejects ) ;
recentRejects - > insert ( orphanHash ) ;
}
EraseOrphanTx ( orphanHash ) ;
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done = true ;
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}
mempool . check ( pcoinsTip . get ( ) ) ;
}
}
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bool static ProcessMessage ( CNode * pfrom , const std : : string & strCommand , CDataStream & vRecv , int64_t nTimeReceived , const CChainParams & chainparams , CConnman * connman , const std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc , bool enable_bip61 )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received: %s (%u bytes) peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , vRecv . size ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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if ( gArgs . IsArgSet ( " -dropmessagestest " ) & & GetRand ( gArgs . GetArg ( " -dropmessagestest " , 0 ) ) = = 0 )
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{
LogPrintf ( " dropmessagestest DROPPING RECV MESSAGE \n " ) ;
return true ;
}
if ( ! ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) & &
( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FILTERLOAD | |
strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FILTERADD ) )
{
if ( pfrom - > nVersion > = NO_BLOOM_VERSION ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 ) ;
return false ;
} else {
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return false ;
}
}
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : REJECT )
{
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if ( LogAcceptCategory ( BCLog : : NET ) ) {
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try {
std : : string strMsg ; unsigned char ccode ; std : : string strReason ;
vRecv > > LIMITED_STRING ( strMsg , CMessageHeader : : COMMAND_SIZE ) > > ccode > > LIMITED_STRING ( strReason , MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) ;
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std : : ostringstream ss ;
ss < < strMsg < < " code " < < itostr ( ccode ) < < " : " < < strReason ;
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if ( strMsg = = NetMsgType : : BLOCK | | strMsg = = NetMsgType : : TX )
{
uint256 hash ;
vRecv > > hash ;
ss < < " : hash " < < hash . ToString ( ) ;
}
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Reject %s \n " , SanitizeString ( ss . str ( ) ) ) ;
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} catch ( const std : : ios_base : : failure & ) {
// Avoid feedback loops by preventing reject messages from triggering a new reject message.
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unparseable reject message received \n " ) ;
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}
}
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return true ;
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}
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : VERSION ) {
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// Each connection can only send one version message
if ( pfrom - > nVersion ! = 0 )
{
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if ( enable_bip61 ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , strCommand , REJECT_DUPLICATE , std : : string ( " Duplicate version message " ) ) ) ;
}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 1 ) ;
return false ;
}
int64_t nTime ;
CAddress addrMe ;
CAddress addrFrom ;
uint64_t nNonce = 1 ;
uint64_t nServiceInt ;
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ServiceFlags nServices ;
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int nVersion ;
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int nSendVersion ;
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std : : string cleanSubVer ;
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int nStartingHeight = - 1 ;
bool fRelay = true ;
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vRecv > > nVersion > > nServiceInt > > nTime > > addrMe ;
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nSendVersion = std : : min ( nVersion , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
nServices = ServiceFlags ( nServiceInt ) ;
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if ( ! pfrom - > fInbound )
{
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connman - > SetServices ( pfrom - > addr , nServices ) ;
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}
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if ( ! pfrom - > fInbound & & ! pfrom - > fFeeler & & ! pfrom - > m_manual_connection & & ! HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( nServices ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d does not offer the expected services (%08x offered, %08x expected); disconnecting \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , nServices , GetDesirableServiceFlags ( nServices ) ) ;
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if ( enable_bip61 ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , strCommand , REJECT_NONSTANDARD ,
strprintf ( " Expected to offer services %08x " , GetDesirableServiceFlags ( nServices ) ) ) ) ;
}
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pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return false ;
}
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if ( nVersion < MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION ) {
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// disconnect from peers older than this proto version
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " peer=%d using obsolete version %i; disconnecting \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , nVersion ) ;
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if ( enable_bip61 ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , strCommand , REJECT_OBSOLETE ,
strprintf ( " Version must be %d or greater " , MIN_PEER_PROTO_VERSION ) ) ) ;
}
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pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return false ;
}
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) )
vRecv > > addrFrom > > nNonce ;
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) ) {
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std : : string strSubVer ;
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vRecv > > LIMITED_STRING ( strSubVer , MAX_SUBVERSION_LENGTH ) ;
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cleanSubVer = SanitizeString ( strSubVer ) ;
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}
if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) ) {
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vRecv > > nStartingHeight ;
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}
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if ( ! vRecv . empty ( ) )
vRecv > > fRelay ;
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// Disconnect if we connected to ourself
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if ( pfrom - > fInbound & & ! connman - > CheckIncomingNonce ( nNonce ) )
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{
LogPrintf ( " connected to self at %s, disconnecting \n " , pfrom - > addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
if ( pfrom - > fInbound & & addrMe . IsRoutable ( ) )
{
SeenLocal ( addrMe ) ;
}
// Be shy and don't send version until we hear
if ( pfrom - > fInbound )
PushNodeVersion ( pfrom , connman , GetAdjustedTime ( ) ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : VERACK ) ) ;
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pfrom - > nServices = nServices ;
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pfrom - > SetAddrLocal ( addrMe ) ;
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{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_SubVer ) ;
pfrom - > cleanSubVer = cleanSubVer ;
}
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pfrom - > nStartingHeight = nStartingHeight ;
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// set nodes not relaying blocks and tx and not serving (parts) of the historical blockchain as "clients"
pfrom - > fClient = ( ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK ) & & ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) ) ;
// set nodes not capable of serving the complete blockchain history as "limited nodes"
pfrom - > m_limited_node = ( ! ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK ) & & ( nServices & NODE_NETWORK_LIMITED ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_filter ) ;
pfrom - > fRelayTxes = fRelay ; // set to true after we get the first filter* message
}
// Change version
pfrom - > SetSendVersion ( nSendVersion ) ;
pfrom - > nVersion = nVersion ;
if ( ( nServices & NODE_WITNESS ) )
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fHaveWitness = true ;
}
// Potentially mark this peer as a preferred download peer.
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
UpdatePreferredDownload ( pfrom , State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ) ;
}
if ( ! pfrom - > fInbound )
{
// Advertise our address
if ( fListen & & ! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) )
{
CAddress addr = GetLocalAddress ( & pfrom - > addr , pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) ) ;
FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
if ( addr . IsRoutable ( ) )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " ProcessMessages: advertising address %s \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
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pfrom - > PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
} else if ( IsPeerAddrLocalGood ( pfrom ) ) {
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addr . SetIP ( addrMe ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " ProcessMessages: advertising address %s \n " , addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
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pfrom - > PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
}
}
// Get recent addresses
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if ( pfrom - > fOneShot | | pfrom - > nVersion > = CADDR_TIME_VERSION | | connman - > GetAddressCount ( ) < 1000 )
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{
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( nSendVersion ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETADDR ) ) ;
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pfrom - > fGetAddr = true ;
}
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connman - > MarkAddressGood ( pfrom - > addr ) ;
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}
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std : : string remoteAddr ;
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if ( fLogIPs )
remoteAddr = " , peeraddr= " + pfrom - > addr . ToString ( ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " receive version message: %s: version %d, blocks=%d, us=%s, peer=%d%s \n " ,
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cleanSubVer , pfrom - > nVersion ,
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pfrom - > nStartingHeight , addrMe . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ,
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
remoteAddr ) ;
int64_t nTimeOffset = nTime - GetTime ( ) ;
pfrom - > nTimeOffset = nTimeOffset ;
AddTimeData ( pfrom - > addr , nTimeOffset ) ;
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// If the peer is old enough to have the old alert system, send it the final alert.
if ( pfrom - > nVersion < = 70012 ) {
CDataStream finalAlert ( ParseHex ( " 60010000000000000000000000ffffff7f00000000ffffff7ffeffff7f01ffffff7f00000000ffffff7f00ffffff7f002f555247454e543a20416c657274206b657920636f6d70726f6d697365642c2075706772616465207265717569726564004630440220653febd6410f470f6bae11cad19c48413becb1ac2c17f908fd0fd53bdc3abd5202206d0e9c96fe88d4a0f01ed9dedae2b6f9e00da94cad0fecaae66ecf689bf71b50 " ) , SER_NETWORK , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( nSendVersion ) . Make ( " alert " , finalAlert ) ) ;
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}
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// Feeler connections exist only to verify if address is online.
if ( pfrom - > fFeeler ) {
assert ( pfrom - > fInbound = = false ) ;
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
}
return true ;
}
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if ( pfrom - > nVersion = = 0 ) {
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// Must have a version message before anything else
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 1 ) ;
return false ;
}
// At this point, the outgoing message serialization version can't change.
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const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pfrom - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : VERACK )
{
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pfrom - > SetRecvVersion ( std : : min ( pfrom - > nVersion . load ( ) , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ) ;
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if ( ! pfrom - > fInbound ) {
// Mark this node as currently connected, so we update its timestamp later.
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fCurrentlyConnected = true ;
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LogPrintf ( " New outbound peer connected: version: %d, blocks=%d, peer=%d%s \n " ,
pfrom - > nVersion . load ( ) , pfrom - > nStartingHeight , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ,
( fLogIPs ? strprintf ( " , peeraddr=%s " , pfrom - > addr . ToString ( ) ) : " " ) ) ;
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}
if ( pfrom - > nVersion > = SENDHEADERS_VERSION ) {
// Tell our peer we prefer to receive headers rather than inv's
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because even
// non-NODE NETWORK peers can announce blocks (such as pruning
// nodes)
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDHEADERS ) ) ;
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}
if ( pfrom - > nVersion > = SHORT_IDS_BLOCKS_VERSION ) {
// Tell our peer we are willing to provide version 1 or 2 cmpctblocks
// However, we do not request new block announcements using
// cmpctblock messages.
// We send this to non-NODE NETWORK peers as well, because
// they may wish to request compact blocks from us
bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false ;
uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 2 ;
if ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS )
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 1 ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT , fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK , nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ) ) ;
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}
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pfrom - > fSuccessfullyConnected = true ;
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return true ;
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}
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if ( ! pfrom - > fSuccessfullyConnected ) {
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// Must have a verack message before anything else
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 1 ) ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : ADDR ) {
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr ;
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vRecv > > vAddr ;
// Don't want addr from older versions unless seeding
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if ( pfrom - > nVersion < CADDR_TIME_VERSION & & connman - > GetAddressCount ( ) > 1000 )
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return true ;
if ( vAddr . size ( ) > 1000 )
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " message addr size() = %u " , vAddr . size ( ) ) ) ;
return false ;
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}
// Store the new addresses
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddrOk ;
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int64_t nNow = GetAdjustedTime ( ) ;
int64_t nSince = nNow - 10 * 60 ;
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for ( CAddress & addr : vAddr )
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{
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if ( interruptMsgProc )
return true ;
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2017-10-04 23:59:30 +02:00
// We only bother storing full nodes, though this may include
// things which we would not make an outbound connection to, in
// part because we may make feeler connections to them.
