This PULL reworks new (post-0.6.*) features of the
gettransaction/getblock RPC calls as follows:
It removes the 'decompositions' object argument from getblock,
replacing it just a list of transaction hashes; equivalent
(I believe) of passing the {"tx":"hash"} decomposition.
It replaces the 'decompositions' object argument of
gettransaction with a boolean flag; if true, returns
the same stuff that the {"script":"obj"} decomposition
would return (txins/txouts as hex, disassembled, and bitcoin
addresses).
It adds a "rawtx" field to the output of gettransaction,
that is the entire transaction serialized and hex-encoded.
It removes the "size" field from gettransaction, since the size
is trivial to compute from the "rawtx" field (either take the
length after hex-decoding, or just compute it as hex-length/2).
If the top-level object is an array, it is assumed to be an array of
JSON-RPC requests. An array is returned, containing one response (error or
not) per request, in the order submitted.
In a slight change in semantics, batched requests -always- return
an HTTP 200 OK status, even ones full of invalid or incorrect requests.
- remove "#include <QString>" as this is included in the header
- add some missing plural forms that can be translated
- change "yours" into "own address", which is easier to understand and translate in that context
- cleanup translatable strings to not include HTML or unneeded chars (e.g. ":")
- resize TransactionDescDialog a little (remove unwanted line-breaks with non english translations)
Bitcoin will not make an outbound connection to a network group
(/16 for IPv4) that it is already connected to. This means that
if an attacker wants good odds of capturing all a nodes outbound
connections he must have hosts on a a large number of distinct
groups.
Previously both inbound and outbound connections were used to
feed this exclusion. The use of inbound connections, which can be
controlled by the attacker, actually has the potential of making
sibyl attacks _easier_: An attacker can start up hosts in groups
which house many honest nodes and make outbound connections to
the victim to exclude big swaths of honest nodes. Because the
attacker chooses to make the outbound connection he can always
beat out honest nodes for the consumption of inbound slots.
At _best_ the old behavior increases attacker costs by a single
group (e.g. one distinct group to use to fill up all your inbound
slots), but at worst it allows the attacker to select whole
networks you won't connect to.
This commit makes the nodes use only outbound links to exclude
network groups for outbound connections. Fancier things could
be done, like weaker exclusion for inbound groups... but
simplicity is good and I don't believe more complexity is
currently needed.
Useful for developers who need to refer to futher back in debug.log history, but who don't want to
enable the -debug option and all the verbosity that comes with that.
- display as "language - country (locale name)", when locale name consists of 2 parts
- display as "language (locale name)", when locale name consists of 1 part
