There are a few too many edge-cases here to make this a scripted diff.
The following commits will move a few functions into PeerLogicValidation, where
the local connman instance can be used. This change prepares for that usage.
3fb81a8 Use list initialization (C++11) for maps/vectors instead of boost::assign::map_list_of/list_of (practicalswift)
Tree-SHA512: 63a9ac9ec5799472943dce1cd92a4b14e7f1fe12758a5fc4b1efceaf2c85a4ba71dad5ccc50813527f18b192e7714c076e2478ecd6ca0d452b24e88416f872f7
This adds the listening address on which incoming connections were received to the
CNode and CNodeStats structures.
The address is reported in `getpeerinfo`.
This can be useful for distinguishing connections received on different listening ports
(e.g. when using a different listening port for Tor hidden service connections)
or different networks.
This is another violation of the one definition rule, as the type
for mapOrphanTransactionsByPrev did not match the one in
net_processing.cpp anymore. As it now depends on a custom Iterator,
it seems too much hassle to correctly expose it to the tests.
Instead, this commit just removes the one test it was referenced in.
The changes here are dense and subtle, but hopefully all is more explicit
than before.
- CConnman is now in charge of sending data rather than the nodes themselves.
This is necessary because many decisions need to be made with all nodes in
mind, and a model that requires the nodes calling up to their manager quickly
turns to spaghetti.
- The per-node-serializer (ssSend) has been replaced with a (quasi-)const
send-version. Since the send version for serialization can only change once
per connection, we now explicitly tag messages with INIT_PROTO_VERSION if
they are sent before the handshake. With this done, there's no need to lock
for access to nSendVersion.
Also, a new stream is used for each message, so there's no need to lock
during the serialization process.
- This takes care of accounting for optimistic sends, so the
nOptimisticBytesWritten hack can be removed.
- -dropmessagestest and -fuzzmessagestest have not been preserved, as I suspect
they haven't been used in years.
CConnman then passes the current best height into CNode at creation time.
This way CConnman/CNode have no dependency on main for height, and the signals
only move in one direction.
This also helps to prevent identity leakage a tiny bit. Before this change, an
attacker could theoretically make 2 connections on different interfaces. They
would connect fully on one, and only establish the initial connection on the
other. Once they receive a new block, they would relay it to your first
connection, and immediately commence the version handshake on the second. Since
the new block height is reflected immediately, they could attempt to learn
whether the two connections were correlated.
This is, of course, incredibly unlikely to work due to the small timings
involved and receipt from other senders. But it doesn't hurt to lock-in
nBestHeight at the time of connection, rather than letting the remote choose
the time.
54326a6 Increase maximum orphan size to 100,000 bytes. (Gregory Maxwell)
8c99d1b Treat orphans as implicit inv for parents, discard when parents rejected. (Gregory Maxwell)
11cc143 Adds an expiration time for orphan tx. (Gregory Maxwell)
db0ffe8 This eliminates the primary leak that causes the orphan map to always grow to its maximum size. (Gregory Maxwell)
1b0bcc5 Track orphan by prev COutPoint rather than prev hash (Pieter Wuille)
We used to have a trickle node, a node which was chosen in each iteration of
the send loop that was privileged and allowed to send out queued up non-time
critical messages. Since the removal of the fixed sleeps in the network code,
this resulted in fast and attackable treatment of such broadcasts.
This pull request changes the 3 remaining trickle use cases by random delays:
* Local address broadcast (while also removing the the wiping of the seen filter)
* Address relay
* Inv relay (for transactions; blocks are always relayed immediately)
The code is based on older commits by Patrick Strateman.
Prevent denial-of-service attacks by banning
peers that send us invalid orphan transactions
and only storing orphan transactions given to
us by a peer while the peer is connected.