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if ( ! MayHaveUsefulAddressDB ( addr . nServices ) & & ! HasAllDesirableServiceFlags ( addr . nServices ) )
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continue ;
if ( addr . nTime < = 100000000 | | addr . nTime > nNow + 10 * 60 )
addr . nTime = nNow - 5 * 24 * 60 * 60 ;
pfrom - > AddAddressKnown ( addr ) ;
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if ( g_banman - > IsBanned ( addr ) ) continue ; // Do not process banned addresses beyond remembering we received them
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bool fReachable = IsReachable ( addr ) ;
if ( addr . nTime > nSince & & ! pfrom - > fGetAddr & & vAddr . size ( ) < = 10 & & addr . IsRoutable ( ) )
{
// Relay to a limited number of other nodes
RelayAddress ( addr , fReachable , connman ) ;
}
// Do not store addresses outside our network
if ( fReachable )
vAddrOk . push_back ( addr ) ;
}
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > AddNewAddresses ( vAddrOk , pfrom - > addr , 2 * 60 * 60 ) ;
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if ( vAddr . size ( ) < 1000 )
pfrom - > fGetAddr = false ;
if ( pfrom - > fOneShot )
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
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}
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : SENDHEADERS ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fPreferHeaders = true ;
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : SENDCMPCT ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
bool fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK = false ;
uint64_t nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = 0 ;
vRecv > > fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK > > nCMPCTBLOCKVersion ;
if ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 1 | | ( ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS ) & & nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// fProvidesHeaderAndIDs is used to "lock in" version of compact blocks we send (fWantsCmpctWitness)
if ( ! State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs ) {
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fProvidesHeaderAndIDs = true ;
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness = nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ;
}
if ( State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness = = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ) // ignore later version announces
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fPreferHeaderAndIDs = fAnnounceUsingCMPCTBLOCK ;
if ( ! State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
if ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_WITNESS )
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 2 ) ;
else
State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion = ( nCMPCTBLOCKVersion = = 1 ) ;
}
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : INV ) {
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std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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vRecv > > vInv ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) > MAX_INV_SZ )
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2018-01-18 17:21:08 +01:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " message inv size() = %u " , vInv . size ( ) ) ) ;
return false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2019-05-09 15:16:29 +02:00
bool fBlocksOnly = ! g_relay_txes ;
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// Allow whitelisted peers to send data other than blocks in blocks only mode if whitelistrelay is true
2017-08-01 21:17:40 +02:00
if ( pfrom - > fWhitelisted & & gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -whitelistrelay " , DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY ) )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
fBlocksOnly = false ;
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) ;
2019-02-07 05:25:27 +01:00
int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-05-18 09:42:14 +02:00
for ( CInv & inv : vInv )
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{
2016-12-27 23:13:04 +01:00
if ( interruptMsgProc )
return true ;
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bool fAlreadyHave = AlreadyHave ( inv ) ;
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " got inv: %s %s peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , fAlreadyHave ? " have " : " new " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( inv . type = = MSG_TX ) {
inv . type | = nFetchFlags ;
}
if ( inv . type = = MSG_BLOCK ) {
UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , inv . hash ) ;
if ( ! fAlreadyHave & & ! fImporting & & ! fReindex & & ! mapBlocksInFlight . count ( inv . hash ) ) {
// We used to request the full block here, but since headers-announcements are now the
// primary method of announcement on the network, and since, in the case that a node
// fell back to inv we probably have a reorg which we should get the headers for first,
// we now only provide a getheaders response here. When we receive the headers, we will
// then ask for the blocks we need.
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , inv . hash ) ) ;
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders (%d) %s to peer=%d \n " , pindexBestHeader - > nHeight , inv . hash . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
}
else
{
pfrom - > AddInventoryKnown ( inv ) ;
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
if ( fBlocksOnly ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " transaction (%s) inv sent in violation of protocol peer=%d \n " , inv . hash . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
} else if ( ! fAlreadyHave & & ! fImporting & & ! fReindex & & ! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) ) {
2019-02-07 05:25:27 +01:00
RequestTx ( State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) , inv . hash , nNow ) ;
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : GETDATA ) {
2017-01-27 09:43:41 +01:00
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
vRecv > > vInv ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) > MAX_INV_SZ )
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2018-01-18 17:21:08 +01:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " message getdata size() = %u " , vInv . size ( ) ) ) ;
return false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received getdata (%u invsz) peer=%d \n " , vInv . size ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
if ( vInv . size ( ) > 0 ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received getdata for: %s peer=%d \n " , vInv [ 0 ] . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
pfrom - > vRecvGetData . insert ( pfrom - > vRecvGetData . end ( ) , vInv . begin ( ) , vInv . end ( ) ) ;
2018-05-02 14:10:27 +02:00
ProcessGetData ( pfrom , chainparams , connman , interruptMsgProc ) ;
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKS ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CBlockLocator locator ;
uint256 hashStop ;
vRecv > > locator > > hashStop ;
2018-08-07 22:37:45 +02:00
if ( locator . vHave . size ( ) > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d \n " , locator . vHave . size ( ) , MAX_LOCATOR_SZ , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
2016-12-31 18:16:08 +01:00
// We might have announced the currently-being-connected tip using a
// compact block, which resulted in the peer sending a getblocks
// request, which we would otherwise respond to without the new block.
// To avoid this situation we simply verify that we are on our best
// known chain now. This is super overkill, but we handle it better
// for getheaders requests, and there are no known nodes which support
// compact blocks but still use getblocks to request blocks.
{
2017-01-12 06:15:28 +01:00
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > a_recent_block ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
a_recent_block = most_recent_block ;
}
2018-04-18 15:58:13 +02:00
CValidationState state ;
if ( ! ActivateBestChain ( state , Params ( ) , a_recent_block ) ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " failed to activate chain (%s) \n " , FormatStateMessage ( state ) ) ;
}
2016-12-31 18:16:08 +01:00
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
const CBlockIndex * pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex ( : : ChainActive ( ) , locator ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// Send the rest of the chain
if ( pindex )
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
int nLimit = 500 ;
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks %d to %s limit %d from peer=%d \n " , ( pindex ? pindex - > nHeight : - 1 ) , hashStop . IsNull ( ) ? " end " : hashStop . ToString ( ) , nLimit , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
for ( ; pindex ; pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) )
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{
if ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) = = hashStop )
{
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping at %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
break ;
}
// If pruning, don't inv blocks unless we have on disk and are likely to still have
// for some reasonable time window (1 hour) that block relay might require.
const int nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave = MIN_BLOCKS_TO_KEEP - 3600 / chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) . nPowTargetSpacing ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( fPruneMode & & ( ! ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) | | pindex - > nHeight < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nHeight - nPrunedBlocksLikelyToHave ) )
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{
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping, pruned or too old block at %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
break ;
}
pfrom - > PushInventory ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
if ( - - nLimit < = 0 )
{
// When this block is requested, we'll send an inv that'll
// trigger the peer to getblocks the next batch of inventory.
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getblocks stopping at limit %d %s \n " , pindex - > nHeight , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
pfrom - > hashContinue = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
break ;
}
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKTXN ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
BlockTransactionsRequest req ;
vRecv > > req ;
2016-12-15 01:28:22 +01:00
std : : shared_ptr < const CBlock > recent_block ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
if ( most_recent_block_hash = = req . blockhash )
recent_block = most_recent_block ;
// Unlock cs_most_recent_block to avoid cs_main lock inversion
}
if ( recent_block ) {
SendBlockTransactions ( * recent_block , req , pfrom , connman ) ;
return true ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2018-01-12 01:23:09 +01:00
const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( req . blockhash ) ;
if ( ! pindex | | ! ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) ) {
2018-05-02 14:50:38 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block we don't have \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( pindex - > nHeight < : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) - MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// If an older block is requested (should never happen in practice,
// but can happen in tests) send a block response instead of a
// blocktxn response. Sending a full block response instead of a
// small blocktxn response is preferable in the case where a peer
// might maliciously send lots of getblocktxn requests to trigger
// expensive disk reads, because it will require the peer to
// actually receive all the data read from disk over the network.
2018-05-02 14:50:38 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us a getblocktxn for a block > %i deep \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , MAX_BLOCKTXN_DEPTH ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CInv inv ;
inv . type = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) - > fWantsCmpctWitness ? MSG_WITNESS_BLOCK : MSG_BLOCK ;
inv . hash = req . blockhash ;
pfrom - > vRecvGetData . push_back ( inv ) ;
2017-12-24 17:59:02 +01:00
// The message processing loop will go around again (without pausing) and we'll respond then (without cs_main)
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
CBlock block ;
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bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk ( block , pindex , chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ;
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assert ( ret ) ;
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2016-12-15 01:28:22 +01:00
SendBlockTransactions ( block , req , pfrom , connman ) ;
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return true ;
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}
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS ) {
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CBlockLocator locator ;
uint256 hashStop ;
vRecv > > locator > > hashStop ;
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if ( locator . vHave . size ( ) > MAX_LOCATOR_SZ ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders locator size %lld > %d, disconnect peer=%d \n " , locator . vHave . size ( ) , MAX_LOCATOR_SZ , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
if ( IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring getheaders from peer=%d because node is in initial block download \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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return true ;
}
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr ;
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if ( locator . IsNull ( ) )
{
// If locator is null, return the hashStop block
2018-01-12 01:23:09 +01:00
pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hashStop ) ;
if ( ! pindex ) {
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return true ;
2018-01-12 01:23:09 +01:00
}
2017-08-22 23:09:04 +02:00
2017-10-30 15:41:05 +01:00
if ( ! BlockRequestAllowed ( pindex , chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) ) {
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: ignoring request from peer=%i for old block header that isn't in the main chain \n " , __func__ , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-08-22 23:09:04 +02:00
return true ;
}
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}
else
{
// Find the last block the caller has in the main chain
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
pindex = FindForkInGlobalIndex ( : : ChainActive ( ) , locator ) ;
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if ( pindex )
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pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) ;
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}
// we must use CBlocks, as CBlockHeaders won't include the 0x00 nTx count at the end
2017-01-27 09:43:41 +01:00
std : : vector < CBlock > vHeaders ;
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int nLimit = MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ;
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " getheaders %d to %s from peer=%d \n " , ( pindex ? pindex - > nHeight : - 1 ) , hashStop . IsNull ( ) ? " end " : hashStop . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
for ( ; pindex ; pindex = : : ChainActive ( ) . Next ( pindex ) )
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{
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
if ( - - nLimit < = 0 | | pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) = = hashStop )
break ;
}
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
// pindex can be nullptr either if we sent ::ChainActive().Tip() OR
// if our peer has ::ChainActive().Tip() (and thus we are sending an empty
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// headers message). In both cases it's safe to update
// pindexBestHeaderSent to be our tip.
2016-12-31 18:16:08 +01:00
//
// It is important that we simply reset the BestHeaderSent value here,
// and not max(BestHeaderSent, newHeaderSent). We might have announced
// the currently-being-connected tip using a compact block, which
// resulted in the peer sending a headers request, which we respond to
// without the new block. By resetting the BestHeaderSent, we ensure we
// will re-announce the new block via headers (or compact blocks again)
// in the SendMessages logic.
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
nodestate - > pindexBestHeaderSent = pindex ? pindex : : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : HEADERS , vHeaders ) ) ;
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return true ;
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}
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if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : TX ) {
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// Stop processing the transaction early if
// We are in blocks only mode and peer is either not whitelisted or whitelistrelay is off
2019-05-09 15:16:29 +02:00
if ( ! g_relay_txes & & ( ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted | | ! gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -whitelistrelay " , DEFAULT_WHITELISTRELAY ) ) )
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{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " transaction sent in violation of protocol peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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return true ;
}
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CTransactionRef ptx ;
vRecv > > ptx ;
const CTransaction & tx = * ptx ;
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CInv inv ( MSG_TX , tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > AddInventoryKnown ( inv ) ;
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LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
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bool fMissingInputs = false ;
CValidationState state ;
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CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
nodestate - > m_tx_download . m_tx_announced . erase ( inv . hash ) ;
nodestate - > m_tx_download . m_tx_in_flight . erase ( inv . hash ) ;
EraseTxRequest ( inv . hash ) ;
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2017-01-09 20:38:06 +01:00
std : : list < CTransactionRef > lRemovedTxn ;
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if ( ! AlreadyHave ( inv ) & &
AcceptToMemoryPool ( mempool , state , ptx , & fMissingInputs , & lRemovedTxn , false /* bypass_limits */ , 0 /* nAbsurdFee */ ) ) {
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mempool . check ( pcoinsTip . get ( ) ) ;
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RelayTransaction ( tx , connman ) ;
for ( unsigned int i = 0 ; i < tx . vout . size ( ) ; i + + ) {
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auto it_by_prev = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . find ( COutPoint ( inv . hash , i ) ) ;
if ( it_by_prev ! = mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . end ( ) ) {
for ( const auto & elem : it_by_prev - > second ) {
2019-03-20 23:26:21 +01:00
pfrom - > orphan_work_set . insert ( elem - > first ) ;
2019-03-20 02:06:35 +01:00
}
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
pfrom - > nLastTXTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " AcceptToMemoryPool: peer=%d: accepted %s (poolsz %u txn, %u kB) \n " ,
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pfrom - > GetId ( ) ,
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tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
mempool . size ( ) , mempool . DynamicMemoryUsage ( ) / 1000 ) ;
// Recursively process any orphan transactions that depended on this one
2019-03-20 23:26:21 +01:00
ProcessOrphanTx ( connman , pfrom - > orphan_work_set , lRemovedTxn ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
else if ( fMissingInputs )
{
bool fRejectedParents = false ; // It may be the case that the orphans parents have all been rejected
2017-06-02 03:18:57 +02:00
for ( const CTxIn & txin : tx . vin ) {
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if ( recentRejects - > contains ( txin . prevout . hash ) ) {
fRejectedParents = true ;
break ;
}
}
if ( ! fRejectedParents ) {
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) ;
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int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
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for ( const CTxIn & txin : tx . vin ) {
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CInv _inv ( MSG_TX | nFetchFlags , txin . prevout . hash ) ;
pfrom - > AddInventoryKnown ( _inv ) ;
2019-02-07 05:25:27 +01:00
if ( ! AlreadyHave ( _inv ) ) RequestTx ( State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) , _inv . hash , nNow ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2016-12-05 09:15:33 +01:00
AddOrphanTx ( ptx , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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// DoS prevention: do not allow mapOrphanTransactions to grow unbounded
2017-08-01 21:17:40 +02:00
unsigned int nMaxOrphanTx = ( unsigned int ) std : : max ( ( int64_t ) 0 , gArgs . GetArg ( " -maxorphantx " , DEFAULT_MAX_ORPHAN_TRANSACTIONS ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
unsigned int nEvicted = LimitOrphanTxSize ( nMaxOrphanTx ) ;
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
if ( nEvicted > 0 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " mapOrphan overflow, removed %u tx \n " , nEvicted ) ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
} else {
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOL , " not keeping orphan with rejected parents %s \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 04:06:51 +01:00
// We will continue to reject this tx since it has rejected
// parents so avoid re-requesting it from other peers.
recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
} else {
2019-02-21 19:46:25 +01:00
assert ( IsTransactionReason ( state . GetReason ( ) ) ) ;
2019-01-17 05:35:01 +01:00
if ( ! tx . HasWitness ( ) & & state . GetReason ( ) ! = ValidationInvalidReason : : TX_WITNESS_MUTATED ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// Do not use rejection cache for witness transactions or
// witness-stripped transactions, as they can have been malleated.
// See https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/issues/8279 for details.
assert ( recentRejects ) ;
recentRejects - > insert ( tx . GetHash ( ) ) ;
2017-01-17 05:00:58 +01:00
if ( RecursiveDynamicUsage ( * ptx ) < 100000 ) {
2017-01-09 20:30:43 +01:00
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( ptx ) ;
2017-01-17 05:00:58 +01:00
}
} else if ( tx . HasWitness ( ) & & RecursiveDynamicUsage ( * ptx ) < 100000 ) {
2017-01-09 20:30:43 +01:00
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( ptx ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2017-08-01 21:17:40 +02:00
if ( pfrom - > fWhitelisted & & gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -whitelistforcerelay " , DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY ) ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// Always relay transactions received from whitelisted peers, even
// if they were already in the mempool or rejected from it due
// to policy, allowing the node to function as a gateway for
// nodes hidden behind it.
//
2017-11-08 17:57:38 +01:00
// Never relay transactions that might result in being
// disconnected (or banned).
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) & & TxRelayMayResultInDisconnect ( state ) ) {
LogPrintf ( " Not relaying invalid transaction %s from whitelisted peer=%d (%s) \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) , FormatStateMessage ( state ) ) ;
} else {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Force relaying tx %s from whitelisted peer=%d \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
RelayTransaction ( tx , connman ) ;
}
}
}
2017-01-09 20:38:06 +01:00
2017-01-19 20:39:03 +01:00
for ( const CTransactionRef & removedTx : lRemovedTxn )
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( removedTx ) ;
2017-01-09 20:38:06 +01:00
2018-10-09 04:19:56 +02:00
// If a tx has been detected by recentRejects, we will have reached
// this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't run
// the tx through AcceptToMemoryPool, we won't have computed a DoS
// score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
// tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
// we have to account for recentRejects showing false positives. In
// other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
// submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that recentRejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
// due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our recentRejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
2018-04-16 18:52:03 +02:00
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) )
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{
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : MEMPOOLREJ , " %s from peer=%d was not accepted: %s \n " , tx . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
pfrom - > GetId ( ) ,
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
FormatStateMessage ( state ) ) ;
2018-07-09 21:02:32 +02:00
if ( enable_bip61 & & state . GetRejectCode ( ) > 0 & & state . GetRejectCode ( ) < REJECT_INTERNAL ) { // Never send AcceptToMemoryPool's internal codes over P2P
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , strCommand , ( unsigned char ) state . GetRejectCode ( ) ,
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
state . GetRejectReason ( ) . substr ( 0 , MAX_REJECT_MESSAGE_LENGTH ) , inv . hash ) ) ;
2018-05-01 15:05:49 +02:00
}
2018-04-16 18:52:03 +02:00
MaybePunishNode ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , state , /*via_compact_block*/ false ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
// Ignore cmpctblock received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected cmpctblock message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ;
vRecv > > cmpctblock ;
2017-10-23 19:59:07 +02:00
bool received_new_header = false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2018-01-12 01:23:09 +01:00
if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( cmpctblock . header . hashPrevBlock ) ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// Doesn't connect (or is genesis), instead of DoSing in AcceptBlockHeader, request deeper headers
if ( ! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) )
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexBestHeader ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
2017-10-23 19:59:07 +02:00
2018-01-12 01:23:09 +01:00
if ( ! LookupBlockIndex ( cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ) {
2017-10-23 19:59:07 +02:00
received_new_header = true ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2017-08-07 07:36:37 +02:00
const CBlockIndex * pindex = nullptr ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CValidationState state ;
if ( ! ProcessNewBlockHeaders ( { cmpctblock . header } , state , chainparams , & pindex ) ) {
2017-11-08 17:57:38 +01:00
if ( state . IsInvalid ( ) ) {
MaybePunishNode ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , state , /*via_compact_block*/ true , " invalid header via cmpctblock " ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
}
2016-11-22 23:36:16 +01:00
// When we succeed in decoding a block's txids from a cmpctblock
// message we typically jump to the BLOCKTXN handling code, with a
// dummy (empty) BLOCKTXN message, to re-use the logic there in
// completing processing of the putative block (without cs_main).
bool fProcessBLOCKTXN = false ;
CDataStream blockTxnMsg ( SER_NETWORK , PROTOCOL_VERSION ) ;
2016-12-01 16:27:12 +01:00
// If we end up treating this as a plain headers message, call that as well
// without cs_main.
bool fRevertToHeaderProcessing = false ;
2016-12-14 20:42:04 +01:00
// Keep a CBlock for "optimistic" compactblock reconstructions (see
// below)
std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
bool fBlockReconstructed = false ;
2016-11-22 23:36:16 +01:00
{
2017-12-04 23:10:45 +01:00
LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// If AcceptBlockHeader returned true, it set pindex
assert ( pindex ) ;
UpdateBlockAvailability ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
2017-10-23 19:59:07 +02:00
CNodeState * nodestate = State ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// If this was a new header with more work than our tip, update the
// peer's last block announcement time
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( received_new_header & & pindex - > nChainWork > : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
2017-10-23 19:59:07 +02:00
nodestate - > m_last_block_announcement = GetTime ( ) ;
}
2017-01-27 09:43:41 +01:00
std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator blockInFlightIt = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
bool fAlreadyInFlight = blockInFlightIt ! = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) ;
if ( pindex - > nStatus & BLOCK_HAVE_DATA ) // Nothing to do here
return true ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( pindex - > nChainWork < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork | | // We know something better
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
pindex - > nTx ! = 0 ) { // We had this block at some point, but pruned it
if ( fAlreadyInFlight ) {
// We requested this block for some reason, but our mempool will probably be useless
// so we just grab the block via normal getdata
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
2017-05-02 09:32:21 +02:00
vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
return true ;
}
// If we're not close to tip yet, give up and let parallel block fetch work its magic
if ( ! fAlreadyInFlight & & ! CanDirectFetch ( chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) )
return true ;
if ( IsWitnessEnabled ( pindex - > pprev , chainparams . GetConsensus ( ) ) & & ! nodestate - > fSupportsDesiredCmpctVersion ) {
// Don't bother trying to process compact blocks from v1 peers
// after segwit activates.
return true ;
}
// We want to be a bit conservative just to be extra careful about DoS
// possibilities in compact block processing...
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( pindex - > nHeight < = : : ChainActive ( ) . Height ( ) + 2 ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( ( ! fAlreadyInFlight & & nodestate - > nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) | |
( fAlreadyInFlight & & blockInFlightIt - > second . first = = pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ) {
2017-08-07 07:36:37 +02:00
std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator * queuedBlockIt = nullptr ;
2017-05-02 23:00:14 +02:00
if ( ! MarkBlockAsInFlight ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex , & queuedBlockIt ) ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( ! ( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock )
( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock . reset ( new PartiallyDownloadedBlock ( & mempool ) ) ;
else {
// The block was already in flight using compact blocks from the same peer
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer sent us compact block we were already syncing! \n " ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock & partialBlock = * ( * queuedBlockIt ) - > partialBlock ;
2016-12-05 05:44:37 +01:00
ReadStatus status = partialBlock . InitData ( cmpctblock , vExtraTxnForCompact ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( status = = READ_STATUS_INVALID ) {
MarkBlockAsReceived ( pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ; // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist
2018-01-18 17:21:08 +01:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 , strprintf ( " Peer %d sent us invalid compact block \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
} else if ( status = = READ_STATUS_FAILED ) {
// Duplicate txindexes, the block is now in-flight, so just request it
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
2017-05-02 09:32:21 +02:00
vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
BlockTransactionsRequest req ;
for ( size_t i = 0 ; i < cmpctblock . BlockTxCount ( ) ; i + + ) {
if ( ! partialBlock . IsTxAvailable ( i ) )
req . indexes . push_back ( i ) ;
}
if ( req . indexes . empty ( ) ) {
// Dirty hack to jump to BLOCKTXN code (TODO: move message handling into their own functions)
BlockTransactions txn ;
txn . blockhash = cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ;
blockTxnMsg < < txn ;
2016-11-22 23:36:16 +01:00
fProcessBLOCKTXN = true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
} else {
req . blockhash = pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETBLOCKTXN , req ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2016-12-14 20:42:04 +01:00
} else {
// This block is either already in flight from a different
// peer, or this peer has too many blocks outstanding to
// download from.
// Optimistically try to reconstruct anyway since we might be
// able to without any round trips.
PartiallyDownloadedBlock tempBlock ( & mempool ) ;
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ReadStatus status = tempBlock . InitData ( cmpctblock , vExtraTxnForCompact ) ;
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if ( status ! = READ_STATUS_OK ) {
// TODO: don't ignore failures
return true ;
}
std : : vector < CTransactionRef > dummy ;
status = tempBlock . FillBlock ( * pblock , dummy ) ;
if ( status = = READ_STATUS_OK ) {
fBlockReconstructed = true ;
}
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}
} else {
if ( fAlreadyInFlight ) {
// We requested this block, but its far into the future, so our
// mempool will probably be useless - request the block normally
std : : vector < CInv > vInv ( 1 ) ;
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vInv [ 0 ] = CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , cmpctblock . header . GetHash ( ) ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vInv ) ) ;
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return true ;
} else {
// If this was an announce-cmpctblock, we want the same treatment as a header message
2016-12-01 16:27:12 +01:00
fRevertToHeaderProcessing = true ;
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}
}
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} // cs_main
if ( fProcessBLOCKTXN )
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return ProcessMessage ( pfrom , NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN , blockTxnMsg , nTimeReceived , chainparams , connman , interruptMsgProc , enable_bip61 ) ;
2016-12-14 20:42:04 +01:00
2017-10-26 20:54:33 +02:00
if ( fRevertToHeaderProcessing ) {
// Headers received from HB compact block peers are permitted to be
// relayed before full validation (see BIP 152), so we don't want to disconnect
// the peer if the header turns out to be for an invalid block.
// Note that if a peer tries to build on an invalid chain, that
// will be detected and the peer will be banned.
2019-01-15 21:54:04 +01:00
return ProcessHeadersMessage ( pfrom , connman , { cmpctblock . header } , chainparams , /*via_compact_block=*/ true ) ;
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}
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if ( fBlockReconstructed ) {
// If we got here, we were able to optimistically reconstruct a
// block that is in flight from some other peer.
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . emplace ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) , std : : make_pair ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , false ) ) ;
}
bool fNewBlock = false ;
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// Setting fForceProcessing to true means that we bypass some of
// our anti-DoS protections in AcceptBlock, which filters
// unrequested blocks that might be trying to waste our resources
// (eg disk space). Because we only try to reconstruct blocks when
// we're close to caught up (via the CanDirectFetch() requirement
// above, combined with the behavior of not requesting blocks until
// we have a chain with at least nMinimumChainWork), and we ignore
// compact blocks with less work than our tip, it is safe to treat
// reconstructed compact blocks as having been requested.
ProcessNewBlock ( chainparams , pblock , /*fForceProcessing=*/ true , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom - > nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
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LOCK ( cs_main ) ; // hold cs_main for CBlockIndex::IsValid()
if ( pindex - > IsValid ( BLOCK_VALID_TRANSACTIONS ) ) {
// Clear download state for this block, which is in
// process from some other peer. We do this after calling
// ProcessNewBlock so that a malleated cmpctblock announcement
// can't be used to interfere with block relay.
MarkBlockAsReceived ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
}
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return true ;
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}
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : BLOCKTXN )
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{
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// Ignore blocktxn received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected blocktxn message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
BlockTransactions resp ;
vRecv > > resp ;
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std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
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bool fBlockRead = false ;
{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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std : : map < uint256 , std : : pair < NodeId , std : : list < QueuedBlock > : : iterator > > : : iterator it = mapBlocksInFlight . find ( resp . blockhash ) ;
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if ( it = = mapBlocksInFlight . end ( ) | | ! it - > second . second - > partialBlock | |
it - > second . first ! = pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Peer %d sent us block transactions for block we weren't expecting \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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return true ;
}
PartiallyDownloadedBlock & partialBlock = * it - > second . second - > partialBlock ;
2016-12-04 09:17:30 +01:00
ReadStatus status = partialBlock . FillBlock ( * pblock , resp . txn ) ;
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if ( status = = READ_STATUS_INVALID ) {
MarkBlockAsReceived ( resp . blockhash ) ; // Reset in-flight state in case of whitelist
2018-01-18 17:21:08 +01:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 , strprintf ( " Peer %d sent us invalid compact block/non-matching block transactions \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ) ;
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return true ;
} else if ( status = = READ_STATUS_FAILED ) {
// Might have collided, fall back to getdata now :(
std : : vector < CInv > invs ;
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invs . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | GetFetchFlags ( pfrom ) , resp . blockhash ) ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , invs ) ) ;
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} else {
// Block is either okay, or possibly we received
// READ_STATUS_CHECKBLOCK_FAILED.
// Note that CheckBlock can only fail for one of a few reasons:
// 1. bad-proof-of-work (impossible here, because we've already
// accepted the header)
// 2. merkleroot doesn't match the transactions given (already
// caught in FillBlock with READ_STATUS_FAILED, so
// impossible here)
// 3. the block is otherwise invalid (eg invalid coinbase,
// block is too big, too many legacy sigops, etc).
// So if CheckBlock failed, #3 is the only possibility.
// Under BIP 152, we don't DoS-ban unless proof of work is
// invalid (we don't require all the stateless checks to have
// been run). This is handled below, so just treat this as
// though the block was successfully read, and rely on the
// handling in ProcessNewBlock to ensure the block index is
// updated, reject messages go out, etc.
MarkBlockAsReceived ( resp . blockhash ) ; // it is now an empty pointer
fBlockRead = true ;
// mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores,
// so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
// BIP 152 permits peers to relay compact blocks after validating
// the header only; we should not punish peers if the block turns
// out to be invalid.
mapBlockSource . emplace ( resp . blockhash , std : : make_pair ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , false ) ) ;
}
} // Don't hold cs_main when we call into ProcessNewBlock
if ( fBlockRead ) {
bool fNewBlock = false ;
// Since we requested this block (it was in mapBlocksInFlight), force it to be processed,
// even if it would not be a candidate for new tip (missing previous block, chain not long enough, etc)
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// This bypasses some anti-DoS logic in AcceptBlock (eg to prevent
// disk-space attacks), but this should be safe due to the
// protections in the compact block handler -- see related comment
// in compact block optimistic reconstruction handling.
ProcessNewBlock ( chainparams , pblock , /*fForceProcessing=*/ true , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom - > nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
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}
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return true ;
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}
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : HEADERS )
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{
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// Ignore headers received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected headers message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
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std : : vector < CBlockHeader > headers ;
// Bypass the normal CBlock deserialization, as we don't want to risk deserializing 2000 full blocks.
unsigned int nCount = ReadCompactSize ( vRecv ) ;
if ( nCount > MAX_HEADERS_RESULTS ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2018-01-18 17:21:08 +01:00
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 20 , strprintf ( " headers message size = %u " , nCount ) ) ;
return false ;
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}
headers . resize ( nCount ) ;
for ( unsigned int n = 0 ; n < nCount ; n + + ) {
vRecv > > headers [ n ] ;
ReadCompactSize ( vRecv ) ; // ignore tx count; assume it is 0.
}
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return ProcessHeadersMessage ( pfrom , connman , headers , chainparams , /*via_compact_block=*/ false ) ;
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}
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : BLOCK )
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{
2019-03-14 01:59:37 +01:00
// Ignore block received while importing
if ( fImporting | | fReindex ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unexpected block message received from peer %d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
return true ;
}
2016-12-04 09:17:30 +01:00
std : : shared_ptr < CBlock > pblock = std : : make_shared < CBlock > ( ) ;
vRecv > > * pblock ;
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2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received block %s peer=%d \n " , pblock - > GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-10-11 22:01:51 +02:00
bool forceProcessing = false ;
2016-12-04 09:17:30 +01:00
const uint256 hash ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
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{
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
// Also always process if we requested the block explicitly, as we may
// need it even though it is not a candidate for a new best tip.
forceProcessing | = MarkBlockAsReceived ( hash ) ;
// mapBlockSource is only used for sending reject messages and DoS scores,
// so the race between here and cs_main in ProcessNewBlock is fine.
mapBlockSource . emplace ( hash , std : : make_pair ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , true ) ) ;
}
bool fNewBlock = false ;
2016-12-04 09:23:17 +01:00
ProcessNewBlock ( chainparams , pblock , forceProcessing , & fNewBlock ) ;
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if ( fNewBlock ) {
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pfrom - > nLastBlockTime = GetTime ( ) ;
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} else {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
mapBlockSource . erase ( pblock - > GetHash ( ) ) ;
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
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}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : GETADDR ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// This asymmetric behavior for inbound and outbound connections was introduced
// to prevent a fingerprinting attack: an attacker can send specific fake addresses
// to users' AddrMan and later request them by sending getaddr messages.
// Making nodes which are behind NAT and can only make outgoing connections ignore
// the getaddr message mitigates the attack.
if ( ! pfrom - > fInbound ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring \" getaddr \" from outbound connection. peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
// Only send one GetAddr response per connection to reduce resource waste
// and discourage addr stamping of INV announcements.
if ( pfrom - > fSentAddr ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Ignoring repeated \" getaddr \" . peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
pfrom - > fSentAddr = true ;
pfrom - > vAddrToSend . clear ( ) ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr = connman - > GetAddresses ( ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
FastRandomContext insecure_rand ;
2019-03-18 06:05:49 +01:00
for ( const CAddress & addr : vAddr ) {
if ( ! g_banman - > IsBanned ( addr ) ) {
pfrom - > PushAddress ( addr , insecure_rand ) ;
}
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : MEMPOOL ) {
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if ( ! ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) & & ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted )
{
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " mempool request with bloom filters disabled, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
if ( connman - > OutboundTargetReached ( false ) & & ! pfrom - > fWhitelisted )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " mempool request with bandwidth limit reached, disconnect peer=%d \n " , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_inventory ) ;
pfrom - > fSendMempool = true ;
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : PING ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( pfrom - > nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION )
{
uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
vRecv > > nonce ;
// Echo the message back with the nonce. This allows for two useful features:
//
// 1) A remote node can quickly check if the connection is operational
// 2) Remote nodes can measure the latency of the network thread. If this node
// is overloaded it won't respond to pings quickly and the remote node can
// avoid sending us more work, like chain download requests.
//
// The nonce stops the remote getting confused between different pings: without
// it, if the remote node sends a ping once per second and this node takes 5
// seconds to respond to each, the 5th ping the remote sends would appear to
// return very quickly.
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PONG , nonce ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : PONG ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
int64_t pingUsecEnd = nTimeReceived ;
uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
size_t nAvail = vRecv . in_avail ( ) ;
bool bPingFinished = false ;
std : : string sProblem ;
if ( nAvail > = sizeof ( nonce ) ) {
vRecv > > nonce ;
// Only process pong message if there is an outstanding ping (old ping without nonce should never pong)
if ( pfrom - > nPingNonceSent ! = 0 ) {
if ( nonce = = pfrom - > nPingNonceSent ) {
// Matching pong received, this ping is no longer outstanding
bPingFinished = true ;
int64_t pingUsecTime = pingUsecEnd - pfrom - > nPingUsecStart ;
if ( pingUsecTime > 0 ) {
// Successful ping time measurement, replace previous
pfrom - > nPingUsecTime = pingUsecTime ;
2017-02-06 08:34:57 +01:00
pfrom - > nMinPingUsecTime = std : : min ( pfrom - > nMinPingUsecTime . load ( ) , pingUsecTime ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
} else {
// This should never happen
sProblem = " Timing mishap " ;
}
} else {
// Nonce mismatches are normal when pings are overlapping
sProblem = " Nonce mismatch " ;
if ( nonce = = 0 ) {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true ;
sProblem = " Nonce zero " ;
}
}
} else {
sProblem = " Unsolicited pong without ping " ;
}
} else {
// This is most likely a bug in another implementation somewhere; cancel this ping
bPingFinished = true ;
sProblem = " Short payload " ;
}
if ( ! ( sProblem . empty ( ) ) ) {
2016-12-25 21:19:40 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " pong peer=%d: %s, %x expected, %x received, %u bytes \n " ,
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pfrom - > GetId ( ) ,
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
sProblem ,
pfrom - > nPingNonceSent ,
nonce ,
nAvail ) ;
}
if ( bPingFinished ) {
pfrom - > nPingNonceSent = 0 ;
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
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}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FILTERLOAD ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CBloomFilter filter ;
vRecv > > filter ;
if ( ! filter . IsWithinSizeConstraints ( ) )
{
// There is no excuse for sending a too-large filter
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 ) ;
}
else
{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_filter ) ;
2017-08-09 16:14:37 +02:00
pfrom - > pfilter . reset ( new CBloomFilter ( filter ) ) ;
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pfrom - > pfilter - > UpdateEmptyFull ( ) ;
pfrom - > fRelayTxes = true ;
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FILTERADD ) {
2017-01-27 09:43:41 +01:00
std : : vector < unsigned char > vData ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
vRecv > > vData ;
// Nodes must NEVER send a data item > 520 bytes (the max size for a script data object,
// and thus, the maximum size any matched object can have) in a filteradd message
bool bad = false ;
if ( vData . size ( ) > MAX_SCRIPT_ELEMENT_SIZE ) {
bad = true ;
} else {
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pfrom - > pfilter ) {
pfrom - > pfilter - > insert ( vData ) ;
} else {
bad = true ;
}
}
if ( bad ) {
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
Misbehaving ( pfrom - > GetId ( ) , 100 ) ;
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FILTERCLEAR ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( pfrom - > GetLocalServices ( ) & NODE_BLOOM ) {
2017-08-09 16:14:37 +02:00
pfrom - > pfilter . reset ( new CBloomFilter ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
pfrom - > fRelayTxes = true ;
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : FEEFILTER ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CAmount newFeeFilter = 0 ;
vRecv > > newFeeFilter ;
if ( MoneyRange ( newFeeFilter ) ) {
{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
pfrom - > minFeeFilter = newFeeFilter ;
}
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " received: feefilter of %s from peer=%d \n " , CFeeRate ( newFeeFilter ) . ToString ( ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
if ( strCommand = = NetMsgType : : NOTFOUND ) {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// We do not care about the NOTFOUND message, but logging an Unknown Command
// message would be undesirable as we transmit it ourselves.
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
2018-08-12 13:55:01 +02:00
// Ignore unknown commands for extensibility
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Unknown command \" %s \" from peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
}
2017-10-05 19:10:58 +02:00
bool PeerLogicValidation : : SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned ( CNode * pnode , bool enable_bip61 ) EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED ( cs_main )
2017-02-07 18:02:02 +01:00
{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState & state = * State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2018-07-09 21:02:32 +02:00
if ( enable_bip61 ) {
2018-05-01 15:05:49 +02:00
for ( const CBlockReject & reject : state . rejects ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pnode , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , std : : string ( NetMsgType : : BLOCK ) , reject . chRejectCode , reject . strRejectReason , reject . hashBlock ) ) ;
}
2017-02-07 18:02:02 +01:00
}
state . rejects . clear ( ) ;
if ( state . fShouldBan ) {
state . fShouldBan = false ;
if ( pnode - > fWhitelisted )
LogPrintf ( " Warning: not punishing whitelisted peer %s! \n " , pnode - > addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2017-10-05 17:49:16 +02:00
else if ( pnode - > m_manual_connection )
LogPrintf ( " Warning: not punishing manually-connected peer %s! \n " , pnode - > addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2017-10-05 00:25:34 +02:00
else if ( pnode - > addr . IsLocal ( ) ) {
// Disconnect but don't ban _this_ local node
LogPrintf ( " Warning: disconnecting but not banning local peer %s! \n " , pnode - > addr . ToString ( ) ) ;
2017-02-07 18:02:02 +01:00
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
2017-10-05 00:25:34 +02:00
} else {
// Disconnect and ban all nodes sharing the address
2017-10-05 19:10:58 +02:00
if ( m_banman ) {
m_banman - > Ban ( pnode - > addr , BanReasonNodeMisbehaving ) ;
}
2017-10-05 00:25:34 +02:00
connman - > DisconnectNode ( pnode - > addr ) ;
2017-02-07 18:02:02 +01:00
}
return true ;
}
return false ;
}
2017-07-06 20:08:23 +02:00
bool PeerLogicValidation : : ProcessMessages ( CNode * pfrom , std : : atomic < bool > & interruptMsgProc )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
const CChainParams & chainparams = Params ( ) ;
//
// Message format
// (4) message start
// (12) command
// (4) size
// (4) checksum
// (x) data
//
2016-12-31 08:05:26 +01:00
bool fMoreWork = false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
if ( ! pfrom - > vRecvGetData . empty ( ) )
2018-05-02 14:10:27 +02:00
ProcessGetData ( pfrom , chainparams , connman , interruptMsgProc ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2019-03-20 23:26:21 +01:00
if ( ! pfrom - > orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) {
std : : list < CTransactionRef > removed_txn ;
LOCK2 ( cs_main , g_cs_orphans ) ;
ProcessOrphanTx ( connman , pfrom - > orphan_work_set , removed_txn ) ;
for ( const CTransactionRef & removedTx : removed_txn ) {
AddToCompactExtraTransactions ( removedTx ) ;
}
}
2016-12-31 08:05:26 +01:00
if ( pfrom - > fDisconnect )
return false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
// this maintains the order of responses
2016-12-31 08:05:26 +01:00
if ( ! pfrom - > vRecvGetData . empty ( ) ) return true ;
2019-03-20 23:26:21 +01:00
if ( ! pfrom - > orphan_work_set . empty ( ) ) return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Don't bother if send buffer is too full to respond anyway
if ( pfrom - > fPauseSend )
return false ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
std : : list < CNetMessage > msgs ;
{
LOCK ( pfrom - > cs_vProcessMsg ) ;
if ( pfrom - > vProcessMsg . empty ( ) )
2016-12-31 08:05:26 +01:00
return false ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Just take one message
msgs . splice ( msgs . begin ( ) , pfrom - > vProcessMsg , pfrom - > vProcessMsg . begin ( ) ) ;
pfrom - > nProcessQueueSize - = msgs . front ( ) . vRecv . size ( ) + CMessageHeader : : HEADER_SIZE ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
pfrom - > fPauseRecv = pfrom - > nProcessQueueSize > connman - > GetReceiveFloodSize ( ) ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
fMoreWork = ! pfrom - > vProcessMsg . empty ( ) ;
}
CNetMessage & msg ( msgs . front ( ) ) ;
msg . SetVersion ( pfrom - > GetRecvVersion ( ) ) ;
// Scan for message start
if ( memcmp ( msg . hdr . pchMessageStart , chainparams . MessageStart ( ) , CMessageHeader : : MESSAGE_START_SIZE ) ! = 0 ) {
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " PROCESSMESSAGE: INVALID MESSAGESTART %s peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( msg . hdr . GetCommand ( ) ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
pfrom - > fDisconnect = true ;
return false ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Read header
CMessageHeader & hdr = msg . hdr ;
if ( ! hdr . IsValid ( chainparams . MessageStart ( ) ) )
{
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " PROCESSMESSAGE: ERRORS IN HEADER %s peer=%d \n " , SanitizeString ( hdr . GetCommand ( ) ) , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
return fMoreWork ;
}
std : : string strCommand = hdr . GetCommand ( ) ;
// Message size
unsigned int nMessageSize = hdr . nMessageSize ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Checksum
CDataStream & vRecv = msg . vRecv ;
const uint256 & hash = msg . GetMessageHash ( ) ;
if ( memcmp ( hash . begin ( ) , hdr . pchChecksum , CMessageHeader : : CHECKSUM_SIZE ) ! = 0 )
{
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): CHECKSUM ERROR expected %s was %s \n " , __func__ ,
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize ,
HexStr ( hash . begin ( ) , hash . begin ( ) + CMessageHeader : : CHECKSUM_SIZE ) ,
HexStr ( hdr . pchChecksum , hdr . pchChecksum + CMessageHeader : : CHECKSUM_SIZE ) ) ;
return fMoreWork ;
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Process message
bool fRet = false ;
try
{
2018-07-09 21:02:32 +02:00
fRet = ProcessMessage ( pfrom , strCommand , vRecv , msg . nTime , chainparams , connman , interruptMsgProc , m_enable_bip61 ) ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
if ( interruptMsgProc )
return false ;
if ( ! pfrom - > vRecvGetData . empty ( ) )
fMoreWork = true ;
}
catch ( const std : : ios_base : : failure & e )
{
2018-07-09 21:02:32 +02:00
if ( m_enable_bip61 ) {
2018-05-01 15:05:49 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pfrom , CNetMsgMaker ( INIT_PROTO_VERSION ) . Make ( NetMsgType : : REJECT , strCommand , REJECT_MALFORMED , std : : string ( " error parsing message " ) ) ) ;
}
2019-05-13 21:38:10 +02:00
if ( strstr ( e . what ( ) , " end of data " ) ) {
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// Allow exceptions from under-length message on vRecv
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught, normally caused by a message being shorter than its stated length \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) ) ;
2019-05-13 21:38:10 +02:00
} else if ( strstr ( e . what ( ) , " size too large " ) ) {
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
// Allow exceptions from over-long size
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) ) ;
2019-05-13 21:38:10 +02:00
} else if ( strstr ( e . what ( ) , " non-canonical ReadCompactSize() " ) ) {
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// Allow exceptions from non-canonical encoding
2017-10-30 23:56:37 +01:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) ) ;
2019-05-13 21:38:10 +02:00
} else if ( strstr ( e . what ( ) , " Superfluous witness record " ) ) {
// Allow exceptions from illegal witness encoding
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) ) ;
} else if ( strstr ( e . what ( ) , " Unknown transaction optional data " ) ) {
// Allow exceptions from unknown witness encoding
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes): Exception '%s' caught \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , e . what ( ) ) ;
} else {
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PrintExceptionContinue ( & e , " ProcessMessages() " ) ;
}
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}
catch ( const std : : exception & e ) {
PrintExceptionContinue ( & e , " ProcessMessages() " ) ;
} catch ( . . . ) {
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PrintExceptionContinue ( nullptr , " ProcessMessages() " ) ;
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}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
if ( ! fRet ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s(%s, %u bytes) FAILED peer=%d \n " , __func__ , SanitizeString ( strCommand ) , nMessageSize , pfrom - > GetId ( ) ) ;
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
}
2017-02-07 18:02:02 +01:00
2017-03-06 17:54:08 +01:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
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SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned ( pfrom , m_enable_bip61 ) ;
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2016-12-31 08:05:26 +01:00
return fMoreWork ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
void PeerLogicValidation : : ConsiderEviction ( CNode * pto , int64_t time_in_seconds )
{
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
CNodeState & state = * State ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pto - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
if ( ! state . m_chain_sync . m_protect & & IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate ( pto ) & & state . fSyncStarted ) {
// This is an outbound peer subject to disconnection if they don't
// announce a block with as much work as the current tip within
// CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME seconds (note: if
// their chain has more work than ours, we should sync to it,
// unless it's invalid, in which case we should find that out and
// disconnect from them elsewhere).
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
if ( state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > nChainWork ) {
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout ! = 0 ) {
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = 0 ;
state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header = nullptr ;
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = false ;
}
} else if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = = 0 | | ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr & & state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > nChainWork > = state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > nChainWork ) ) {
// Our best block known by this peer is behind our tip, and we're either noticing
// that for the first time, OR this peer was able to catch up to some earlier point
// where we checked against our tip.
// Either way, set a new timeout based on current tip.
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = time_in_seconds + CHAIN_SYNC_TIMEOUT ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = false ;
} else if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout > 0 & & time_in_seconds > state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout ) {
// No evidence yet that our peer has synced to a chain with work equal to that
// of our tip, when we first detected it was behind. Send a single getheaders
// message to give the peer a chance to update us.
if ( state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders ) {
// They've run out of time to catch up!
LogPrintf ( " Disconnecting outbound peer %d for old chain, best known block = %s \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) , state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ? state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) : " <none> " ) ;
pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
} else {
2017-11-10 15:22:54 +01:00
assert ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " sending getheaders to outbound peer=%d to verify chain work (current best known block:%s, benchmark blockhash: %s) \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) , state . pindexBestKnownBlock ! = nullptr ? state . pindexBestKnownBlock - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) : " <none> " , state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
2019-03-27 16:14:25 +01:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( state . m_chain_sync . m_work_header - > pprev ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
state . m_chain_sync . m_sent_getheaders = true ;
constexpr int64_t HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME = 120 ; // 2 minutes
// Bump the timeout to allow a response, which could clear the timeout
// (if the response shows the peer has synced), reset the timeout (if
// the peer syncs to the required work but not to our tip), or result
// in disconnect (if we advance to the timeout and pindexBestKnownBlock
// has not sufficiently progressed)
state . m_chain_sync . m_timeout = time_in_seconds + HEADERS_RESPONSE_TIME ;
}
}
}
}
2017-10-24 22:56:07 +02:00
void PeerLogicValidation : : EvictExtraOutboundPeers ( int64_t time_in_seconds )
{
// Check whether we have too many outbound peers
int extra_peers = connman - > GetExtraOutboundCount ( ) ;
if ( extra_peers > 0 ) {
// If we have more outbound peers than we target, disconnect one.
// Pick the outbound peer that least recently announced
// us a new block, with ties broken by choosing the more recent
// connection (higher node id)
NodeId worst_peer = - 1 ;
int64_t oldest_block_announcement = std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ;
connman - > ForEachNode ( [ & ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
2018-06-08 20:09:08 +02:00
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
2017-10-24 22:56:07 +02:00
// Ignore non-outbound peers, or nodes marked for disconnect already
if ( ! IsOutboundDisconnectionCandidate ( pnode ) | | pnode - > fDisconnect ) return ;
CNodeState * state = State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( state = = nullptr ) return ; // shouldn't be possible, but just in case
// Don't evict our protected peers
if ( state - > m_chain_sync . m_protect ) return ;
if ( state - > m_last_block_announcement < oldest_block_announcement | | ( state - > m_last_block_announcement = = oldest_block_announcement & & pnode - > GetId ( ) > worst_peer ) ) {
worst_peer = pnode - > GetId ( ) ;
oldest_block_announcement = state - > m_last_block_announcement ;
}
} ) ;
if ( worst_peer ! = - 1 ) {
bool disconnected = connman - > ForNode ( worst_peer , [ & ] ( CNode * pnode ) {
2018-06-08 20:09:08 +02:00
AssertLockHeld ( cs_main ) ;
2017-10-24 22:56:07 +02:00
// Only disconnect a peer that has been connected to us for
// some reasonable fraction of our check-frequency, to give
// it time for new information to have arrived.
// Also don't disconnect any peer we're trying to download a
// block from.
CNodeState & state = * State ( pnode - > GetId ( ) ) ;
if ( time_in_seconds - pnode - > nTimeConnected > MINIMUM_CONNECT_TIME & & state . nBlocksInFlight = = 0 ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " disconnecting extra outbound peer=%d (last block announcement received at time %d) \n " , pnode - > GetId ( ) , oldest_block_announcement ) ;
pnode - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
} else {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " keeping outbound peer=%d chosen for eviction (connect time: %d, blocks_in_flight: %d) \n " , pnode - > GetId ( ) , pnode - > nTimeConnected , state . nBlocksInFlight ) ;
return false ;
}
} ) ;
if ( disconnected ) {
// If we disconnected an extra peer, that means we successfully
// connected to at least one peer after the last time we
// detected a stale tip. Don't try any more extra peers until
// we next detect a stale tip, to limit the load we put on the
// network from these extra connections.
connman - > SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( false ) ;
}
}
}
}
void PeerLogicValidation : : CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers ( const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams )
{
2018-08-23 01:29:01 +02:00
LOCK ( cs_main ) ;
2017-10-24 22:56:07 +02:00
if ( connman = = nullptr ) return ;
int64_t time_in_seconds = GetTime ( ) ;
EvictExtraOutboundPeers ( time_in_seconds ) ;
if ( time_in_seconds > m_stale_tip_check_time ) {
// Check whether our tip is stale, and if so, allow using an extra
// outbound peer
2018-08-23 01:29:01 +02:00
if ( ! fImporting & & ! fReindex & & connman - > GetNetworkActive ( ) & & connman - > GetUseAddrmanOutgoing ( ) & & TipMayBeStale ( consensusParams ) ) {
2017-10-24 22:56:07 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Potential stale tip detected, will try using extra outbound peer (last tip update: %d seconds ago) \n " , time_in_seconds - g_last_tip_update ) ;
connman - > SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( true ) ;
} else if ( connman - > GetTryNewOutboundPeer ( ) ) {
connman - > SetTryNewOutboundPeer ( false ) ;
}
m_stale_tip_check_time = time_in_seconds + STALE_CHECK_INTERVAL ;
}
}
2018-06-08 21:09:20 +02:00
namespace {
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
class CompareInvMempoolOrder
{
CTxMemPool * mp ;
public :
2017-08-01 12:22:41 +02:00
explicit CompareInvMempoolOrder ( CTxMemPool * _mempool )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
mp = _mempool ;
}
bool operator ( ) ( std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator a , std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator b )
{
/* As std::make_heap produces a max-heap, we want the entries with the
* fewest ancestors / highest fee to sort later . */
return mp - > CompareDepthAndScore ( * b , * a ) ;
}
} ;
2018-06-08 21:09:20 +02:00
}
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
2018-07-02 04:26:47 +02:00
bool PeerLogicValidation : : SendMessages ( CNode * pto )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
{
const Consensus : : Params & consensusParams = Params ( ) . GetConsensus ( ) ;
{
2017-01-26 18:35:49 +01:00
// Don't send anything until the version handshake is complete
if ( ! pto - > fSuccessfullyConnected | | pto - > fDisconnect )
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
return true ;
// If we get here, the outgoing message serialization version is set and can't change.
2017-01-31 22:57:40 +01:00
const CNetMsgMaker msgMaker ( pto - > GetSendVersion ( ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
//
// Message: ping
//
bool pingSend = false ;
if ( pto - > fPingQueued ) {
// RPC ping request by user
pingSend = true ;
}
if ( pto - > nPingNonceSent = = 0 & & pto - > nPingUsecStart + PING_INTERVAL * 1000000 < GetTimeMicros ( ) ) {
// Ping automatically sent as a latency probe & keepalive.
pingSend = true ;
}
if ( pingSend ) {
uint64_t nonce = 0 ;
while ( nonce = = 0 ) {
GetRandBytes ( ( unsigned char * ) & nonce , sizeof ( nonce ) ) ;
}
pto - > fPingQueued = false ;
pto - > nPingUsecStart = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
if ( pto - > nVersion > BIP0031_VERSION ) {
pto - > nPingNonceSent = nonce ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PING , nonce ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
} else {
// Peer is too old to support ping command with nonce, pong will never arrive.
pto - > nPingNonceSent = 0 ;
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : PING ) ) ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
}
}
TRY_LOCK ( cs_main , lockMain ) ; // Acquire cs_main for IsInitialBlockDownload() and CNodeState()
if ( ! lockMain )
return true ;
2017-10-05 19:10:58 +02:00
if ( SendRejectsAndCheckIfBanned ( pto , m_enable_bip61 ) ) return true ;
2016-12-02 00:45:50 +01:00
CNodeState & state = * State ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// Address refresh broadcast
int64_t nNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
if ( ! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) & & pto - > nNextLocalAddrSend < nNow ) {
AdvertiseLocal ( pto ) ;
pto - > nNextLocalAddrSend = PoissonNextSend ( nNow , AVG_LOCAL_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
}
//
// Message: addr
//
if ( pto - > nNextAddrSend < nNow ) {
pto - > nNextAddrSend = PoissonNextSend ( nNow , AVG_ADDRESS_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
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std : : vector < CAddress > vAddr ;
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vAddr . reserve ( pto - > vAddrToSend . size ( ) ) ;
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for ( const CAddress & addr : pto - > vAddrToSend )
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{
if ( ! pto - > addrKnown . contains ( addr . GetKey ( ) ) )
{
pto - > addrKnown . insert ( addr . GetKey ( ) ) ;
vAddr . push_back ( addr ) ;
// receiver rejects addr messages larger than 1000
if ( vAddr . size ( ) > = 1000 )
{
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : ADDR , vAddr ) ) ;
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vAddr . clear ( ) ;
}
}
}
pto - > vAddrToSend . clear ( ) ;
if ( ! vAddr . empty ( ) )
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : ADDR , vAddr ) ) ;
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// we only send the big addr message once
if ( pto - > vAddrToSend . capacity ( ) > 40 )
pto - > vAddrToSend . shrink_to_fit ( ) ;
}
// Start block sync
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if ( pindexBestHeader = = nullptr )
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pindexBestHeader = : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) ;
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bool fFetch = state . fPreferredDownload | | ( nPreferredDownload = = 0 & & ! pto - > fClient & & ! pto - > fOneShot ) ; // Download if this is a nice peer, or we have no nice peers and this one might do.
if ( ! state . fSyncStarted & & ! pto - > fClient & & ! fImporting & & ! fReindex ) {
// Only actively request headers from a single peer, unless we're close to today.
if ( ( nSyncStarted = = 0 & & fFetch ) | | pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) > GetAdjustedTime ( ) - 24 * 60 * 60 ) {
state . fSyncStarted = true ;
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state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = GetTimeMicros ( ) + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + HEADERS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_HEADER * ( GetAdjustedTime ( ) - pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) ) / ( consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing ) ;
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nSyncStarted + + ;
const CBlockIndex * pindexStart = pindexBestHeader ;
/* If possible, start at the block preceding the currently
best known header . This ensures that we always get a
non - empty list of headers back as long as the peer
is up - to - date . With a non - empty response , we can initialise
the peer ' s known best block . This wouldn ' t be possible
if we requested starting at pindexBestHeader and
got back an empty response . */
if ( pindexStart - > pprev )
pindexStart = pindexStart - > pprev ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " initial getheaders (%d) to peer=%d (startheight:%d) \n " , pindexStart - > nHeight , pto - > GetId ( ) , pto - > nStartingHeight ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETHEADERS , : : ChainActive ( ) . GetLocator ( pindexStart ) , uint256 ( ) ) ) ;
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}
}
//
// Try sending block announcements via headers
//
{
// If we have less than MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE in our
// list of block hashes we're relaying, and our peer wants
// headers announcements, then find the first header
// not yet known to our peer but would connect, and send.
// If no header would connect, or if we have too many
// blocks, or if the peer doesn't want headers, just
// add all to the inv queue.
LOCK ( pto - > cs_inventory ) ;
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std : : vector < CBlock > vHeaders ;
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bool fRevertToInv = ( ( ! state . fPreferHeaders & &
( ! state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs | | pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . size ( ) > 1 ) ) | |
pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . size ( ) > MAX_BLOCKS_TO_ANNOUNCE ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pBestIndex = nullptr ; // last header queued for delivery
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ProcessBlockAvailability ( pto - > GetId ( ) ) ; // ensure pindexBestKnownBlock is up-to-date
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if ( ! fRevertToInv ) {
bool fFoundStartingHeader = false ;
// Try to find first header that our peer doesn't have, and
// then send all headers past that one. If we come across any
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// headers that aren't on ::ChainActive(), give up.
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for ( const uint256 & hash : pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce ) {
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hash ) ;
assert ( pindex ) ;
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) [ pindex - > nHeight ] ! = pindex ) {
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// Bail out if we reorged away from this block
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
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if ( pBestIndex ! = nullptr & & pindex - > pprev ! = pBestIndex ) {
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// This means that the list of blocks to announce don't
// connect to each other.
// This shouldn't really be possible to hit during
// regular operation (because reorgs should take us to
// a chain that has some block not on the prior chain,
// which should be caught by the prior check), but one
// way this could happen is by using invalidateblock /
// reconsiderblock repeatedly on the tip, causing it to
// be added multiple times to vBlockHashesToAnnounce.
// Robustly deal with this rare situation by reverting
// to an inv.
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
pBestIndex = pindex ;
if ( fFoundStartingHeader ) {
// add this to the headers message
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
} else if ( PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) ) {
continue ; // keep looking for the first new block
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} else if ( pindex - > pprev = = nullptr | | PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex - > pprev ) ) {
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// Peer doesn't have this header but they do have the prior one.
// Start sending headers.
fFoundStartingHeader = true ;
vHeaders . push_back ( pindex - > GetBlockHeader ( ) ) ;
} else {
// Peer doesn't have this header or the prior one -- nothing will
// connect, so bail out.
fRevertToInv = true ;
break ;
}
}
}
if ( ! fRevertToInv & & ! vHeaders . empty ( ) ) {
if ( vHeaders . size ( ) = = 1 & & state . fPreferHeaderAndIDs ) {
// We only send up to 1 block as header-and-ids, as otherwise
// probably means we're doing an initial-ish-sync or they're slow
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s sending header-and-ids %s to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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int nSendFlags = state . fWantsCmpctWitness ? 0 : SERIALIZE_TRANSACTION_NO_WITNESS ;
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bool fGotBlockFromCache = false ;
{
LOCK ( cs_most_recent_block ) ;
if ( most_recent_block_hash = = pBestIndex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) {
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if ( state . fWantsCmpctWitness | | ! fWitnessesPresentInMostRecentCompactBlock )
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , * most_recent_compact_block ) ) ;
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else {
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( * most_recent_block , state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
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}
fGotBlockFromCache = true ;
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}
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}
if ( ! fGotBlockFromCache ) {
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CBlock block ;
bool ret = ReadBlockFromDisk ( block , pBestIndex , consensusParams ) ;
assert ( ret ) ;
CBlockHeaderAndShortTxIDs cmpctblock ( block , state . fWantsCmpctWitness ) ;
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( nSendFlags , NetMsgType : : CMPCTBLOCK , cmpctblock ) ) ;
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}
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex ;
} else if ( state . fPreferHeaders ) {
if ( vHeaders . size ( ) > 1 ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: %u headers, range (%s, %s), to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . size ( ) ,
vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
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vHeaders . back ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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} else {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: sending header %s to peer=%d \n " , __func__ ,
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vHeaders . front ( ) . GetHash ( ) . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : HEADERS , vHeaders ) ) ;
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state . pindexBestHeaderSent = pBestIndex ;
} else
fRevertToInv = true ;
}
if ( fRevertToInv ) {
// If falling back to using an inv, just try to inv the tip.
// The last entry in vBlockHashesToAnnounce was our tip at some point
// in the past.
if ( ! pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . empty ( ) ) {
const uint256 & hashToAnnounce = pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . back ( ) ;
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const CBlockIndex * pindex = LookupBlockIndex ( hashToAnnounce ) ;
assert ( pindex ) ;
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// Warn if we're announcing a block that is not on the main chain.
// This should be very rare and could be optimized out.
// Just log for now.
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if ( : : ChainActive ( ) [ pindex - > nHeight ] ! = pindex ) {
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Announcing block %s not on main chain (tip=%s) \n " ,
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hashToAnnounce . ToString ( ) , : : ChainActive ( ) . Tip ( ) - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ) ;
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}
// If the peer's chain has this block, don't inv it back.
if ( ! PeerHasHeader ( & state , pindex ) ) {
pto - > PushInventory ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , hashToAnnounce ) ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " %s: sending inv peer=%d hash=%s \n " , __func__ ,
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pto - > GetId ( ) , hashToAnnounce . ToString ( ) ) ;
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}
}
}
pto - > vBlockHashesToAnnounce . clear ( ) ;
}
//
// Message: inventory
//
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std : : vector < CInv > vInv ;
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{
LOCK ( pto - > cs_inventory ) ;
vInv . reserve ( std : : max < size_t > ( pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend . size ( ) , INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX ) ) ;
// Add blocks
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for ( const uint256 & hash : pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend ) {
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vInv . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK , hash ) ) ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
}
pto - > vInventoryBlockToSend . clear ( ) ;
// Check whether periodic sends should happen
bool fSendTrickle = pto - > fWhitelisted ;
if ( pto - > nNextInvSend < nNow ) {
fSendTrickle = true ;
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if ( pto - > fInbound ) {
pto - > nNextInvSend = connman - > PoissonNextSendInbound ( nNow , INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
} else {
// Use half the delay for outbound peers, as there is less privacy concern for them.
pto - > nNextInvSend = PoissonNextSend ( nNow , INVENTORY_BROADCAST_INTERVAL > > 1 ) ;
}
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}
// Time to send but the peer has requested we not relay transactions.
if ( fSendTrickle ) {
LOCK ( pto - > cs_filter ) ;
if ( ! pto - > fRelayTxes ) pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . clear ( ) ;
}
// Respond to BIP35 mempool requests
if ( fSendTrickle & & pto - > fSendMempool ) {
auto vtxinfo = mempool . infoAll ( ) ;
pto - > fSendMempool = false ;
CAmount filterrate = 0 ;
{
LOCK ( pto - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
filterrate = pto - > minFeeFilter ;
}
LOCK ( pto - > cs_filter ) ;
for ( const auto & txinfo : vtxinfo ) {
const uint256 & hash = txinfo . tx - > GetHash ( ) ;
CInv inv ( MSG_TX , hash ) ;
pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . erase ( hash ) ;
if ( filterrate ) {
if ( txinfo . feeRate . GetFeePerK ( ) < filterrate )
continue ;
}
if ( pto - > pfilter ) {
if ( ! pto - > pfilter - > IsRelevantAndUpdate ( * txinfo . tx ) ) continue ;
}
pto - > filterInventoryKnown . insert ( hash ) ;
vInv . push_back ( inv ) ;
if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
}
pto - > timeLastMempoolReq = GetTime ( ) ;
}
// Determine transactions to relay
if ( fSendTrickle ) {
// Produce a vector with all candidates for sending
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std : : vector < std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator > vInvTx ;
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vInvTx . reserve ( pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . size ( ) ) ;
for ( std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator it = pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . begin ( ) ; it ! = pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . end ( ) ; it + + ) {
vInvTx . push_back ( it ) ;
}
CAmount filterrate = 0 ;
{
LOCK ( pto - > cs_feeFilter ) ;
filterrate = pto - > minFeeFilter ;
}
// Topologically and fee-rate sort the inventory we send for privacy and priority reasons.
// A heap is used so that not all items need sorting if only a few are being sent.
CompareInvMempoolOrder compareInvMempoolOrder ( & mempool ) ;
std : : make_heap ( vInvTx . begin ( ) , vInvTx . end ( ) , compareInvMempoolOrder ) ;
// No reason to drain out at many times the network's capacity,
// especially since we have many peers and some will draw much shorter delays.
unsigned int nRelayedTransactions = 0 ;
LOCK ( pto - > cs_filter ) ;
while ( ! vInvTx . empty ( ) & & nRelayedTransactions < INVENTORY_BROADCAST_MAX ) {
// Fetch the top element from the heap
std : : pop_heap ( vInvTx . begin ( ) , vInvTx . end ( ) , compareInvMempoolOrder ) ;
std : : set < uint256 > : : iterator it = vInvTx . back ( ) ;
vInvTx . pop_back ( ) ;
uint256 hash = * it ;
// Remove it from the to-be-sent set
pto - > setInventoryTxToSend . erase ( it ) ;
// Check if not in the filter already
if ( pto - > filterInventoryKnown . contains ( hash ) ) {
continue ;
}
// Not in the mempool anymore? don't bother sending it.
auto txinfo = mempool . info ( hash ) ;
if ( ! txinfo . tx ) {
continue ;
}
if ( filterrate & & txinfo . feeRate . GetFeePerK ( ) < filterrate ) {
continue ;
}
if ( pto - > pfilter & & ! pto - > pfilter - > IsRelevantAndUpdate ( * txinfo . tx ) ) continue ;
// Send
vInv . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_TX , hash ) ) ;
nRelayedTransactions + + ;
{
// Expire old relay messages
while ( ! vRelayExpiration . empty ( ) & & vRelayExpiration . front ( ) . first < nNow )
{
mapRelay . erase ( vRelayExpiration . front ( ) . second ) ;
vRelayExpiration . pop_front ( ) ;
}
auto ret = mapRelay . insert ( std : : make_pair ( hash , std : : move ( txinfo . tx ) ) ) ;
if ( ret . second ) {
vRelayExpiration . push_back ( std : : make_pair ( nNow + 15 * 60 * 1000000 , ret . first ) ) ;
}
}
if ( vInv . size ( ) = = MAX_INV_SZ ) {
2017-07-06 19:53:52 +02:00
connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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vInv . clear ( ) ;
}
pto - > filterInventoryKnown . insert ( hash ) ;
}
}
}
if ( ! vInv . empty ( ) )
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : INV , vInv ) ) ;
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// Detect whether we're stalling
nNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
if ( state . nStallingSince & & state . nStallingSince < nNow - 1000000 * BLOCK_STALLING_TIMEOUT ) {
// Stalling only triggers when the block download window cannot move. During normal steady state,
// the download window should be much larger than the to-be-downloaded set of blocks, so disconnection
// should only happen during initial block download.
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Peer=%d is stalling block download, disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
// In case there is a block that has been in flight from this peer for 2 + 0.5 * N times the block interval
// (with N the number of peers from which we're downloading validated blocks), disconnect due to timeout.
// We compensate for other peers to prevent killing off peers due to our own downstream link
// being saturated. We only count validated in-flight blocks so peers can't advertise non-existing block hashes
// to unreasonably increase our timeout.
if ( state . vBlocksInFlight . size ( ) > 0 ) {
QueuedBlock & queuedBlock = state . vBlocksInFlight . front ( ) ;
int nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads = nPeersWithValidatedDownloads - ( state . nBlocksInFlightValidHeaders > 0 ) ;
if ( nNow > state . nDownloadingSince + consensusParams . nPowTargetSpacing * ( BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_BASE + BLOCK_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_PER_PEER * nOtherPeersWithValidatedDownloads ) ) {
2017-04-11 18:13:55 +02:00
LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading block %s from peer=%d, disconnecting \n " , queuedBlock . hash . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
}
}
2017-05-08 21:05:22 +02:00
// Check for headers sync timeouts
if ( state . fSyncStarted & & state . nHeadersSyncTimeout < std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ) {
// Detect whether this is a stalling initial-headers-sync peer
if ( pindexBestHeader - > GetBlockTime ( ) < = GetAdjustedTime ( ) - 24 * 60 * 60 ) {
if ( nNow > state . nHeadersSyncTimeout & & nSyncStarted = = 1 & & ( nPreferredDownload - state . fPreferredDownload > = 1 ) ) {
// Disconnect a (non-whitelisted) peer if it is our only sync peer,
// and we have others we could be using instead.
// Note: If all our peers are inbound, then we won't
// disconnect our sync peer for stalling; we have bigger
// problems if we can't get any outbound peers.
if ( ! pto - > fWhitelisted ) {
LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading headers from peer=%d, disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
pto - > fDisconnect = true ;
return true ;
} else {
LogPrintf ( " Timeout downloading headers from whitelisted peer=%d, not disconnecting \n " , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
// Reset the headers sync state so that we have a
// chance to try downloading from a different peer.
// Note: this will also result in at least one more
// getheaders message to be sent to
// this peer (eventually).
state . fSyncStarted = false ;
nSyncStarted - - ;
state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = 0 ;
}
}
} else {
// After we've caught up once, reset the timeout so we can't trigger
// disconnect later.
state . nHeadersSyncTimeout = std : : numeric_limits < int64_t > : : max ( ) ;
}
}
Permit disconnection of outbound peers on bad/slow chains
Currently we have no rotation of outbound peers. If an outbound peer
stops serving us blocks, or is on a consensus-incompatible chain with
less work than our tip (but otherwise valid headers), then we will never
disconnect that peer, even though that peer is using one of our 8
outbound connection slots. Because we rely on our outbound peers to
find an honest node in order to reach consensus, allowing an
incompatible peer to occupy one of those slots is undesirable,
particularly if it is possible for all such slots to be occupied by such
peers.
Protect against this by always checking to see if a peer's best known
block has less work than our tip, and if so, set a 20 minute timeout --
if the peer is still not known to have caught up to a chain with as much
work as ours after 20 minutes, then send a single getheaders message,
wait 2 more minutes, and if a better header hasn't been received by then,
disconnect that peer.
Note:
- we do not require that our peer sync to the same tip as ours, just an
equal or greater work tip. (Doing otherwise would risk partitioning the
network in the event of a chain split, and is also unnecessary.)
- we pick 4 of our outbound peers and do not subject them to this logic,
to be more conservative. We don't wish to permit temporary network
issues (or an attacker) to excessively disrupt network topology.
2017-10-12 19:55:43 +02:00
// Check that outbound peers have reasonable chains
// GetTime() is used by this anti-DoS logic so we can test this using mocktime
ConsiderEviction ( pto , GetTime ( ) ) ;
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//
// Message: getdata (blocks)
//
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std : : vector < CInv > vGetData ;
2017-10-14 06:48:00 +02:00
if ( ! pto - > fClient & & ( ( fFetch & & ! pto - > m_limited_node ) | | ! IsInitialBlockDownload ( ) ) & & state . nBlocksInFlight < MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER ) {
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std : : vector < const CBlockIndex * > vToDownload ;
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NodeId staller = - 1 ;
FindNextBlocksToDownload ( pto - > GetId ( ) , MAX_BLOCKS_IN_TRANSIT_PER_PEER - state . nBlocksInFlight , vToDownload , staller , consensusParams ) ;
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for ( const CBlockIndex * pindex : vToDownload ) {
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uint32_t nFetchFlags = GetFetchFlags ( pto ) ;
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vGetData . push_back ( CInv ( MSG_BLOCK | nFetchFlags , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) ) ) ;
2017-05-02 23:00:14 +02:00
MarkBlockAsInFlight ( pto - > GetId ( ) , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) , pindex ) ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting block %s (%d) peer=%d \n " , pindex - > GetBlockHash ( ) . ToString ( ) ,
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pindex - > nHeight , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
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}
if ( state . nBlocksInFlight = = 0 & & staller ! = - 1 ) {
if ( State ( staller ) - > nStallingSince = = 0 ) {
State ( staller ) - > nStallingSince = nNow ;
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LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Stall started peer=%d \n " , staller ) ;
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}
}
}
//
// Message: getdata (non-blocks)
//
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auto & tx_process_time = state . m_tx_download . m_tx_process_time ;
while ( ! tx_process_time . empty ( ) & & tx_process_time . begin ( ) - > first < = nNow & & state . m_tx_download . m_tx_in_flight . size ( ) < MAX_PEER_TX_IN_FLIGHT ) {
const uint256 & txid = tx_process_time . begin ( ) - > second ;
CInv inv ( MSG_TX | GetFetchFlags ( pto ) , txid ) ;
if ( ! AlreadyHave ( inv ) ) {
// If this transaction was last requested more than 1 minute ago,
// then request.
int64_t last_request_time = GetTxRequestTime ( inv . hash ) ;
if ( last_request_time < = nNow - GETDATA_TX_INTERVAL ) {
LogPrint ( BCLog : : NET , " Requesting %s peer=%d \n " , inv . ToString ( ) , pto - > GetId ( ) ) ;
vGetData . push_back ( inv ) ;
if ( vGetData . size ( ) > = MAX_GETDATA_SZ ) {
connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
vGetData . clear ( ) ;
}
UpdateTxRequestTime ( inv . hash , nNow ) ;
state . m_tx_download . m_tx_in_flight . insert ( inv . hash ) ;
} else {
// This transaction is in flight from someone else; queue
// up processing to happen after the download times out
// (with a slight delay for inbound peers, to prefer
// requests to outbound peers).
RequestTx ( & state , txid , nNow ) ;
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}
} else {
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// We have already seen this transaction, no need to download.
state . m_tx_download . m_tx_announced . erase ( inv . hash ) ;
state . m_tx_download . m_tx_in_flight . erase ( inv . hash ) ;
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}
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tx_process_time . erase ( tx_process_time . begin ( ) ) ;
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}
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if ( ! vGetData . empty ( ) )
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : GETDATA , vGetData ) ) ;
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//
// Message: feefilter
//
// We don't want white listed peers to filter txs to us if we have -whitelistforcerelay
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if ( pto - > nVersion > = FEEFILTER_VERSION & & gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -feefilter " , DEFAULT_FEEFILTER ) & &
! ( pto - > fWhitelisted & & gArgs . GetBoolArg ( " -whitelistforcerelay " , DEFAULT_WHITELISTFORCERELAY ) ) ) {
CAmount currentFilter = mempool . GetMinFee ( gArgs . GetArg ( " -maxmempool " , DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE ) * 1000000 ) . GetFeePerK ( ) ;
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int64_t timeNow = GetTimeMicros ( ) ;
if ( timeNow > pto - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter ) {
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static CFeeRate default_feerate ( DEFAULT_MIN_RELAY_TX_FEE ) ;
static FeeFilterRounder filterRounder ( default_feerate ) ;
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CAmount filterToSend = filterRounder . round ( currentFilter ) ;
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// We always have a fee filter of at least minRelayTxFee
filterToSend = std : : max ( filterToSend , : : minRelayTxFee . GetFeePerK ( ) ) ;
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if ( filterToSend ! = pto - > lastSentFeeFilter ) {
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connman - > PushMessage ( pto , msgMaker . Make ( NetMsgType : : FEEFILTER , filterToSend ) ) ;
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pto - > lastSentFeeFilter = filterToSend ;
}
pto - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter = PoissonNextSend ( timeNow , AVG_FEEFILTER_BROADCAST_INTERVAL ) ;
}
// If the fee filter has changed substantially and it's still more than MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY
// until scheduled broadcast, then move the broadcast to within MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY.
else if ( timeNow + MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY * 1000000 < pto - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter & &
( currentFilter < 3 * pto - > lastSentFeeFilter / 4 | | currentFilter > 4 * pto - > lastSentFeeFilter / 3 ) ) {
pto - > nextSendTimeFeeFilter = timeNow + GetRandInt ( MAX_FEEFILTER_CHANGE_DELAY ) * 1000000 ;
}
}
}
return true ;
}
class CNetProcessingCleanup
{
public :
CNetProcessingCleanup ( ) { }
~ CNetProcessingCleanup ( ) {
// orphan transactions
mapOrphanTransactions . clear ( ) ;
mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev . clear ( ) ;
}
} instance_of_cnetprocessingcleanup ;